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This book is an empirical study on
the relationship between the inter-
nal liberalisation of trade and the
behaviour of wages in the European
Community. On the basis of the
standard theory of international
trade, we develop a model indica-
ting that geographically discrimina-
tory liberalisation of trade schemes
need not necessarily result in a con-
vergence of factor prices. Under
some circumstances, wages may di-
verge after a customs union arran-
gement is set up. In the empirical
part of the book, quantitative asses-
ments are produced of the relation-
ship between the establishment of
the customs union of the EC (1958-
1970) and the behaviour of wages.
In addition, we study the possible
impact of the internal market pro-
gramme on wages (1985-1992). We
conclude that the establishment of ~—
the customs union had a much
more profound effect than the pro-
gramme to complete the internal
ket mav be expected to gei
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Contrary to the USA, where the supposed wage effects of the NAFTA treaty have given
rise to a great deal of controversy, the wage effects of the European integration process
have hardly attracted any attention in the (empirical) literature. Although early discus-
sions of European economic integration were in addition to the question of the welfare
effects of trade liberalisation also concerned with the problem of a European movement
towards factor price equalisation, the behaviour of wages, and the related issue of la-
bour mobility, has ran into an increasing neglect by students of the integration process.
In so far as factor prices have been the subject of study, there are, broadly speaking,
two views. Ffrsf/y, there are those who believe that factor prices tend to converge as a
result of the liberalisation of trade in the Community (see, for instance, Meyer and Will-
gerodt (1954), Fisher (1966)). This view, which has been the dominant school of thought,
was based on predictions derived from the (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) theory of
international trade. According to the conventional wisdom of that body of economics,
there are at least two factors producing a movement in the direction of equalised factor
prices (convergence of factor prices). Firsf/y, there is of course the liberalisation of factor
movements after the Community had been set up. Factors of production, it was argued,
would always move in the direction of countries where the returns to their employment
would be higher than in their home region. This would tend to eliminate the differences
in scarcity of factors and would thus lead to an equalisation of factor prices. Second/y,
and more importantly, if countries specialise according to their comparative advantage,
there may be factor price equalisation through free commodity trade. Thus it is believed
that trade tends to be a perfect substitute for factor migration.
The dominance of the factor price equalisation school has had its counterpart in the
policy sphere. Indeed, it can hardly be denied that the distributional consequences of
the integration process had a low priority in the past three decades. However, there is
some evidence that things are changing now and that politicians and EC officials be-
come increasingly aware of the distributional consequences of the completion of the in-
ternal market in Europe in 1992.
According to the second opinion, factor prices will tend to diverge rather than con-
verge as a consequence of trade liberalisation. The reasons for this is that the conditions
for factor price equalisation may fail to be fulfilled in practice. Trade may be impeded2 C/iapfer î
by the collusive practices of firms, by import duties (on third country goods) and trans-
portation costs. Technology may be monopolised by large firms. Those are essentially
the factors highlighted by the divergence school. Their arguments go back to the work
of, among others, Myrdal (1956, 1957)', who pointed out that a system marked by large
initial disparities, certain rigidities and the absence of countervailing government poli-
cies, tends towards progressively unbalanced development, a process labelled "cumula-
tive causation". Technological elements from the spatial variant of the life-cycle theory
have revealed the tendency of advanced countries to perpetuate the gap between them
and backward nations by selecting new products with high value added as soon as they
emerge, whilst at the same time pushing away products as soon as their value added de-
clines and no longer can sustain high wages.
1.2 The problem of this study
Whatever the correct view may be, it is interesting to observe an increasing awareness
of the social consequences of the formation of the EC and its internal market. It is in the
light of this revived interest for the social consequences of trade liberalisation that this
study should be seen, /fs aim is f/ie ana/ysis of fne interrelationship between the behaviour of
/actor prices and the trade /ibera/isation process in the European Community. More speci/ïca/iy,
the study /ocuses on the impact of the economic integration process on wages, in other iwords, we
sha// try to answer the question in what direction wages might change in response to the EC's
economic integration scheme. Thus, we shall primarily be concerned with the behaviour of
one possible factor price and ignore any effect on other factor prices than wages. Apart
from a rather narrow definition of factor prices, we shall also interpret the term "econo-
mic integration" in a narrow sense, in that we shall confine the analysis to the wage ef-
fects of liberalisation of commodity trade in customs unions and free trade areas. Thus,
we shall ignore the effects of all integration attempts beyond the stage of customs
unions (i.e., the effects of liberalisation of factor movements and the integration of
economic and monetary policies).
The study of factor prices in a setting of international economic integration is impor-
tant for several reasons. The most obvious one is that the inclusion of international ele-
ments is a dimension that has been neglected by most previous (empirical) analyses,
which have mostly been concerned with the study of factor prices or wage structures
within a single country. Thus, wage structure analyses have almost exclusively been
concerned with the testing of labour economics theories and have mostly ignored test-
ing the implications of international integration and international trade theory. There-
fore, our attempt to asses the distributional effects of the formation of the EC at the
same time encompasses a test of some of the theorems of the theory of international in-
tegration and international trade. Secondly, the present work hopes to contribute to the
increasing prominence of labour-market issues in European integration research now
that EC countries are well on their way to complete the internal market That develop-
ment will probably shift away the orientation of research from the national labour mar-
kets to the European labour market. Moreover, the political interest in "social" Europe
has got an impetus as a result of the attempts to establish the internal market. It is obvi-
ous, even to the most casual observer, that the further liberalisation of commodity trade
in Europe will have certain distributional consequences. In addition, it is conceivable
' See also Giersch (1949).Jnfroducfion
that the orientation of trade unions and employer organizations, which has up till now
almost completely been a national one, will shift ever more towards a European focus,
and that in the near future European bargaining processes may well become a reality.
1.3 Economic integration and international trade theory
The lack of interest in distributional consequences of trade liberalisation is paradoxical,
since the modern theory of international trade was primarily developed to provide a
more conclusive answer to the question of the distributional consequences of internatio-
nal trade and trade policy than classical trade theory had been able to give. Classical
trade theory, with its emphasis on the labour theory of value, was ill-equipped to shed
some light on this question. The publication of two seminal works by Swedish econo-
mists Heckscher and Ohlin at the beginning of this century, however, turned away eco-
nomists' attention from the one-factor Ricardian world and greatly contributed to our
knowledge of the distributional consequences of international trade and international
trade policies.
The theory of Heckscher and Ohlin predicts a tendency towards international equali-
sation of factor returns under free trade. The most remarkable aspect of this result is
due to the fact that the movement towards equalisation is caused by trade in commodi-
ties and that international factor mobility is therefore not required. Commodity move-
ments, in Mundell's words, substitute for factor trade. Samuelson, in a formalisation of
Heckscher-Ohlin theory, succeeded in the exact proof that under free trade, factor prices
must necessarily be equalised, given, of course, that Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions hold.
Heckscher-Ohlin theory has been the dominant international trade theory paradigm
for several decades. The theory of international economic integration, whose first and
most important occupation has been with commodity trade, has always tended to rely
heavily on insights from trade theory. Not surprisingly then, it has emphasised the for-
ces which lead to a convergence of factor prices. As a result, the above mentioned lack
of interest in income distribution issues and in the effects of economic integration might
partly be explained by Heckscher-Ohlin dominance, with its emphasis on factor price
equalising tendencies. Most experts on economic integration believed that factor price
differentials between countries would automatically disappear when trade between
these countries is liberalised. Indeed, under a variety of circumstances, the Heckscher-
Ohlin trade model predicts that factor prices will be equalised under free traded
Closely linked up to the development of Heckscher-Ohlin theory is a result called the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. This theorem, which deals with the income distribution
consequences of commodity price changes, predicts that the factor used intensively in
the production of a certain commodity will gain in real terms if the relative price of that
commodity increases, whereas the non-intensive factor will loose in real terms, and vice
cersa.
It would appear then, that Heckscher-Ohlin theory has put heavy emphasis on forces
leading to a convergence of factor prices. Yet other branches of the literature, which
have departed from the standard (restrictive) Heckscher-Ohlin trade model assumpt-
ions, have found numerous reasons for the persistence of factor price differentials. In
* The notion of factor price equalisation being a credible outcome of an integration process
strongly persists, even in the most modern treatments of the theory of economic integration. The
reader compare, for instance, Molle (1990).4 Oiaprer I
this respect two departures capable of explaining intersectoral factor price differentials
between countries are worthy of mentioning. According to the /irsf, intra-sectoral inter-
national differences in production functions could lead to internationally differentiated
factor prices.^ For one thing, countries using different production technologies will only
by coincidence have identical factor prices. In addition to that, differences in production
technology have been shown to reverse the substitution relationship between commo-
dity and factor trade into a complementary relationship, i.e., increases in commodity
trade tend to go hand in hand with increases in factor movements. For the other thing,
differences in elasticities of substitution may result in factor intensity reversals. The lat-
ter will in turn break down the one-to-one relationship between factor prices and com-
modity prices, a relationship which is crucial for the proof of factor price equalisation.
A second departure from the Heckscher-Ohlin model was formed by the possibility of
imperfect intersectoral factor mobility. The implication of the introduction of imperfect
intersectoral factor mobility is that factors will reallocate only as the returns exceed the
costs. The consequence is that factor-price differentials will persist in the long-run. That
possibility becomes more plausible in the extreme case of firm- of sector-specific capital.
In such circumstances, factor prices are most unlikely to equalise, unless labour becomes
highly mobile among countries. However, that labour would become highly mobile na-
tionally as well as internationally is not very probable.
The distributional consequences of this imperfect intersectoral factor mobility are
completely different from the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Perfect mobili-
ty of labour implies that there will be no intersectoral wage differentials, and hence
wages in all industries will react identically to any change in output prices. If labour is
imperfectly mobile, that may no longer be true. In other words, the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem breaks down. If the price of a certain sector's output rises -for instance because
a levy is imposed on it-, wages may rise more in that particular sector than in others. If
one assumes complete intersectoral labour immobility, wages in other sectors may not
even rise at all. The interests of workers in different industries are then likely to di-
verge. Likewise, an increase in the capital stock of a certain industry may increase the
wages in that industry more than in other industries. Similar conclusions apply to the
effects of technological progress, wages rising relatively more in the industry which ad-
vances technically.
The two departures from Heckscher-Ohlin theory discussed above, have remained
largely within the confines of the general equilibrium standard trade model. Recently,
another element has been added to the development of international trade theory by the
emergence of the so-called "new" trade theories, which put a heavy emphasis on the
influence of imperfect competition (see for an excellent review Helpman and Krugman
(1985)). Although much theoretical work in this field is still on its way, some tentative
conclusions may, however, be drawn from this branch of theory. Ffrsf, the introduction
of exfemfl/ economies of scale may be inconsistent with factor price equalisation, but it
need not interfere with the validity of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem provided "there
* Differences in production functions manifest themselves, among others, in different values
for the elasticities of substitution. High substitution elasticities will limit the extent of wage in-
creases, for production will be immediately rationalised as soon as wages are rising, for instance
by a change in the factor proportions. With a low elasticity of substitution, on the contrary,
there is but little chance of substituting capital for labour, so that wage increases do not necessa-
rily entail a serious drop in the demand for labour./«froducfion
are not too much economies of scale". Second, the introduction of mferna/ economies of
scale, while being inconsistent with perfect competition on commodity markets, is not
necessarily inconsistent with factor price equalisation and with the Stolper-Samuelson
results (see Batra (1973), ch. 11). For factor price equalisation to hold, all that is neces-
sary is the condition of identical technology in production. The Stolper-Samuelson result
is in principle unaffected, too. Third and finally, the implications of imperfections on
factor markets have hardly played any role whatsoever in the trade literature.
1.4 Outline of the study •
The point of departure of this study is based on the standard model of international
trade theory (for "classic" discussions of this model, see Jones (19965) and Woodland
(1982)). As we saw above, that body of economics has produced valuable insights into
issues of distributional nature. The study begins with a (selective) survey of these in-
sights in Chapter 2. The controversies regarding the factor price equalisation theorem
will be reviewed in that chapter. The discussion of this model is useful, since the factor
price equalisation theorem has either been readily applied to the EC by many authors,
or has at least considered to describe effectively the tendencies in factor prices that
might be expected after countries would join up in an economic integration scheme. We
shall give a selective and predominantly chronological review of the vast number of
publications that have dealt with factor price equalisation. In this respect, we shall pri-
marily emphasise the contributions which were initiated by Samuelson's (1948, 1953)
treatment of the topic. Attention is therefore focused on rather technical aspects of the
debate, such as the question of invertibility of cost functions and the issue of dimensio-
nality. It will turn out that the assumptions of the factor price equalisation model are
very restrictive indeed, and a full equalisation of factor prices might be an unrealistic
prediction. Hence, the best one can hope for probably is a fendenn/ in the direction of
factor price equalisation.
Chapter 2 also surveys some extensions of the basic factor price equalisation model.
Two extensions will pass in review, notably the Stolper-Samuelson result (both in even
and odd dimensions) and the standard specific factors model. Obviously, the standard
factor price equalisation model has been extended in a great many more directions than
the ones mentioned here. There are, however, two main reasons to confine the discus-
sion to the topics mentioned. For one thing, a complete discussion of all conceivable ex-
tensions is prohibited for reasons of space. For the other, the extensions that we discuss
will prove useful for a full comprehension of our own model that is the topic of
Chapter 5.
Chapter 3 is devoted to a study of the temporal behaviour of wages in the most im-
portant founding members of the European Community. Using some crude data mate-
rial pertaining to wage behaviour in NACE 2-digit industries since the 1960s, it will be
shown that gross hourly wages, hourly labour costs and labour costs per manyear all
tended to converge considerably when wages are converted with the aid of the purcha-
sing power parity exchange rate. However, when wages are converted with the aid of
the current exchange rate, this tendency is much less clear. A comparison of the EC and
EFTA wage experiences will reveal that EFTA countries' wages also converged quite
considerably.
Chapter 4 will elaborate upon some regularities that were found in the empirical lite-
rature. Most of the studies discussed in that chapter have one thing in common, which
is their inability to capture the effects of an economic integration scheme. As far as theirOwpter 1
have been attempts to empirically measure the effects of economic integration on factor
prices, these have been very ad /IOC, if not artificial. As a result, the few studies that have
tried to incorporate the effects of integration, are not based on optimising behaviour on
the part of consumers and producers. This is serious shortcoming of the literature, since
the factor price equalisation theorem and the related Stolper-Samuelson theorem are and
have always been propositions concerning a general equilibrium economy.
In Chapter 5 we develop an empirically implementable model capable of predicting
the wage effects of economic integration. The formulation of the model relies heavily on
the duality results of international trade theory (cf. Woodland, 1982). Contrary to most
existing empirical models in the field, this model does reflect optimising behaviour of
both consumers and producers. Following some suggestions in the literature, the distri-
butional effects are brought into the model through the use of both final and interme-
diate products, which may either be produced at home, in partner countries or in non-
partner countries. Another characteristic of the model is its assumption of complete
intersectoral factor immobility in the short-run. It turns out, that the effects of geogra-
phically discriminating tariff liberalisation schemes may be rather ambiguous, indeed.
Factors influencing the outcome are partial elasticities of factor substitution, factor en-
dowments and the change of effective protection rates. The long-run version of the
model resembles a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model with intermediate products.
In Chapter 6 the parameters of the model will be estimated using data from the Nat-
ional Accounts Statistics. The dual formulation of our theoretical model requires the est-
imation of cost functions, for which we shall use a translog functional form. These cost
functions are estimated for 13 industrial sectors in the five main founding countries of
the EC. The cost functions allow us to calculate Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution,
which we shall need in Chapter 7 for our simulations of the effects of economic integra-
tion.
Chapter 7 reports the results of two simulation experiments. Firsf of all, we shall dis-
cuss the wage effects of the customs union's anti-monde, i.e., we try to obtain estimates
of wage changes that might occur if the customs union would be undone in 1970 and if
the EC countries would re-implement the pre-customs union tariff rates. Second/y, we
shall analyze the potential wage responses to the immediate implementation of the
internal market programme in 1985. Needless to say, a comparison of the results of both
simulation experiments allows us to infer which of these two integration attempts
produced the most significant wage effects. In this respect, it is first of all found that the
wage effects of the customs union were considerable in that the creation of the customs
union seems to have resulted in a substantial amount of wage convergence. Secondly,
we find that the expected wage effects of the completion of the internal market are
negligible. Thus, a good deal of integration had already followed the implementation of
the customs union. Chapter 8, finally summarises the main statement of the thesis.
tor ICHAPTER
FACTOR PRICES IN THE TRADITIONAL
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
2.1 Introduction
In the literature on economic integration, the factor price consequences of free trade
areas and customs unions have always been discussed with the aid of the theory of
international trade. More specifically, the integration literature has always either expli-
citly or implicitly assumed that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson results on factor price
equalisation are directly applicable to most integration schemes. Therefore, a discussion
of the basic factor price equalisation model, as well as some important departures from
this model, could prove to be a useful exercise.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, we shall discuss the standard factor
price equalisation model as it has been put forward in the literature. Second, one exten-
sion and one departure from the basic assumptions of the the standard model, i>iz. the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the specific-factor model, will be discussed at the end
of this chapter. Although the standard model has been modified in a variety of other
directions^, we shall confine the exposition to those elements which are useful for a full
comprehension of our own model that will be the topic of Chapter 5.
Until fairly recently most of the international trade literature was concerned with the
possibility of factor price equalisation within the framework of the 2x2 model. However,
in recent years attention has shifted to more general models of n factors and m commo-
dities. The results of these models show that the conditions for factor price equalisation
are very restrictive indeed. This has provoked two types of comments on the relevance
of factor price equalisation theory. Haberler (1961, p. 37), for instance, expressed the
view that "we must thus conclude that Lerner-Samuelson theory, though formally cor-
rect, rests on such restrictive and unrealistic assumptions that it can hardly be regarded
as a valuable contribution to economic theory." In the same vein, Caves (1960, p. 92)
evaluated the whole factor price equalisation controversy as "arid" and "an extreme
example of inoperational theorizing". Chipman (1965, p. 479) on the other hand, believes
' For the introduction of elements of imperfect competition, see Helpman and Krugman
(1985).8 Chapter 2
that it "represents probably the most complex and impressive theoretical structure that
has yet been developed in economic thought".
What reasons are there for this diversity in views? To answer this question, we start
with an introduction outlining the basic structure of Heckscher and Ohlin's arguments
in section 2.2. That brings us to Samuelson's formal arguments for factor price equalisa-
tion and the theoretical contributions to which his analysis gave rise (section 2.3).
Samuelson's contributions to the subject have almost completely set the tone of the
debate. Many papers following his analysis have tended to focus on the importance of
factor intensity reversals and the related issue of (global) invertibility of systems of cost
functions. It appears that, although there are some flaws in Samuelson's first papers on
the subject, his most important conclusions have stood up against criticism. Section 2.4
discusses some alternative treatments of the theorem which have surfaced in the litera-
ture more or less independently of Samuelson's papers. Section 2.5 is concerned with
the issue of dimensionality, which has dominated a good deal of the theoretical litera-
ture on the subject. Section 2.6 discusses the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
which is a comparative-static extension of the factor price equalisation theorem. In
section 2.7, finally, we investigate the role of inter-sectoral factor mobility, and outline
the consequences of factor specificity. The concluding remarks follow in section 2.8.
2.2 Heckscher and Ohlin
The factor price equalisation theorem is due to the work of Heckscher (1919). Contrary
to many classical analyses, Heckscher's major purpose was to see how international
trade works out on the (functional) distribution of income within trading nations. Due
to its assumption of only one factor of production, classical trade theory was ill-
equipped to provide a clear-cut answer to this question. Therefore, Heckscher extended
the number of factors to three, i>/z. land, labour and capital. Another departure from
classical trade theory was constituted by the assumption of identical techniques in use
in the production process. Implicitly, Heckscher also assumed fixed coefficient produc-
tion functions (see Mackscheidt (1967), p. 13). Also implicit was the assumption of iden-
tical preference structures in the trading countries. The remaining assumptions, how-
ever, were all in line with classical trade theory (e.g., complete internal mobility of pro-
duction factors, and complete international immobility).
On the basis of these assumptions, Heckscher advanced two main theorems of inter-
national trade. The /ïrsf maintained that if factor prices would be identical international-
ly, then goods should be produced with the same cost conditions everywhere. But this
equality of production costs cannot give rise to international trade. Therefore differences
in costs should arise from different distributions of production factors over the countries
involved in trade. However, this conclusion strongly rests on the condition that factor
intensities in the production of any good are unique, that is, factor intensities should
differ from commodity to commodity. This is a crucial condition, because without it, no
differences in comparative advantage would exist, whatever the endowments of coun-
tries with factors of production.
Since Heckscher did not elaborate upon this condition, his analysis of the effects of
foreign trade on the behaviour of factor prices was to remain a rudimentary analysis, as
we shall see soon. However, as countries will specialise in the production of commodi-
ties that make an intensive use of the abundant factor, the opening up of trade will tend
to cause an equalisation of factor prices, the second main theorem, since the demand for
the abundant factor increases at the expense of the demand for the scarce factor. Hence,Factor prices m Me f/ieory 0/ m/enjafiowa/ frade
after the adjustment process is complete, the scarce factor will become unemployed.
Allowing international factor migration would cause the scarce factor to move abroad,
so "when supply reactions are taken into account, foreign trade tends to increase the
relative differences in the supply of factors of production in different countries" (Heck-
scher (1949), p. 293).
Ohlin, in his seminal work "/nferre^iono/ and /nferna^ona/ Trade" extended and shar-
pened Heckscher's analysis. Although he agrees that factor endowments are the most
prominent determinant of international trade, he also discusses other determinants, such
as the influence of demand structures and mass production. According to Ohlin, inter-
national trade results from differences in prices, and these in turn depend on differences
in demand and supply between regions. Demand for goods is determined by consumer
preferences, whereas supply depends on the supply of factors of production and the
techniques used in production. Here we see the three basic determinants that are tradi-
tionally distinguished in international trade theory. Since Ohlin assumed international
equality of preference structures and absence of differences in techniques, he was able
to reduce the causes of trade to factor endowments.^
As to the feedback of international trade on factor prices, Ohlin argued that internat-
ional trade would merely /end to equalise factor prices internationally. Due to the exis-
tence of transport costs and other barriers to international trade, he did not believe in a
complete equalisation of factor prices. But that is, as Samuelson pointed out, posing the
wrong question, since the question is not whether imperfect mobility of goods will lead
to equalisation of factor prices, but whether perfect mobility is capable of doing so, that
is, whether full equalisation of commodity prices also results in complete equalisation of
factor prices.
Ohlin's analysis did not stop with the arguments paraphrased above. In fact Ohlin's
discussion of factor price equalisation is surrounded by so many qualifications, that "the
logic and the consequences of his arguments escaped general notice" (Chipman (1966),
p. 19). Although the various extensions made his analysis rather complex, we mention
four other factors which he also explicitly considered.
F/rsf/y, Ohlin paid explicit attention to mass-production, or what we would call eco-
nomies of scale to day. In this respect, he concluded that these scale effects may both in-
crease as well as decrease the possibility of factor price equalisation. The possibilities in-
crease in the case scale effects tend to be complementary to comparative advantage con-
veyed by factor proportions. This means that when as a result of economies of scale the
demand for the abundant factor increases, this will be an independent force contributing
to factor price equalisation. On the other hand, whenever enterprises experiencing scale
economies choose their location in countries where the most intensively used factor is
not relatively abundant, factor prices might just as well diverge, because the demand for
the relatively scarce factor increases in this case.
A second complicating factor Ohlin has introduced in his analysis of the feedback of
trade on factor prices concerns the reversal of factor intensities, although there are
reasons to believe that he did not understand the serious consequences of this point.
Production functions with factor intensity reversals (FIRs) imply that factor intensities
change in such a direction after a certain change in factor prices, that, for example, a
labour-intensive commodity turns into a capital-intensive commodity. Ohlin believed
Thus, contrary to what some believe, factor proportions theory is only a special case of Oh-
lin's theory.10
that FIRs are more likely in the case factors are close substitutes for one another.^ How-
ever, Ohlin considered FIRs explicitly as exception to the rule (Ohlin (1933), p. 100). In
Heckscher's analysis, the problem of FIRs did not pose itself since he assumed fixed
coefficients in production.
A //nrd direction in which Ohlin extended his basic model was the introduction of dif-
ferent qualities of factors of production. International comparisons of factors of produc-
tion reveal (some) differences in the quality of these factors. For instance, labour may be
subdivided in skilled and unskilled labour, and capital can be split up according to the
level of associated risk. Ohlin proposed to solve the problem of different qualities of
factors in two ways. Firsf/y, he proposed to distinguish several groups of factors which
would more or less be available in all countries. This procedure would entail that some
factors of production would still not be comparable among countries, with all the ob-
vious consequences for his factor price equalisation theorem. A second procedure would
be to desaggregate factors in a very detailed way. However, this would entail the risk
that certain factors would simply not be available in some countries, and would there-
fore also imply the impossibility of factor price equalisation in a number of instances.
A /burtft extension of the basic model concerns the possibility of a variable factor
supply. Factor supply is of course sensitive to (changes in) its remuneration. Because
trade increases the price of the relatively abundant factor, the latter's price will rise, and
this will, depending upon the value of the relevant supply elasticity, lead to an even
"greater unevenness internationally as to the factor equipment, and a strengthening of
the tendency to trade" (Ohlin (1933), p. 119).
2.3 Samuelson's contributions
In his celebrated (1949) contribution, as well as in the articles following this path-
breaking work, Samuelson proves that if commodity trade is able to equalise commo-
dity prices, this would imply that factor prices are also equalised, given the usual as-
sumptions as regards production technology, factor endowments and tastes. The beauty
of his analysis is due to the fact that he was able to show that the factor price equalisa-
tion model is a very general model, nof depending on the validity of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem. In essence, his proof of factor price equalisation rests on showing that a
system of two equations (for prices) has a unique solution. Samuelson in essence proved
that under a certain set of assumptions, we are able to impose a functional relationship
between (a vector of) commodity prices p and (a vector of) factor prices w, such that p
= c(w). If production functions would be identical internationally, this functional rela-
tionship would also be identical internationally. However, due to differences in factor
endowments and consumer tastes, p and w would be different internationally, as long
as there is no commodity trade or factor mobility between countries. The factor price
equalisation theorem is concerned with the question whether an equalisation of p as a
result of commodity trade will also lead to an equalisation of w.
Samuelson's proof consisted of three steps. It was first assumed that factor prices are
equal internationally. Second, the argument proceeded by proving equality of commo-
dity prices in this case. Third, prove was reversed in that it was shown that equal com-
* This is a mistake, as Mackscheidt (1967), p. 31, points out. In the case of limitational
production functions FIRs are impossible, but this does not imply that greater substitution
possibilities increase the likelihood of FIRs.Factor prices in f/ie //teory 0/ mternaflona/ /rade "H
modity prices must necessarily be accompanied by equal factor prices. Hence, if free
trade equalises commodity prices it will also equalise factor prices.
Samuelson's most definitive proof appears in his (1953) article "Prices of Factors and
Goods in General Equilibrium". Below, we shall present a summary of his argument as
it has given rise to most comments that have been made in the literature.
To start with, let us assume there are M commodities Yj, which are produced by m
factors XJ:. The production functions, which may be written as Yj = f^x^, ..., x^) are as-
sumed to be homogenous of degree one. Factor prices Wj: are given. The minimisation
of cost, subject to the usual constraints, results in a total cost function for each commo-
dity, Q = Q(Yj, W;j, ..., w^). D"£ t° the assumption of linear homogeneity, this function
may be written as Q = Yj.q(w^, ..., w^)*, where q(..), the unit cost function, is homo-
geneous of degree one in its arguments. Minimum unit cost, q = Cj/Yj is constant and
therefore equal to marginal cost and hence, under perfect competition, equal to the
price, provided of course that the commodity under consideration is produced.^ The
assumptions of perfect competition on all markets and perfect inter-sectoral mobility of
factors of production will ensure that factor prices are the same in all industries (i.e., w^
= W:, for all /). In vector notation this implies
p < c(w) (2.1)
where p is the commodity price vector and w is the factor price vector.
If all commodities are produced, so that there is no complete specialisation, the equa-
lity sign in (2.1) will hold and each country will have the same function q, which means
that there is a unique mapping from factor prices to commodity prices. However, in
order to have factor price equalisation, the relationship must also be reversible, i.e.,
from commodity prices to factor prices. According to Samuelson (and also according to
McKenzie (1955), p. 252), if this reversibility applies, then
".. without mentioning factor endowments of the country ..., we have uniquely determined
its factor prices from knowledge of its commodity prices alone." (1953/54), pp. 5-6).
This comment, which states that factor price equalisation may be proved without
reference to factor endowments, although formally correct, is rather confusing and
doesn't give us the whole truth. Incidentally, Chipman (1965b) has shown that the map-
ping from factor prices to commodity prices is reversible when a) there is no complete
specialisation in both countries, and b) when the system (2.1) is globally invertible.
Chipman added to this that these conditions are su/jfo'en/, and not necessary (Chipman
(1966), pp. 20-21). The first condition is a condition of diversification, the second is that
of univalence of the cost functions and rules out the possibility of FIRs.^ Below, we
shall discuss both conditions in greater detail.
Let us first focus on the dryersi/ïcafion condition. Consider Figure 2.1 which is a graphical
illustration of the two-by-two case, using unit value isoquants. Given the relative com-
* This is result is also due to Shephard (1953).
Note that q > p; implies that a commodity will not be produced.
Note that the problem of invertibility of (systems of) cost functions did not pose itself in
Heckscher's analysis since he assumed fixed coefficients in production. As Pearce (1971, p. 481)
points out, cost functions which exhibit this property will always be invertible.12 Owpfer 2
modity price ratio, both commodities will be produced provided that a) there exists an
isocost line which is tangential to both unit isoquants, and b) the overall factor endow-
ment ratio lies between the capital-labour ratios of both commodities. Assume that the
slope of the isocost line, or the factor price ratio w/r, is given by the line PQ. In that
case points R and S are points of tangency with the isocost line. Assume next that the
overall factor endowment ratio is given by the slope of the ray OA. Given the factor
price ratio, the equilibrium capital-labour ratios of commodities X and Y are given by
the slopes of the rays OR and OS, respectively. The cone which is formed by the points
ROS is usually called the "cone of diversification" (McKenzie/Lerner/Chipman). The al-
location of the factors of production may be obtained by completing a parallelogram at
W, which is the point of intersection of OA with the common isocost line PQ. Thus, the
combinations of factors employed by the industries X and Y are given by points U and
V respectively.
Now let us assume that factor endowments in the foreign country are given by the
ray OB. If OB lies inside the domestic diversification cone, factor prices will be identical
in the home and foreign countries and there will be incomplete specialisation. The allo-
cation of factors of production in the foreign country is then given by U' and V.
Figure 2.1 Unit isoquants
K
An interesting case comes up if it is assumed that the endowment ray of one of the two
countries coincides with one of the two equilibrium capital-labour ratios. Suppose the
foreign country's endowment ray coincides with the ray OS. Under those circumstances,
the foreign country would completely specialise in the production of commodity Y.
However, despite this complete specialisation, factor prices will still be identical interna-
tionally. That conclusion changes, however, if the endowment ray in one of the two
countries lies outside the diversification cone, as is the case with the ray OB'. Under
these circumstances, the foreign country will completely specialise in commodity Y, and
factor prices will not be equalised internationally since PQ does not represent an equili-Facfor pn'ces in f/ie rteory 0/ mtemarioMa/ irode 13
brium factor price vector in the foreign country. The factor price vector which does
result in full employment of all factors in the foreign country is given by P'Q'.
The conclusion is therefore that factor prices can only be equalised internationally if
the factor endowment rays are in the same cone of diversification. The larger this cone,
the greater the chances for international factor price equalisation.
Let us now discuss the question of the tnzvrrtMtfy or un/pa/ewce 0/ Me cosf /WHC/IOM. This
question is of extreme importance for the overall argument, since the whole factor price
equalisation debate is centred around the problem of whether or not the equation sys-
tem (2.1) has a single, unique solution. Samuelson, in a discussion of the two-by-two
case, maintained that the assumption of non-reversal of factor intensities would ensure
a non-vanishing Jacobian determinant of the equation system and therefore uniqueness
of its solution. Most of the pre-1965 literature followed Samuelson in this assumption of
non-reversal of factor intensities. However, as Gale and Nikaido (1965) showed using a
counterexample, the theorem concerning the non-vanishing Jacobian is not correct. Gale
and Nikaido also provided a correct set of conditions which are not met in the presence
of a factor intensity reversal and which we shall discuss any moment. The attack on
factor price equalisation through the possibility of FIRs is therefore not without founda-
tion, since FIRs preclude invertibility of the cost function.
It may be useful to devote some space to a brief discussion of the whole debate on
the conditions for univalence/ Samuelson's discussion of uniqueness made use of the
implicit function theorem. To use his own words (1949, p. 191-192)
".. two suitably continuous equations of the form w,(y,, V2) = W2<Vj, V2) = 0, possessing a
solution (y?, y§) cannot have any other solution provided that
A =
This condition of a non-vanishing Jacobian determinant, as is well-known by now, is a
condition for /oca/ invertibility of cost functions and does by no means guarantee a g/o-
ta/ univalence of those functions. By 1953, Samuelson seems to have realised his error as
the following quote goes to prove (1953, p. 16)
".... the non-vanishing Jacobian and the usual version of the implicit function theorem
does not guarantee uniqueness of the solution m the /arge, but only that multiple solutions
- if they exist - will be locally isolated However, all of the elements of the Jacobian ....
were eventually one-signed; and this condition combined with the non-vanishing deter-
minant, turns out to be sufficient to guarantee uniqueness in the large."
* See also Ethier (1984), and Takayama (1973).
Note that in terms of our cost functions for sector 1 and 2, the Jacobian determinant is
formed from the derivatives <kj/dwj, 1',/' = 1,2.14 C/wpfer 2
Thus Samuelson in fact adds a condition of non-negativity of the elements of the Jaco-
bian determinant in order for global univalence to be assured. This non-negativity is, of
course, motivated by sound economic reasons, since in the cost minimization process,
only non-negative factor prices are usually considered to be of greatest interest to the
researcher. However, using a counterexample and exploiting the (row) stochastic pro-
perty of the Jacobian, McKenzie (1955) was able to prove that Samuelson had also erred
in the development of this theorem.
In the celebrated Gale-Nikaido (1965) article, it was shown where Samuelson had
gone wrong in deriving his theorem. Gale and Nikaido pointed out that Samuelson's
condition in fact came to saying that "univalence holds if the upper left-hand principal
minors of the Jacobian do not vanish in a region" (1965, p. 82). Using a counterexample,
they then went on to show that this need not be true, even in simple two dimensional
regions. Gale and Nikaido also offered the correct theorem: a su/jfcien/ condition for
global univalence of a differentiable mapping p = c(w), where both p and w are n-
dimensional vectors, is that the Jacobian matrix will only have pos/fii* principal minors,





As their counterexample shows, the Gale-Nikaido condition does not ensure non-
negativity of w. To obtain non-negativity one should also invoke Kuhn's (1959) unique-
ness theorem, which states that, under certain conditions, it is possible to find a unique
w for any p, that is to find a unique inverse function. Kuhn's theorem in fact proves the
possibility of the existence of various combinations of factor endowments for which,
under competitive conditions, a complete diversification of production will be likely.
It is interesting to apply the Gale-Nikaido conditions to Samuelson's two-by-two
example, since this will reveal that the problem of invertibility did not pose itself due to
Samuelson's strong factor intensity assumption. Assume once more that the economy
produces X and Y, using K and L. Let L^ be the labour input in sector X, and so on. The




Note that due to Shephard's lemma, c^ represents the amount of the ;-th input to pro-
duce the i-th output, or, e.g., c^ = l^/X. Thus, the Gale-Nikaido condition implies the
following
c,, = L*/X > 0,
C22 = Ky/Y > 0,
and
Ci,C22 - C12C21 =
The first two conditions are, of course, easily met. The third may be rewritten asFacfor prices m ffte f Jieory of intemaf zona/ frade 15
lc, - k^ > 0 for all factor prices,
where ky = Ky/Ly, and so on. Since the names of industries X and Y may be used inter-
changeably, the Gale-Nikaido condition thus simply implies the condition for non-rever-
sibility of production factors. In the two-by-two case, this requires imperfect specialisa-
tion (complete diversification). To put things differently, in the exceptional case of a
two-by-two model, local univalence implies global univalence. If the dimension of the
model is lifted beyond the two-by-two framework, however, local univalence does no
longer also guarantee global univalence (the reverse is, needless to say, always true).
The Gale-Nikaido conditions resulted in a number of contributions in which the condi-
tions for global univalence are examined more closely. One extension was put forward
by Inada (1971), who emphasized that the Gale-Nikaido univalence theorem is only one
of many univalence theorems. To be more precise, the Gale-Nikaido conditions are con-
cerned with the case where the inverse of the production coefficient matrix has the Min-
kowski property, i.e., is a matrix whose inverse has positive diagonal elements and non-
positive off-diagonal elements. However, as Inada points out, confining the discussion
to Minkowski matrices seriously restricts it to a very special case. Another generalisa-
tion of factor price equalisation theory might be obtained by studying matrices with the
Metzler property, that is, matrices with negative diagonal elements and non-negative
off-diagonal elements. Obviously, Minkowski and Metzler matrices are two sides of the
same coin, so, in Inada's words (p. 220) "if we concern ourselves only with the first one,
there is left unexplored an area as big as that explored".
As was pointed out by Gale and Nikaido, a Minkowski matrix has only positive prin-
cipal minors, that is, a Minkowski matrix is a so-called P-matrix. Inada proves that if a
matrix is PN, i.e., whenever its principal minors of odd orders are positive and its prin-
cipal minors of even order are negative, then global univalence of the system of cost
functions will hold as well. Thus the Gale-Nikaido conditions are only one set of condi-
tions which guarantee univalence, while Inada's conditions may produce exactly the
same result.
In a second line of contributions following the Gale-Nikaido paper, efforts were
made to weaken their conditions, taking into account the fact that these conditions are
only su/jfcienf for global univalence. In this respect, Mas-Colell's (1979) paper points out
that the non-vanishing Jacobian determinant may be sufficient after all if one considers
only strictly positive factor prices. In those circumstances, the requirement that all prin-
cipal minors of order less than n are positive is in fact too strong. When, in addition to
strictly positive factor prices, it is also assumed that all commodity prices are strictly
positive, global univalence obtains if the determinant of /actor s/wres is non-zero.
2.4 Alternative approaches to factor price equalisation
Apart from Samuelson, several authors have played important roles in the factor price
equalisation debate. In some cases their arguments were of decisive influence in the
debate, so it is interesting to give these approaches a separate treatment. In this section,
we shall discuss the more formal treatments by McKenzie (1955), and Uzawa (1959), as
well as some popular graphical proofs that may be found in the literature, notably the
contributions of Schweinberger (1975), Mussa (1979), Neary (1978) and Woodland
(1982), Travis (1965), and Dixit and Norman (1980).16 C/iap/er 2
McKenzie (1955) used linear activity analysis to solve the same problem as Samuel-
son. Like the latter he approaches the problem of factor price equalisation through deri-
ving a unique relationship between commodity and factor prices. McKenzie's most im-
portant assumptions are that each country is confronted with a fixed vector of factor en-
dowments, absence of impediments to trade, and linear homogeneous production funct-
ions which are identical between countries.
Using the competitive equilibrium zero profit conditions and the definition of linear
independence of vectors, McKenzie is able to prove what he calls "theorem I" which im-
plies
"....that if there is a competitive equilibrium, free of specialisation, with P (a given price
vector P - AvM) and equalised factor prices, there cannot be another equilibrium with P
and factor prices not equalised." (1955, p. 243)
like Samuelson, McKenzie proves factor price equalisation without making direct and
explicit reference to factor endowments (1955, p. 252). However, like Samuelson,
McKenzie explicitly invoked the assumptions of complete diversification and absence of
FIRs. Utilizing an n-dimensional framework, McKenzie discussed the conditions which
should be met for factor endowments to lie in the interior of the same cone of diversifi-
cation. Hence, his assumptions of complete diversification and non-cross overs of factor
intensities simply imply the restrictions which should underlie the supply of factors of
production if factor price equalisation is to occur at all.
Uzawa (1959) approached the factor price equalisation theorem as a problem of welfare
economics. Central to his analysis is the world welfare function, which he maximizes
under three different trade regimes, viz. 1) complete absence of international trade; 2)
international trade in commodities; and, 3) international trade in both commodities and
factors of production. Uzawa proves that if welfare could be increased by moving from
regime 2) to regime 3), factor prices could not have been equalised under regime 2), or
in his own words:
"The present study shows .... that the complete factor-price equalization occurs only in the
cases in which the factor endowments in the countries are precisely the ones that arise in
an equilibrium position of world trade when factors of production as well as the commo-
dities can move internationally". (1959, p. 448).
Uzawa concluded that a "complete equalization of the prices of the factors of production
is rather unlikely to occur" (p. 449), since this would require that "neither of both coun-
tries has great comparative advantage in any commodity" (p. 465), "that is, complete
factor price equalization will occur if and only if the initial factor endowments in all
countries are the same" (p. 468). Therefore, Uzawa postulates that a partial equalisation
of factor prices would be the more likely result. Chipman considered this "difficult to
accept" (1966, p. 43), since his assumptions are overly strong, especially where they con-
cern the nature of Uzawa's excess demand functions for commodities. However, in de-
fence of Uzawa it should be noted that the latter in fact introduced the concept of "inte-
grated equilibrium", a concept central to the modern treatments like those of Dixit and
Norman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985).' In addition to that, Uzawa discus-
ses factor price equalisation by explicitly considering not only the supply of commodi-
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ties, but also their demand in a two country world. Thus, contrary to Samuelson c.s.
commodity prices are endogenous in his analysis in stead of given exogenously. Finally,
Uzawa's employment vectors of production factors are endogenously determined,
which is not the case in the models of Dixit and Norman (see below).
In the previous section we presented a graphical proof for factor price equalisation in
terms of the K-L space. Following Schweinberger (1975), Mussa (1979) and Neary (1978)
the theorem may also be proved in terms of the dual of the production function model.
The dual of the production function model makes use of the unit cost functions, which
may be plotted in the w-r space in stead of in the K-L space. This representation of the
factor price equalisation theorem is discussed here, since it has become increasingly
popular (see Woodland's (1982) textbook, which discusses most theorems in terms of
the dual of the production function model). Figure 2.2 is such a diagram showing the
unit cost functions c* and c^ for sector X and Y respectively.
Figure 2.2 Unit cost functions
w
Note that the slope of the unit cost curve at any point gives the capital-labour ratio in
that industry. If the production functions are linear-homogeneous then the cost funct-
ions will be linear-homogeneous as well, so that relative factor intensities are indepen-
dent of the factor price ratio. The feasible set of factor prices is bounded by the line
CyEc,< ^nd includes all points to the right and above this boundary. Evidently, if one
would assume identical production functions and international equalised commodity
prices then the same unit cost functions would apply to all trading countries.
If the endowment ratio of these trading countries are less than the slope of Cy at E
and more than the slope of c^ at E, then a competitive trade equilibrium with equalised18 C/wpfer 2
factor prices is possible. Thus, in this case the cone of diversification may be obtained
from the slopes of the lines I and H.
Dixit and Norman (1980) have extended the concept of diversification cones to a two
country world. They criticized the conventional analysis of factor price equalisation on
the ground that its result is "conditional on exogenous product prices" (p. 52). In other
words, the objection they raise is that the analysis starts from a one country world with
given product prices. Rather than treating these product prices as given, they suggest
that international trade theory should explain these product prices. Since commodity
prices are usually treated as exogenous, the proof of factor price equalisation rests on a
description of production technology and production equilibrium in one country only in
stead of two. In addition to that, they point out that the diversification cones are them-
selves dependent on relative commodity prices.
In their analysis, Dixit and Norman assume that all the usual assumptions as regards
production technology, preferences, inter-sectoral mobility of factors of production, etc.
are met. The kernel of their arguments, which is based on Travis' discussion of the
factor allocation box, may be paraphrased with the aid of Figure 2.3.'" The factor allo-
cation box in that figure considers the production equilibrium in the entire (i.e., two
country) world. Assume that world supply of capital and labour are given. The total
availability of these factors of production determines the magnitude of the box. As
usual, the commodity price ratio determines uniquely the factor price ratio w/r. The
latter determines the capital-labour ratios in both industries. These K/L ratios are equal
in both countries due to the assumption of identical production technology in both
sectors. The home country capital-labour ratios are drawn as rays through the lower-left
origin O^, foreign country capital-labour ratios as rays through the upper-right origin
Op. Note that commodity X is produced with a capital-intensive production technique.
The capital-labour ratios form a parallelogram OHAOPBO^-
The next step in the analysis involves the construction of a set of factor price equali-
sation on the basis of a hypothetical construct known as the "integrated equilibrium".
The integrated equilibrium is the resource allocation in the world that would dominate
if both goods and factors were perfectly mobile across all countries of the world. Subse-
quently, the proof of factor price equalisation is obtained by answering the question
whether it is possible to achieve the same resource allocation of factors if the latter are
completely immobile internationally. If this turns out to be the case, international trade
in commodities will equalise factor prices. Dixit and Norman show that, in the standard
2x2 model of international trade there are a great deal of resource allocations for which
this is possible. This set of resource allocations, which replicate the integrated equili-
brium under the assumption of complete international factor immobility, is what they
label the "factor price equalisation set"."
In Figure 23, the parallelogram OnAOpBOn is the graphical representation of this
factor price equalisation set. Note that the factor price equalisation set is never empty,
since it always has the diagonal as element, i.e., it is always possible to achieve interna-
'" The figure is slightly adapted and may be found in Dixit and Norman (1980), p. 112, or in
Helpman and Krugman (1985), p. 16.
" Travis (1964, chapters 1 and 2) called this set the "factor price equalisation region". Note
that the size and shape of the parallelogram are primarily influenced by two factors. Firsf, dif-
ferences in factor intensities are important. The larger their differences, the larger will be the
magnitude of the parallelogram in relation to the size of the box. Second, the endowments are
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tional factor price equalisation through perfect mobility of factors of production. Also
note, that the size of the parallelogram ws-a-ws the size of the box in principle deter-
mines the likelihood of factor price equalisation; the larger the parallelogram, the larger
will be the likelihood of factor price equalisation.







Having established the proof of factor price equalisation, Dixit and Norman proceed to
outline the basic characteristics of the allocation both at home and abroad. The inte-
grated equilibrium employment level in sector X, the capital-intensive sector, is given by
O^B, whereas the integrated equilibrium level of employment in sector Y is given by
O^A. Let E be the endowment point of the home country (measured from the origin
O^) and the foreign country (measured from the origin Op). In the integrated equili-
brium, the total world production of commodity X is measured by the distance O^B (or
OpA), whereas world production of commodity Y is measured by O^A (or OpB). Now if
endowments are given by E, it is possible to decompose production of both goods into a
part that is produced at home and a part that is produced abroad. Graphically, this
decomposition is accomplished by the construction of two components which are paral-
lel to O^B and O^A. At E, the home country production of commodity X equals O^Px*
whereas the foreign production of this commodity is measured by OpP£. Hence, the
home country's share in world production is O|_,Px/OnB. Similarly, the home country
production of commodity Y equals O^Py* and the foreign country production of Y is
OpPy. Thus, the home country's share in world production of commodity Y equals
O^PY/OHA. Note that production points outside the parallelogram, such as B', are not
feasible, since they would imply that the home country's share in world production of
one or both commodities would exceed one. Clearly, such an allocation would be most
peculiar. The same is true for all points outside the parallelogram.20 ..-...•• C/wpfer2
The Dixit and Norman approach to general equilibrium and factor price equalisation
also enables one to predict the trade flows in the world, as Helpman and Krugman
(1985) have shown. Given the assumptions of identical and homothetic tastes, identical
technology, and identical factor prices (given by the slope of the line passing through E
with slope WL/W|<), one can construct point C, where the diagonal of the box intersects
with the factor price line. Point C gives an indication of a country's relative GDP level.
For example, O^C/COp is the home country's GDP level relative to the foreign coun-
try's GDP level. Construction of another parallelogram gives the home (and foreign)
country's consumption points of both goods. Hence O^C^ measures the home country's
consumption of commodity X and O^Cy gives that country's consumption of commo-
dity Y. Evidently, the home country will export commodity X and import commodity Y.
Note that, since E is above the diagonal of the box, the home country is capital-rich and
will export the capital-intensive commodity.
The Dixit and Norman approach to the problems of general equilibrium and factor price
equalisation is not only ingenious, but has certain distinct advantages in comparison
with the univalence approach, too. In this respect, it should be noted that Dixit and
Norman prove factor price equalisation without direct reference to the univalence pro-
blem. In concentrating on the factor price equalisation set the problem of univalence can
be ignored, since all allocations in the interior of the set will lead to diversification of
production. Outside the factor price equalisation region, production is not diversified,
and univalence (and consequently also factor price equalisation) does not hold.
Another important advantage of the approach lies in the treatment of commodity
prices as endogenous variables. If the integrated equilibrium factor price ratio is given
by WL/W^, then simple application of the marginal productivity principle goes to prove
that commodity prices are also equalised. If P^ and Py are the home country produc-
tion points, and p£ and Py the foreign country's production points, and if factors of pro-
duction are rewarded the value of their marginal products, then it follows that the
equality of physical marginal productivities in the optimal production points in combi-
nation with the equalised factor prices (ratios), must necessarily be accompanied by
equal commodity price (ratios).
The endogeneity of commodity prices, as well as the focus on a two-country integra-
ted equilibrium constitutes an important improvement upon earlier studies of the sub-
ject indeed. However, it should also be noted, that Dixit and Norman do nof analyze the
properties of the equilibrium sectoral employment vectors. In fact, these sectoral em-
ployment vectors are determined exogenously. Consequently, the concept of the "factor
price equalisation set" remains as hypothetical as the concept of the "integrated equili-
brium" itself. To put it differently, the size of the factor price equalisation set is for a
large part determined by the exogenously specified employment vectors. Obviously, it is
a questionable procedure to determine the magnitude of the set in such a fashion, and
the sectoral employment vectors should be endogenously determined. If that is not pro-
perly done, the model of production is not able to predict how large the factor price
equalisation set actually will be, and how "similar" factor endowments should be in
order to have factor price equalisation.
Wu (1988) has attempted to solve this problem by developing a model in which one
of the employment vectors is exogenously determined and the other endogenously.
Thus, he is able to show, how sufficiently similar factor endowments should be if there
is to be factor price equalisation, or how dissimilar they should be in order to prevent it.
Hence, he is able to construct actual diversification cones, which are not mere hypotheti-
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cones depends on all the primitives of the economy, i.e., their size depends on both
technology and preferences. Incidentally, Wu also proves that even when factor prices
are not equalised, trade may bring about a convergence of factor prices. However, this
result is conditional on some special assumptions regarding demand conditions, since it
only applies if there is "balanced demand" in both countries.^ However, if there is no
"balanced demand" factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade.
Another disadvantage of the technique employed by Dixit and Norman concerns the
fact that their analysis does not lend itself very easily to a generalisation beyond the
two-country, two-factor model. The Edgeworth box technique only applies to a two-
country, two-factor world, which may, needless to say, unnecessarily restrict the focus
of the analysis on too simple cases. For nxnxn generalisations of the factor price equalisa-
tion theorem, the univalence approach does remain a very useful device.
2.5 Generalisation to higher dimensions
In this section some of the assumptions underlying the factor price equalisation theorem
will be relaxed. The basic model of international trade has often been criticized for its
reliance on a two-by-two-by-twoness, and an important question one must ask is
whether an increase in dimensions leaves the basic conclusions in tact.
As to the increase in the number of countries, we can be very brief, since it is well-
known that such an extension does not invalidate the basic conclusions of the model.
The appropriate procedure to prove factor price equalisation would in this case be to
compare any two sets of countries and to establish factor price equalisation for these
countries and extending this result to any other combination of two countries.
Turn to the second generalisation now, where the model is extended to an nxn frame-
work. All that is required for factor price equalisation in this case is that the diversifica-
tion condition and the conditions for global univalence of systems of cost functions are
fulfilled. Since these conditions have been discussed at great length in the previous sec-
tions, we need not ponder on them here.
It is useful to stress, that the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem need not be invalidated as
well in this nxn case, although some suitable qualifications to the theorem will be re-
quired. Basically, when generalised to higher (but even) dimensions, the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem states that a country will export the services of the abundant factor and
import the services of the scarce factor. Speaking with Learner (1984, p. 15) the higher
dimension generalisation of the theorem "properly emphasizes the point that it is factor
services that are being exchanged through trade. Commodities serve only as bundles
within which factor services are wrapped." This (slight) modification of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem is also known as the "Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek" theorem.
Let us next consider the case where there are more factors fhan commcxi/fies. As is well-
known by now, factor price equalisation is impossible, or at least very unlikely in this
case. Strictly speaking, as Woodland (1982) points out, factor price equalisation may still
be possible when factors outnumber commodities, since the theorem puts no limits on
the number of goods nor on the number of factors. However, it can be shown that in
this case commodity price equalisation is compatible with an arbitrary number of factor
Needless to say, Wu's results are also highly dependent on the exogenously specified em-
ployment vector.22 Owpter2
price ratios. This implies that under these circumstances factor price equalisation would
be a pure coincidence. In mathematical terms one could say that the system of equations
determining the factor prices is under-determined. This result becomes intuitive if one
considers the case of one good and two factors. Under those circumstances, one commo-
dity price should determine two factor prices, which is impossible without further infor-
mation. In the two-by-two model, two commodity prices were all that was needed to
determine the two factor prices. In a model where the number of commodities is less
than the number of factors, demand and supply conditions on the factor markets must
be taken into consideration in order to determine the factor prices. In other words, the
commodity market equilibrium conditions do no longer suffice to solve uniquely for
factor prices, and factor market equilibrium conditions should be invoked to establish
equilibrium factor prices.
This conclusion is readily extended to the more general two good, three factor
model. Suppose that commodity X and Y are produced with labour, capital and land,
and that country I is relatively well endowed with capital and land. The ratio of capital
to labour and capital to land will be higher in both sectors in country I, implying
(much) higher productivities of labour and land in that country. In country II the pro-
ductivity of capital will be higher. Although total production costs and commodity
prices will be equalised in all sectors in both countries after trade is opened up, the rela-
tively high costs for land and labour need not disappear in country I, since they could
be matched by relatively low capital costs. In country II, where capital costs are high,
the relatively low costs or land and labour can also remain without any consequences
for commodity prices. This implies that, although commodity prices will be equalised
after trade is taken up, factor price differentials need not necessarily decrease. In case
one would increase the number of factors even more than just three, it is obvious that
the probability for factor price equalisation will grow smaller. Thus, one must conclude
that factor price equalisation is likely to be a coincidence when factors outnumber com-
modities. In this connection, Woodland (1982, p. 75) remarks that the cone of diversifica-
tion "degenerates" in case factors outnumber commodities.
Let us turn to the case where r/ie number of goods exceeds /he number of /iicfors. From an
analytical point of view, this case is considered to be the most interesting one by the
majority of theorists. The results for this case are more or less confusing, at least at first
sight. This confusion is probably the result of the fact that production may become inde-
terminate. Melvin (1968) showed this production indeterminacy in a 3x2 model. Using
the Edgeworth box, he demonstrated that under these circumstances, the production
possibility surface is a so-called "ruled" surface, which means that every point on the
production possibility surface lies on a line of which every point is on the production
surface, that is, there is an infinite number of combinations of outputs of the three
goods consistent with any given factor price ratio.
As far as the possibility of factor price equalisation when commodities outnumber
factors is concerned, Chipman gives a good summary of the views adhered to by diffe-
rent authors: ••.••••• t.
Tinbergen (1949) held that factor price equalisation would be less likely, Samuelson
(1949) that it would be more likely; and Meade (1950) that it would be equally likely".
(1966, p. 31).
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"... the question of whether adding more commodities makes factor price equalisation less
likely reduces to the question of whether it makes specialisation more likely and one
can expect the possibility of specialisation to be the normal outcome (Relative
numbers of factors and products turn out to be very crucial; and .... this result seems arti-
ficial", (/bid, p. 34). , , ^ . .,: a, ,
In mathematical terms one might say that the equation system determining factor prices
is over-determined when there more goods than factors. Some authors have suggested,
that the consequences of this overdeterminacy for factor prices depend crucially on the
role of specialisation in the model. Samuelson (1953/54), for instance, solves the pro-
blem of over-determinacy by assuming that some industries will shut down, causing the
system to be determinate again. However, he does not point out what the precise conse-
quences of the specialisation are for the factor prices. Tinbergen (1949) also believes that
specialisation will be necessary.
Figure 2.4 The Lerner diagram for « > m
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Much of the controversy, however, can again be resolved with the aid of the concept of
the cone of diversification, a concept introduced by Lerner and McKenzie, as we saw
before. Let us use the familiar Lerner diagram to prove the point. In Figure 2.4 four unit
cost isoquants c^,, c^, c^, c^ are shown, which are no longer tangent to the one and the
same factor price line. Cones of diversification are solely defined by common tangents
to two isoquants if the number of factors equals two. In Figure 2.4, two cones of diversi-
fication are shown, t>iz. AOB on one hand and COD on the other. Assume that the en-
dowment ray for country I is in the interior of AOB, and that the endowment ray for
country II is in the interior of COD. In that case, country I will produce only commodi-
ties W and X, whereas country II will only produce Y and Z. Obviously, Heckscher-
Ohlin theory is satisfied, since country I will tend to specialise in relatively capital-inten-
sive goods, whereas country II will tend to specialise in relatively labour-intensive
goods. Also note, that factor prices are clearly not equalised.24 Chapter 2
Another possibility arises, when both countries' endowment rays are in the interior
of the same cone of diversification, for instance, in AOB. Both countries will then specia-
lise in the production of commodities W and X, even if country I is relatively well en-
dowed with capital. Both countries would import commodities Y and Z from the rest of
the world. Consequently, imports from the rest of the world would be more labour-in-
tensive than their exports. However, the precise amount of production of W and X
would not be determinate in both countries. This indeterminacy of production might be
avoided, if both countries would completely specialise, which might happen, as we
showed above, when their endowment rays would lie in the interior of different diversi-
fication cones. This would imply that each country would specialise in the production
of only two goods and that no two countries would produce the same two goods. How-
ever, in that case, factor price equalisation is impossible.
The same point may be proven with the aid of the isocost functions in the factor price
diagram. In Figure 2.5 we have depicted the four unit cost functions of the same com-
modities in the w-r space. Note that the feasible set of factor prices is bounded by the
line c^ABCCj and again includes all points to the right and above this line. If the
endowment ratios of both countries are less than the slope of c^, at A and more than the
slope of Cj at C then if a competitive equilibrium occurs at one of the vertices A, B or C
only two out of four commodities may be produced. This situation corresponds to the
case where endowments are in the same cone of diversification.
If the endowment ratio of a country happens to be in tangent to a cost function be-
tween two vertices, then it follows that the country will completely specialise in one
good. This case corresponds to the situation where an endowment ratio coincides with a
factor intensity ratio.
Figure 2.5 The factor price diagram for n > m
w
n
Now let countries I and II have endowment ratios which are represented by the slopes
of lines I and II respectively. As a result, country I will specialise in the production ofFncfor prices in Me f/ieory 0/ internatiomi/ trade 25
both W and X, whereas country II will specialise in commodities Y and Z. Hence, pro-
duction is determinate. However, factor prices are not equalised, since country I will
end up in point A and country II will end up in point B.
An interesting case arises, when country I's endowment ratio is given by the slope of
line I and country II's endowment ratio by the slope of line II'. In that case country I
will produce W and X and country II will produce commodities X and Y. Country I will
export W and country II will export Y. However, both countries will also export X to
the rest of the world. Hence, there is a production indeterminacy. This situation corres-
ponds to the case where the two cones of diversification have a common boundary.
Schweinberger (1975) has proven that under these circumstances, a determinate produc-
tion equilibrium is possible only when X is a pure intermediate good.
Figure 2.6 Production indeterminacy in the « > m factor price equalisation model
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A final interesting case arises when there is only one vertex. This case is depicted in
Figure 2.6. If the endowment ratio of country I is given by the slope of line I and that of
country II by the slope of line II, factor prices will clearly be equalised. However, since
both countries will produce all four commodities, production and trade will be indeter-
minate. To put it in perspective, in this case a large number of possible factor use com-
binations is consistent with a single factor price ratio and therefore a large number of
output combinations are consistent with a competitive equilibrium. Also note that only
two prices are independent, since the existence of only two cost functions is all that is
required to determine the factor price ratio. The implication is that the prices of the two
remaining goods must equal their cost at this factor price ratio if they are to be produ-
ced at all, i.e., supply and demand for only two goods determine the price for all goods.
The consequence of all this is that a change in the price of one good would require a
change in the price of at least two other goods if all goods are still to be produced.
Dixit and Norman (1980) have seriously criticized the traditional analysis of the case
of more goods than factors. In their own words, they have the following problems with
this analysisi Chapter 2 • -"•'• ' •-
"On the one hand, it might appear that we have too many equations, one for each good,
in too few unknowns, the factor prices. This raises the danger of inconsistency. On the
other hand, it might appear that, at fixed output prices, optimum production choices
must involve specialization, thereby removing any guarantee that the two countries pro-
duce sufficiently many goods in common, which is the basis of the univalence discus-
sions. 77K frouWe 10M bof/i ttese points is f/wt no account is taten 0/ fhe /act fnat fne product
price rector tnaf is re/ezwnt to the discussion is t/ie trade eijui/ibnum one". (1980, p. 114, italics
added).
Figure 2.7 The three commodity, two factor box diagram
In their analysis of the case of more goods than factors, they use the factor allocation
box to show that factor price equalisation is still possible. If one assumes three commo-
dities and two factors, for instance, then there will be three sectoral employment vectors
that must be considered to solve the problem of factor price equalisation. The trick is to
investigate how adding a third commodity changes the factor price equalisation set. In
Figure 2.7 we have plotted the employment vectors in an allocation box. Analogous to
the two commodity, two factor case, the integrated equilibrium employment vectors add
up to the length of the diagonal of the box.
As is easily seen, the parallelogram becomes polyhedral when the number of com-
modities exceeds two. In Figure 2.7, this polyhedral is given by OHCDOPBAO^- Again,
the conclusion must be that as long as the endowment point is in the interior of polyhe-
dral, factor price equalisation must prevail. Interestingly, the indeterminacy of produc-
tion comes up once more. For instance, if E is the endowment point, full employment
may occur if goods X and Z are produced, with employment vectors O^F and FE, res-
pectively. On the other hand, the home country may also produce all three goods and
still have factor market equilibrium, when the employment vectors are O^G, GH andpnces in the f/ieory of internationa/ trade 29
or, in matrix terms, 8.w = p, where 0 denotes the (2x2) matrix of factor shares, w
denotes the factor price vector, and p is the commodity price vector. The solution of the
system, i.e., w = 0 .g, gives the following reduced form equations for w and ? •>•
W =
and
f = - —
iei
> 0
• p, < 0
(2.12)
(2.13)
where 181 is the determinant of the matrix of factor shares. Eqs. (2.12)-(2.13) show that
labour and capital have conflicting interests. Also, the direction of the relative change of
factor prices depends on whether or not the sign of |8| < 0. The sign of this deter-
minant is determined as follows ;
r
sign iei = sign^e^ - e^J = e^.^w-r.tkj - kj) '
with kj = Kj/L; 0 = 1,2) = the capital intensity in sector f. If sector 1 is labour intensive,
i.e., k2 > kj, a tariff will tend to increase the nominal wage rate and decrease the rental
rate. This is the essence of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.^
It is also possible to predict the change in rea/ factor prices, tfiz. by subtracting p,
from both sides in both equations. This will give
w - p, =
iei
p, > 0 (2.14)
and
(2.15)
which is obtained using the fact that 6^ + 8^ = 1 in both sectors. Hence, if sector I is
labour-intensive, the increase in the nominal wage rate due to a tariff also constitutes an
increase in the real reward for labour, whereas capital will loose in real terms. One will
find that w > p, > pj = 0 > r. Jones (1965) called this result the "magnification effect".
" In their original paper, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) stated the theorem with reference to
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. According to their version of the theorem, a tariff will tend to
favour the scarce factor and will be harmful to the interests of the owners of the abundant fac-
tor. However, formulating the theorem in terms of equations (2.10M2.13), a tariff will favour the
intensive factor of the sector where the tariff is imposed and harm the other factor. Contrary to
the Stolper and Samuelson, the formulation in the text does not depend on the validity of the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, and therefore has a greater validity. In the trade literature both alter-
native formulations may be found.30 C/wpter 2
Figure 2.8 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem in the factor price diagram
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Graphically, the theorem has been illustrated in a variety of ways. In Figure 2.8, we use
the factor price diagram to show the effects of the tariff in sector 1. The diagram
shows the graphical representations of the unit cost functions for both sectors, wz. the
isocost curves. Let both commodities be produced, so that production is diversified.
Then, initial equilibrium is at (WQ, TQ). Note that the cost minimising input vectors in
both sectors are given by kj and kj, which are the gradients of c^(w) and C2(w) eval-
uated at (WQ, TQ). Thus, using Shephard's lemma, the slopes of the isocost curves imply
that sector 2 utilises a capital-intensive technique. These sectoral employment vectors, as
we have seen in the previous chapter, form a cone of diversification. The increase in pj
is indicated by a shift to the right of the isocost curve from CQ to c}. As can easily be ob-
served, the new equilibrium occurs at (w,, r^), where the wage rate has increased and
the rental rate has decreased. Since the change in w and r are proportionally higher
than the change in pj, the nominal changes in the factor rewards will at the same time
be changes in their real magnitudes.
It should be noted, that the question of specialisation in production is also relevant
for the validity of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Assume that there is complete diver-
sification of production in the initial equilibrium, so both commodities are produced at
the outset. Then, as we saw in the previous chapter, there will normally be factor price
equalisation. However, depending on the location of the factor endowment point and on
the magnitude of the change in the commodity price, specialisation might very well oc-
cur, as Woodland (1977, pp. 61-62) has shown. Needless to say, if this happens, factor
price equalisation might easily break down. When complete specialisation in sector 2 oc-
" Similar diagrams may be found in Woodland (1977, 1982) and Mussa (1979).Factor prices m fte f/œory of interna/iona/ frafe 31
curs, however, a further increase in the relative price of commodity 1 will no longer
have an effect on the ratio of marginal productivities of labour and capital. It has been
shown that in beyond the point of complete specialisation both factors will become bet-
ter off after an increase of the relative price of commodity 1 (see, e.g., Chacholiades
(1978), p. 489).
In addition to the issue of specialisation, it should be remarked, that the theorem may
also be endangered if there are FIRs. Note that if these occur, kj = k2, which implies
that the determinant 181 =0. Consequently, the factor price reactions following the im-
position of a tariff in one sector are not defined. As a result, anything might happen
with nominal and real factor rewards.
2.6.2 Genera/isaiïons o/ </ie f/ieorem
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem discussed in the previous subsection is closely linked
up to the 2x2 world. In this subsection we shall be concerned with attempts that have
been made to generalise the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Like the problem of factor
price equalisation, higher dimensional generalisations of the theorem may reflect
situations of even dimensions on one hand and odd dimensions on the other. Both
kinds of generalisation will be discussed below.
In a sense, the question of the generalisation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is con-
cerned with a non-issue. As Jones and Scheinkman (1977) correctly point out, the mag-
nification effect is valid regardless the number of commodities, at least as long as there
is no joint production. This assertion may be established simply by inspection of the
marginal cost condition contained in equations (2.8 and 2.9). For all commodities produ-
ced, prices will equal unit cost. As a result, price changes are the weighted average of
factor price changes, and the change in prices takes an intermediate value between two
extreme changes in factor prices. This relationship is, needless to say, true for all
commodities which are produced in positive quantities, and independent of the dimen-
sionality of the model. But this general formulation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is
almost tautological, and one would wish to determine œfricto factors will gain and w/iic/t
will loose. Thus, the question is which resrrirtions should be placed on the specification
of technology, in order to find the above generalisation of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem.
Let us start with the case of (even) nxn models. Like before, it will be assumed that,
given the factor price vector w = (w,,...,wj, producers will select those input-output
coefficients a^ such that the cost of producing commodity ; is minimised. Therefore, a;; =
ajj(w), where a- is homogeneous of degree zero; also, as before, c' = LjWajXw) = c'(w) is
the unit cost function which will be assumed to be linearly homogeneous and concave
in factor prices. Moreover, note that dc'/âw: = a^ (Shephard's lemma). Under perfect
competition, a commodity market equilibrium with all goods produced requires p =
c(w). The Jacobian matrix is again defined by A = [aj = dc/dw.
The classic reference concerning the generalisation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
is Chipman (1969). According to the latter, the theorem may be valid /oca//y and ^/obfl//y.
The conditions for the validity of both the local and the global version are the same as
those for local vs. global univalence of systems of cost functions. Since these conditions
have been explored in the previous chapter, we shall not dwell upon them here too
long. To recall, local validity implies validity of the theorem in the neighbourhood of a
specified equilibrium. The requirement is that the Jacobian determinant of the system of
cost functions will not vanish at this equilibrium point. Global validity implies that the32 C/iapfer2
association between commodity and factor prices will hold for a// conceivable p and w,
or that all principal minors of the Jacobian matrix are strictly positive. •!
Chipman distinguished two versions of the generalised Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
According to the first, the u?eafc version of the theorem, an increase in the price of the t-
//i commodity gives rise to an unambiguous rise in the price of the r-f/i factor. This re-
quires that 0"' possesses all diagonal elements larger than unity. According to the se-
cond version of the theorem, the sfrowg version, an increase in the price of the i-f/i com-
modity will result in both an unambiguous increase in the price of the i-f/i factor as well
as an unambiguous decline in the prices of all other factors.^ This happens if and
only if the inverse matrix 0"' has all diagonal elements in excess of unity and all off-dia-
gonal elements negative. Needless to say, the strong version of the theorem implies the
weak one, since if all off-diagonal elements of 0*' are negative, then its diagonal ele-
ments must necessarily exceed unity by virtue of the property that 0'' (like 0) is a sto-
chastic matrix.
Most of the generalisations of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem have mainly been con-
cerned with the strong version of the theorem. As may be recalled from our discussion
of factor price equalisation, row stochastic matrices possessing diagonal elements larger
than unity and negative off-diagonal elements are usually called Minkowski matrices.
Lots of effort has been devoted to finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for 0"'
to meet the required conditions.'^ These discussions have shown that, when the condi-
tions for global concavity of the cost function are met, even generalisations of the Stol-
per-Samuelson theorem are in principle possible, and 0"' will be Minkowski, i.e., an in-
crease in any commodity price, all other commodity prices held constant, will tend to
increase the reward of a corresponding factor in real terms and lower the rewards of all
other factors.
Ethier (1985) has suggested a different way of generalising the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem. His argument is as follows. Consider an initial equilibrium with a price vector
p° and factor price vector w°. These vectors are denoted p' and w' in another equili-
brium. It follows that p" = A(w°)w° and that p' = A(w')w'. Invoking the mean-value
theorem, Ethier is able to prove that (w'-w°)A(w)(p'-p°) > 0, i.e., there is a positive cor-
relation between the elements of the vector (w'-w ) and the elements of A(w)(p'-p°), or,
alternatively, between elements of (w'-w°)A(w) and (p'-p°). The implication of this is
that, on average, high values of (w'-w") on the one hand go hand in hand with high
values of (p'-p ) and a;:, or both, on the other hand. Thus, changes in commodity prices
will generally lead to high increases in the rewards of those factors which are used
intensively by the goods whose prices have risen.
This result is intuitively appealing since it is very general: it does not depend on the
dimensionality of the model, nor upon special restrictions on technology. Needless to
say, this formulation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is weaker than the original
theorem, and strips it of some of its analytical rigor.
" Note that several variants of this strong Stolper-Samuelson criterion have surfaced in the
trade literature. Uekawa (1971) has defined the strong version as an increase in the price of the
j'-tfi commodity giving rise to an unambiguous increase in the price of the i-tto factor price, while
the proportionate increase of this factor priœ increase exceeds all other factor price changes.
Therefore, Uekawa allows the other factor price changes to be positive. It will be recalled from
the previous chapter, that Inada (1971) distinguished a strong version of the theorem in which
all diagonal elements of 0 were negative and all off-diagonal elements were positive.
" See, a.o., Chipman (1969), Kemp and Wegge (1969), Uekawa (1971), Wegge and Kemp
(1969), Inada (1971), Uekawa, Kemp and Wegge (1973), Ethier (1974) and Chang (1979).Focfor pn'ces in /fie f/ieory of m/ernaflona/ /rode 33
General and weak results can also be obtained for real factor rewards. Consider for
example a good which is produced in both the initial and the terminal equilibrium. As-
sume that this good is produces by m factors of production, whose reward is w^. The
price of this good, call it good 1, must be equal to or above unit cost, so B^Wj + .... +
OimWm < £j. The Gjj are all positive and sum up to unity. Therefore, this equation
implies that there must exist some factor, call it the first, for which w^ £ p~] > 0 = p^ = ...
= p^. Hence, a rise in the price of a good that was initially produced must raise the
reward of at least one factor in terms of this good and lower it in terms of no good. For
the second good, which we also assume to be produced in the initial and terminal equi-
librium, we must have 621 Wi + .... + 9^w^ < p^ = 0- Since W] > 0 and 0j2 > 0, and since
6j2 > 0 and sum up to unity, it follows that there exists some factor reward, call it the
second, which must fall, i.e., W2 < 0 = p2 = ... = £„ < pj. In conclusion, every good is
friend to some factor and enemy to another.
Note that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem formulated in this way is weaker than the
original formulation, since we leave open the possibility that factor 1 does not gain in
real terms, i.e., that its reward might remain constant in terms of p^. However, if it is
assumed that factor owners spend their income on at least two goods and that at least
two factors are used in the production of all goods, the probability that factor 1 will be
faced with a constant real income in terms of £j is very low, indeed.
The weak results concerning the general validity of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
are, as we noted above, quite insensitive to the dimensionality of the model. As Ethier
(1985) points out, increasing the number of commodities does not invalidate the theo-
rem. The same is in principle true for the situation wherein factors outnumber goods.
However, it is possible that the duality results must be changed when dimensions be-
come odd. In the case of factors outnumbering goods, for instance, the result that each
good is friend to a certain factor and enemy to another factor remains true, but the re-
sult that each factor has a distinct enemy can no longer be uphold. In addition, factor
prices can no longer be solved in this case without invoking the factor market equili-
brium conditions.
The above discussion of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows that the theorem can,
in one way or another, be generalised to accommodate to higher dimensions than the
2x2 framework, but that the strong results are only preserved in case technology is
even, i.e., when the number of goods equals the number of factors. That is a most in-
convenient state of the art. As we saw in this section, an increase in the number of
goods resulted only in small changes in the weak results. Conversely, an increase in the
number of factors led to relatively substantial changes in the weak results. It follows
therefore that for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to be true, the key issue is whether or
not the number of goods is at least as large as the number of factors.
However, Ethier (1985, pp. 178-181) has proved that the technological distinction be-
tween goods and factors is not the crucial issue. Rather, as he is able to show, the vali-
dity of the factor price equalisation and Stolper-Samuelson theorem can be reduced to
the question whether or not the number of international markets for both (primary) in-
puts and final goods is larger than the number of (non-traded) factors. This implies that
if the number of factors is larger than the number of final goods, but some or all factors
are internationally traded, factor price equalisation and Stolper-Samuelson results may
still hold.34
2.7 The specific-factors model ,
As we have seen, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the factor price equalisation
theorem are frequently used to derive the factor price effects of commercial policies.
Both theorems assume that factors of production may instantaneously and costlessly be
relocated between sectors. In the last two decades or so, several contributions to the lite-
rature have been made, in which the implications of factor specificity were analyzed.
These include Jones (1971), Samuelson (1971), Mayer (1974) and Mussa (1978, 1982) and
Neary (1978). There are several reasons why factors of production may be sector-speci-
fic. Factors may be embodied in a particular physical form (capital), or may simply be
unwilling to work in a certain sector (compensating wage differentials), or may be im-
mobile because of certain government measures.
Figure 2.9 The likelihood of factor price equalisation in the specific-factors model
(Source: Dixit and Norman (1980), p. 123)
In the standard version of the specific-factors model, or the Ricardo-Viner model as it
has been labelled by Samuelson, it is assumed that there are barriers to factor move-
ments for certain factors in the sense that some factors are completely immobile in the
short-run, and that these barriers do not extend to the long run. One of the earliest ver-
sions of the model, the Jones (1971) model, assumed that there are three factors; one,
labour, is assumed to be perfectly mobile between the two sectors, while each sector
also employs a certain amount of sector specific capital. This sector specific capital is
tied to the production in that sector, and cannot move in the short-run. Obviously, in
this kind of model, there are three distinct factors, while there are only two goods. AsFacfor prices m /te //icory of m/errM/iona/ /raie 35
was shown in section 2.5, factor price equalisation is precluded in that case. In addition,
as was shown in Mussa (1974), the direction and magnitude of factor price changes in
response to commodity price changes tends to depend on the degree of substitutability
between capital and labour on the one hand and the factor intensities in each industry
on the other. Hence, in the specific-factor model, factor price equalisation and Stolper-
Samuelson results are only obtained in the long-run, and do not apply to the short-run.
Below, we shall discuss both the impossibility of factor price equalisation and the modi-
fication of the Stolper-Samuelson result.
Let us start with a focus on the likelihood of factor price equalisation when there are
specific factors. More specifically, one must prove that factor price equalisation reduces
to a fluke in the presence specific factors. We would suggest the use of the factor alloca-
tion box to prove the point.''' The box in Figure 2.9 refers to a situation where labour
is the mobile factor and capital is the sector-specific factor. Since the model in fact dis-
tinguishes three factors (and two commodities), the box will become three dimensional.
The quantity of labour available to the world is measured along the horizontal axis. Let
the amount of capital used in sector 3 be measured along the vertical axis. Capital em-
ployed by sector 2 is measured along the third direction. The home country origin is
again O^, and the foreign country origin is Op.
Since the first sector employs specific capital, the employment vector for that sector,
measured from the origin O^, must lie at the front side of the box. Measured from the
origin Op, however, the employment vector for sector 1 is at the back side of the box.
For sector 2 one finds that the employment vector, as measured from O^, lies on the left
side in the third direction of the box. Measured from Op, this employment vector lies on
the right hand side in the third direction of the box. Thus, the direction and length of
the employment vector O^Cj is identical to the direction and length of C2Op, whereas
O^Cj and C,Op bear a similar relationship to one another. The figure clearly shows the
emergence of a parallelogram, w'z. O^CiO^On- This parallelogram is a two dimensio-
nal plane in a three dimensional space, and represents the factor price equalisation set.
If factor endowments are located en the plane, it will be possible to replicate the integra-
ted equilibrium through international trade in commodities, and factor price equalisa-
tion will obtain. Off the plane, this is clearly not possible. Needless to say, the require-
ment that endowments be on the parallelogram plane would only be met by coinci-
dence. Hence, the possibility of factor price equalisation is not completely excluded, but
it is most unlikely.
Having established the virtual impossibility of factor price equalisation in the specific-
factors model, we proceed to outline the comparative static results of this model. We
shall use Jones' (1975) version of this model in the context of a two commodity, three
factor formulation. Note, that contrary to Jones' analysis, we shall use the duality formu-
lation which exploits the derivatives of the unit cost functions (c/. Woodland (1977),
(1982)). It will be assumed, that all the usual assumptions regarding production techno-
'" The following is based on Dixit and Norman (1980), pp. 123-124.
'* Dixit and Norman also raise the question of whether or not international factor migration
might increase the likelihood of factor price equalisation. The answer is: yes, for the mobile
factor and: yes/no for the specific factors. In other words, "... international migration of the
factor which is mobile across uses within one country always does the trick, whereas that of a
factor which is specific to the production of one of the goods may or may not suffice". (1980, p.
124.)36 ' Chapter 2
logy, tastes, and the existence of perfect competition are met. The model starts with two
commodity market clearance conditions, which read as
c*(w, rj) = pi (2.16)
and
in which c' denotes the unit cost function of both sectors. Thus commodity market clear-
ance requires that commodities are priced according to the marginal cost = marginal
revenue rule. It will be convenient to write these equations in terms of relative changes
of variables. Total differentiation of the system will give
OiA + eiw* = fc 0.16')
and
e^w = p2 ••-,: (2.170
The endogenous variables in these two equations are îj, ?2 arid w. Clearly, there are
more endogenous variables than equations, so the commodity market clearance condi-
tions do not suffice to solve for all endogenous variables. One needs at least one extra
equation. To obtain that third equation, consider the factor market clearance conditions,
which state that the total supply of every factor should equal total demand for that
factor. Note that Shephard's lemma will give unit demand for a factor. For example,
dcVdw 5 c^, = unit demand for labour in sector i. When multiplies by total output of
sector i, y;, one obtains total labour demand by sector i. Bearing all this in mind, the
factor market clearance conditions may be written as
c}(w, ri).y, = Kj (2.18)
c?(w, rjj.yz = K2 (2.19)
and
c^(w, r^.yi + c£(w, rj)^ = L (2.20)
The third equation that one needs to solve the system easily be obtained by substitution
of (2.18) and (2.19) in equation (2.20). This will give
cJL(w, r,) _ cA(w, r,)
- • K, + 2 7 • *2 = L
It will be convenient to write this equation in terms of relative changes as well and sub-
sequently solve the system formed by equations (2.16')-(2.17') and (2.21). Now define
factor employment ratios in both sectors as kj s c^(w, rj)/cj(w, r,) and kj = c£(w,
r2)/c|(w, rj). Then from the definition of the elasticity of substitution, one will recall
that ki = cKwj - W3) and ^ = O^TÂ^ - W3), with o denoting the elasticity of substitutionFoc/or pnces in fte //œory qf interna/tonai rrade 37
between both factors in both industries. Totally differentiating equation (2.21) and





where 8;: is the share of factor ; in unit cost of sector f, and where X.; denotes the
employment share of the mobile factor (labour) in the total use of that factor, i.e., X; s
Lj/L. System (2.22) may easily be solved by inverting the matrix of coefficients on the
left hand side.
Now assume that a tariff is imposed on sector 2 and that this tariff tends to increase
the price of that commodity, the other sector's price remaining the same. Then, one





w = •ft (2.25)
Note that O^XjO] + Oi^o^ is the determinant of the coefficient matrix on the left hand
side of 222.
The reduced forms in eqs. (2.23M2J5) are complicated expressions in primarily three
variables, uiz. 8^ Xj and o^ and may be hard to interpret at first sight. However, at this
stage, it is already justified to conclude that in addition to factor proportions (as measu-
red by distributive shares SJ, the substitutability between the mobile and the specific
factor in both sectors seems to be crucially determining the response of factor prices to
changes in commodity prices. Equations (2.23M2.25) have been derived in different
ways by different authors. However, the system is formally equivalent to, for instance,
Mayer's (1974), Mussa's (1974), and Jones' (1975) systems, which are all classic referen-
ces.
What can be said about the factors who loose or win? Let us first consider the capital
specific to sector 2. As equation (2.23) shows, r,/p, = (Sj/iOi + XJOJ)/(82,^,05 +
^lr^o^)- This expression > 1, since 8^ < 1. Clearly, the specific factor of the sector who's
price increases gains in real terms as a result from the tariff. Capital specific to sector 2,
however, will loose as a result of the change in p, since r^/pi = /t
" Since we are concerned here with the issue of the distributional effects of commodity price
changes, dL = dKj = dK^ have been set equal to 0.38
)' which is clearly negative. Finally, the effect of the commodity price change on
the wage rate is given by w/^j = 82fA.]O]/(02r^iOj + Oi^o^) < 1. Evidently, the nominal
wage will increase, but not proportionally to the increase in the price of commodity 1.
Hence, it is not clear whether or not labour gains in real terms. That depends on
worker's tastes. If they are biased against the output of sector I, labour will gain,
whereas labour will loose in real terms in the opposite case. Thus, if one is to determine
whether or not labour will gain, there is an index number problem. This result, which is
clearly different from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, has also been labelled as "neo-
classical ambiguity" (Ruffin and Jones (1977)) or the "Haberler theorem" (Kenen (1989),
p. 77).
Ruffin and Jones (1977) have analyzed the precise nature of the index problem that is
inherent in the specific-factor model. They show that labour will gain when the fraction
of the worker's income spent on commodity / is less than the increase in p:. This will
normally be the case when a) the elasticity of the value of marginal product of labour
curve in the protected sector is larger than the economy-wide average; b) when the pro-
tected sector is more labour intensive than the economy-wide average; and, c) labour's
preferences are not biased in the direction of the protected commodity.
Figure 2.10 The specific-factors model
In Figure 2.10 the specific-factors model commodity-factor price relationships have been
depicted. The graph has a left-hand section and a right-hand section. Both have been
used separately in the literature to illustrate the effects of commercial policies in the
specific-factors model. The right hand side of the graph refers to the situation on the
labour market and shows the value of marginal product (VMP) curves in both sectors.
The length of the horizontal axis corresponds to the availability of labour. Vj" is the
value of marginal product for sector i (=1^). Whenever a sector's commodity price
changes, the VMP curve of that sector will shift up- or downwards, depending on the
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sector 1. The VMP curve of that sector will shift to V^'. Since the price of sector 2 does
not change, the VMP curve for that sector will be unaffected and stay in place. The
wage rate will increase to w\ One cannot tell, whether this increase in the nominal
wage will be a real wage increase or a real wage decrease. Clearly, in terms of good
one, the real wage will fall (the vertical distance between the V^ and V^' curve is less
than the increase in wages), and in terms of good two, the wage rate will go up.
The left hand side of the graph shows that, due to the increase in the price of the first
commodity, the unit cost function of that sector will move away from the origin. Given
that the wage rate increases to w', the rental rate in the first sector will increase, where-
as the rental rate in the second sector will do the opposite. Qearly, in terms of both com-
modities, the real rental rate of sector two will fall, whereas the rental rate of sector one
will move in the opposite direction.
2.8 Conclusions
The factor price equalisation theorem has occupied a prominent place in the post-war
development of international trade theory. Although the theorem is based on rather res-
trictive assumptions regarding the production technology and dimensionality, it has
stood up against a substantial amount of criticism. The only serious challenge posed to
the theory concerns the case where factors outnumber goods, which precludes the oc-
currence of factor price equalisation. The theorem does accommodate easily to the case
of (tradeable) goods (in the wide sense of the word) outnumbering (non-traded) factors,
and if one follows Ethier, this may be the relevant case.
Closely connected to the factor price equalisation discussion is the analysis pertaining
to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. This theorem, which predicts that active trade poli-
cies will tend to benefit in real terms the intensive factor and harm in real terms the
non-intensive factor, has also stood up against a good deal of scrutiny. It has been
shown, that the dimensionality problem has no influence on weak formulations of this
theorem, and that the basic message contained in it seems to remain in tact when
dimensions are changes beyond the 2x2 framework.
However, it should be noted that these results are conditional upon the exis-tence of
full inter-sectoral factor mobility. As our discussion of the specific-factors model has
shown, both the factor price equalisation theorem and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
may break down if specific factors are taken into consideration. The implication of all
this, as Samuelson has put it, is that "Ohlin was right" when it comes to his prediction
of the influence of free trade on factor prices, i.e., that factor prices fend to be equalised
as a result of free international trade.CHAPTER
DID WAGE CONVERGENCE OCCUR?
THE EXPERIENCE OF EC-5
3.1 Introduction
In the 1950s there used to be considerable factor price disparities in European countries
(see, o.a., Dollar, Wolff and Baumol (1988)). In this chapter we shall attempt to discern
some tendencies in one factor price, uiz. the wage rate. We confine the analysis to only one
single factor price for reasons of space and data availability.
International comparisons of wages and capital costs are extremely scarce in the litera-
ture. Although there have been several studies aiming to compare wages internationally,
these studies are usually not covering the last decades and mostly date back to the first
fifty years of this century. Some exceptions may be found, but in the most recent decades
economists have not spent a a lot of time carrying out these comparisons. That is all the
more true for international comparisons of capital costs, which one will hardly encounter
in the literature. Most of the work that has been done in this area relates to returns on fi-
nancial investments. Since we are interested in the relationship between production techno-
logy and factor prices, this line of analysis will not occupy us in the present chapter.
Rather, we shall try to analyze the behaviour of wages in the various EC countries.
Both international comparisons of wages and of capital costs are fraught with many me-
thodological difficulties which may be the prime reason for the scarcity of this kind of
studies. We shall devote some words to these methodological problems for wage compari-
sons in section 3.2. In addition, the reader is introduced into the wage data used in our
comparisons in that section. In section 3.3 we proceed to present the actual wage compari-
sons itself and try to discern some tendencies in the available data material. We shall con-
clude that our data confirm some tendencies found by other students of international wage
differentials, notably international convergence, similarity and stability of the wage hier-
archy. Section 3.4 sums up our conclusions.42 Chapter 3 '
3.2 International comparison of wages: conceptual issues, measuring problems and
availability of data
An international comparison of wages and labour costs is fraught with many measuring
problems and conceptual caveats. This section seeks to outline the most important problems
involved and explores the limits of these international comparisons. In addition, we shall
describe the sources and basic characteristics of our data material.
We commence our analysis by denning the concept of "wages". As is well-known, wages
may be interpreted as a source of income on the one hand or as the cost of labour on the
other. Thus, the wage rate has both an income and a cost aspect. International comparisons
of wages can therefore relate to both aspects. For one thing, they may refer to a comparison
of the real income of the populations from different countries. These comparisons enable
us to draw conclusions as to differences in the standard of living. For the other, internatio-
nal comparisons of wages may refer to a confrontation of labour costs, which may give an
indication of a country's competitiveness i>is-a-urs other countries. Both kinds of compari-
sons are fundamentally different from one another, and must necessarily employ different
methods of comparison. The implication of this requirement for different methods is that
real wages cannot be used as a source of reference in international labour cost comparisons
and ince yersa (see, among others, Bowley (1930)).
Most international comparisons of wages that have been reported in the economic and
statistical literature, are international comparisons of real wages, i.e., the purchasing power
of wages, or what we labelled "income" above. Some studies have tried to compare the real
wages of nations on a certain point in time. Others have tried to compare the development
of real wages in the nations concerned. Yet other studies have combined both comparisons.
Whatever the object of comparison may be, however, all real wage comparisons seek to
make (implicit) statements about the utility that workers in different countries may derive
from their income. Needless to say, this is almost, if not completely, an impossible task.
Indeed, as is well-known, interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible, and for that
reason, the international comparisons have to confine themselves to a comparison of the
bundles of goods that a certain wage will buy in a certain country.
The earliest international wage comparisons did not always take the distinction between
wages as a source of income and wages as a cost factor into account (see, e.g., Carey
(1835)). One of the first analyses was a study by the British Board of Trade, which was
undertaken for the years 1905-1909. The study took some basic foodstuffs and contract
wages as a starting point and calculated the number of hours that workers in the countries
under consideration would have to work in order to buy a particular quantity of these
foodstuffs. Needless to say, a major drawback of this study was its inability to take dif-
ferent national consumption habits into account, as well as its focus on contract wages. The
British Ministry of Labour introduced a more sophisticated methodology, which allowed
for country-specific differentiation in consumption habits.
The ILO started international real wage comparisons in 1924 (see ILO (1954) for details).
The international conference of labour statisticians had in 1923 agreed upon the adoptation
of a recommendation which requested countries to supply the ILO with annual data on
hourly wages, weekly hours of work and the prices of a number of products which made
up the largest share of workers' budgets. However, these data did not supply the ILO with
adequate material for comparisons and they were stopped being collected in 1931.
The ECSC (1955) provided one of the first comparisons of real wages in the Member
States of the Community. The study concentrated on particular types of wage earners and
used two definitions of purchasing power parities. For one thing, purchasing power parities
were defined using a basket of commodities in a particular country, and applying this bas-Did u»£e cowper^ence occur? T/K experience of EC-5
ket in a fellow Member State. For the other, a basket defined for another Member State
would be applied to the first country. The purchasing power parities defined in both ways
were subsequently used to compare nominal wages in the Member States.
The ECSC study constituted a major improvement on older studies of wage compari-
sons, since it was not based on a compilation and comparison of national wage statistics.
The value of these national wage statistics for purposes of international wage comparisons
is very limited, indeed. Their use would lead to the emergence of at least three problems,
which bias the results of the comparison. Firs/ of all, the different national statistical offices
do not use identical definitions of wages. Different treatments of premiums on wages, allo-
wances, contract wages or actual wages all hamper an adequate international comparison
of the wage rates. Second/y, differential treatment of social security contributions seriously
distort the picture. T/iird/y and finally, the quantitative and qualitative meaning of these
social security contributions influence the results of national wage statistics.
To overcome the above mentioned problems relating to the use of national statistics, the
Statistical Office of the European Communities has undertaken special surveys on wages
and labour costs using harmonized definitions of these concepts. These surveys were con-
ducted on a regular basis since 1966. However, the main problem with the Eurostat data
is their incomplete coverage of sectors and their unreliability, especially in the years of their
first appearance. Several institutions have tried to overcome the problem of incompleteness
by compiling their own data on the basis of harmonized sources and national sources. The
most well-known are the data collected by the Statistisches Bundesamt and the data col-
lected by the Swedish Employers Federation (SAF). Below, we shall use both Eurostat and
SAF data.
Even if one has the advantage of working with data that have been compiled on the
basis of harmonized definitions, at least three problems thwart an international comparison
of wages. Firs/ of all, to avoid an aggregation bias, the data should preferably be corrected
for differences in countries' industrial structures. Wages for the aggregate manufacturing
sector, for instance, are made up of the average of the wages in textile, chemical, transport
equipment etc. industries, so that the industrial composition of countries might turn out
to be a prominent force behind national manufacturing wage differentials. Preponderance
of many low-wage industries might therefore bias the manufacturing wage rate down-
wards, whereas dominance of high-wage industries may do the opposite. In Hanna (1951)
and Gallaway (1963) techniques were developed to correct for the biases described above.
In the context of international wage differentials, these techniques would imply calculation
of a nation's wage rate as if that nation had the same industrial composition as the entire
EC. Therefore the calculated wage rates would indicate to what extent a wage differential
is attributable to differences in the industry mix of countries.
Second/y, the data should in principle also be corrected for the occupational (or skill) mix
of a country or industry. Differential skill mixes could also bias wage rates in the countries
concerned. The preponderance of high skill, high wage industries would thus bias the wage
rates upwards, while the preponderance of low skill, low-wage industries might do the
opposite. In addition, changes in the skill composition might change the industrial wage
structure in the course of time.
Having data on sectoral wage rates, output and employment, the correction technique
described here should in principle be applied to the wage rates used in this chapter. How-
ever, that would only be possible for the wage rate of the entire manufacturing sector
(NACE 03), and would not be possible for the wage rates of the various sub-sectors. Ob-
viously, the aggregation problem applies just as much to these sub-sectors as to the manu-
facturing sector as a whole. Unfortunately data limitations prevent such a correction. For
this reason we decided not to correct the data. As a further justification for this procedure44 C/wp/er 3
it could be argued that analyses of regional wage differentials in the USA have revealed
that adjustments of wage rates only eliminated as much as one quarter of the North-South
wage differential, so that seventy five per cent remained.' Finally, as was shown by Jacobs
(1985), although the skill composition of the labour force in the EC countries and industrial
branches showed substantial changes in the last decades (which through time all go in the
direction of more indirect and maintenance staff), the relative wages of the categories were
rather stable.* In addition, in many countries the sectoral composition of the manufac-
turing sector, measured by the share of various sub-sectors in total manufacturing industry
value added, also seemed to have changed, without showing a correlation with the relative
wages of the various sectors.
T/iird/y, and finally, even if one is able to use harmonized statistics, the problem remains
which wage concept should be used. In this respect it is possible to use gross or net (of
taxes and other deductions) wages on the one hand or (total) labour costs on the other.
However, for reasons of availability of data, net wages can be ruled out at the outset. That
leaves us with a choice between labour costs and gross wages. If (gross) wages were chosen
as the relevant variable, it might be argued that actual wage data are irrelevant because the
parties involved tend to consider costs and benefits over a longer period (think for example
of the Contract Theory) and/or ignore important components of labour cost and that the
compensation effects of non-wage labour cost undermine the conclusions drawn from
statistical sources. As was shown in Jacobs (1985) these effects should not be exaggerated.
Detailed analyses led him to conclude that (1) contributions for social security and pensions
are largely determined on the basis of the (real) wages of workers; (2) wage concepts which
differ in terms of taxes, social security, overtime, holiday allowances, hours of work, hourly
or weekly income, show a high correlation; (3) analysis of labour-cost statistics gave largely
identical results for relative wages as analysis of statistics of hourly real wages; (4) the
non-wage component of labour costs does not seem to vary much between sectors and
through time, although the overall share of non-labour costs in total wages increased in the
period that Jacobs investigated. Thus it does not seem to matter very much which defini-
tion of wages is adopted. For reasons of data-availability, we therefore decided to restrict
the analysis to labour costs.
The above analysis makes clear, that different methods of comparison and the use of dif-
ferent sources may yield different conclusions. In what follows, we shall work with three
definitions of wages:
1. gross hourly earnings for manual and non-manual workers;
2. hourly labour costs for manual and non-manual workers;
3. yearly labour costs for manual and non-manual workers.
Hourly earnings and hourly labour costs data were taken from Swedish Employers Federa-
tion (1972,1982,1992) and are available for the 1964-1989 period. These data refer to twelve
two- and three-digit ISIC industrial sectors. Yearly labour costs were taken from Eurostat
N/ Accounts, Detai/ed TaWes by Branc/i, various years, and refer to twelve NACE-R25
* Additionally, it could be argued that preponderance of low-wage industries is likely to be ac-
companied by relatively labour-intensive techniques, causing a high correlation between capital-la-
bour ratios on the one hand and skill and industry mix on the other. Therefore, the use of capital-
labour ratios is likely to catch up a significant portion of the influence of industry and skill mix,
see below.
* See also Saunders and Marsden (1981), chapter 4.Did wage convergence occur? 77ie experience 0/ EC-5 45
sectors of industries (availability: 1969-1989). The industrial classifications of the UN and
Eurostat do not overlap entirely, but coincide for several industries.
The advantage of the use of three definitions is that it allows a possibility of checking
for the consistency of the results. All wage data were converted with the aid of two ex-
change rates:
1. The o/jfïcia/ EC17 excfcinge rate. Obviously, when wages are converted with the aid of the
official current exchange rate, the value of an international wage comparison is due to
remain limited. However, if the objective of the investigation is to compare pay levels
as an element of cost competitiveness, the use of official exchange rates may give some
information, provided, of course, that other elements of competitiveness are also taken
into consideration.
2. Purcttflsing power pan'fy exc/u?nge rate (PPPs). Wages were converted with the aid of PPPs,
since the official exchange rate does not necessarily reflect the relative domestic purcha-
sing powers of the currencies involved. The Statistical Office of the European Commu-
nities has compiled PPPs for a variety of purposes (comparisons of GDP, investment
data, capital stocks, etc.). Unfortunately, purchasing power parities for the comparison
of wages and labour costs were not published by Eurostat. Therefore, we were forced
to construct these series ourselves. In doing so, we assumed that the experience of the
EC-5 could serve as a benchmark. The year 1985 was chosen as our base year, since in
this year exchange rates had more or less stabilised after the turbulence of the 1970s and
the EMS had been in operation for six years and seemed to have functioned well. Thus,
we assumed that PPP existed in 1985. The ECU exchange rate was subsequently adjusted
for a countries relative (to EC-5) inflation performance with the aid of the consumer
price index. The resulting exchange rate is what we called the PPP exchange rate for the
year in question.
The countries that we shall cover in our analysis are the five main founding members of
the European Community, uiz. Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands
(hereafter: EC-5). The reason for this limited focus of the analysis is a practical one: suf-
ficiently long data series could not be constructed for the other member states, which
renders their inclusion in the analysis meaningless. In addition, the five countries mention-
ed above will be central to the empirical analysis in Chapters 6 and 7.
3.3 Developments in wage differentials
3.3.1 Gross nour/y zwjges and «our/y /abowr cosfs
In this sub-section we focus on the developments of gross hourly wages and hourly labour
costs. The data used in the analysis were taken from the Swedish Employers Federations'
publications on international comparisons of wages (Swedish Employers Federation SAF,
1972, 1982, 1992) and refer to twelve two- and three-digit ISIC industrial sectors.
We start our analysis with some comments on Table 3.1, which reveals the rank orders
of the sectors in the five main founding countries of the EC (EC-5) for the years 11964,1975
and 1989. The information in this table does nof show how the pay level of a certain sector
in one country compares with that in another country, but orders pay levels within each
individual country. The gross hourly wages and hourly labour costs refer to all workers,











Food, beverages & tobacco
Textiles
Wearing apparel, except footwear
Leather and products of leather,
leather substitutes, fur and footwear
Wood & wood products, incl. furniture
Paper and paper products
Printing, publishing & allied products
Chemicals and chemical, petroleum,
coal, rubber and plastic products
Non-metallic mineral products,































































































































































































































































































































































































" ghw = gross hourly wage; hlc = hourly labour costsDid itwge convergence occur? Trie experience of £C-5
The table shows some very interesting points which were also found by other students of
branch wage differentials. Although there exist some national peculiarities, the information
in Table 3.1 seems to represent something like a more or less si/niiar hierarchy of branches
in all countries. We find some notorious low-wage sectors in all countries, which turn out
to be roughly the same everywhere. These sectors include: wearing apparel, which is at the
very bottom of the wage hierarchy in all countries, textiles and leather, and to a lesser
extent, wood and wood products. Several branches may be classified as intermediate-wage
industries: paper and paper products, non-metallic minerals, and fabricated metal products.
High-wage industries include basic metals, chemicals, printing and publishing, and, in
some cases, motor vehicles.
Note also that this hierarchy is rather staWe in the course of time. Most industries that
were low-wage industries in 1964 also tended to be low-wage industries in 1975 and 1989.
Conversely, high-wage industries in 1964 tended to remain in the top-end of the wage
hierarchy in 1975 and 1989.
The similarity of industry wage structures is well evidenced. Butler (1967) found, for in-
stance, that the ranking of industries by labour cost was largely identical in the different
countries of Europe, despite international differences in collective bargaining procedures,
extent of unionisation, and government wage policy. Similarity of wage structures was also
found by Saunders and Marsden (1980), and is in fact apparent from many international
comparisons of wage structures (c/. Papola and Bharadwaj (1970), see also Krueger and
Summers (1987)). Many others found a remarkable stability of industry wage structures,
that is, the ranking of industries by wage levels appears relatively constant in time (OECD
(1965), OECD (1985), Reder (1962)).
This result, which is known as the "stability" thesis, leaves the possibility of narrowing
or broadening intersectoral wage differentials open. To obtain an idea of the development
of the magnitude of international wage differentials, consider Table 3.2, which gives an
indication of the relative dispersion between EC-5 nations of gross nour/y uwges in several
sectors of industry. The relative dispersion in this table is measured by the coefficients of
variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the five countries, average wage
in the relevant sector. Let us first discuss the all-industry average for the manufacturing
sector (ISIC 3).
Consider the first definition of wages, i.e., wages converted by the official current ex-
change rate. A quick glance at the table reveals that the wage dispersion at the beginning
and at the end of the observation period was relatively small, something in the order of
some 15 per cent. However, between 1964 and 1989 there is hardly any movement in the
direction of convergence of wages. On the contrary, starting in 1970, there is clear evidence
of divergence, which lasts until 1978. In that year developments seem to reverse to conver-
gence again, but in 1985/86, there is another reversal in the trend towards divergence. On
balance, therefore, the wage dispersion is just as high in 1989 as it was in 1964.
Things look completely different if one looks at wages converted by the PPP exchange
rates. If we employ PPP converted wages, there is some evidence of divergence until 1968,
but after that year there is clear and strong evidence of a movement towards convergence.''
Between 1968 and 1984 the dispersion decreases from 25 per cent to 11 per cent, which is
a reduction of more than 50 per cent. Starting in 1985, there seems to be a reversal in this
trend, but the observation period ends in 1989, so it is impossible to conclude that we are
dealing here with a structural trend reversal in the direction of divergence.
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Explanatory notes:
" The ISIC numbers represent the sectors:
3 Manufacturing
31 Food, beverages & tobacco
321 Textiles
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear
323/4 Leather and products of leather, leather substitutes, fur and foot-
wear
33 Wood & wood products, incl. furniture
341 Paper and paper products
342 Printing, publishing and allied products
35 Chemicals and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic pro-
ducts
36 Non-metallic mineral products, except products of petroleum and
coal
37 Basic metal industries
38 Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
3843 Motor vehicles
^ Definitions of wages used:
(1) nominal wages at current ECU rate
(2) nominal wages at PPPs
'> The Netherlands not included
The above general picture is confirmed if we consider the individual sectors of industry.
The average dispersion, measured at current exchange rates, is somewhat between 10 and
20 per cent. In most industries, the 1970s implied a divergence in wages. Thus, there is a
great degree of similarity in the international wage developments of various sectors. Addi-
tionally, the dispersion at the end of the 1980s roughly equals that of the beginning of the
observation period. Exceptions are ISIC 322 (wearing apparel, except footwear), 323/324
(leather and products of leather, leather substitutes, fur and footwear), and, to a much less
extent, 33 (wood and wood products, including furniture) and 36 (non-metallic mineral
products, except products of petroleum and coal). Interesting is also the development of
the wage dispersion in the motor vehicles industry (ISIC 3843), which seems to have
increased.
Expressed in PPP exchange rates, most industries also exhibit a diverging trend until
1967/68 and a converging trend after that year. In addition, in the majority of industries
the converging trend in gross hourly wages ends in 1985/86, which seems to mark the start
of divergence again. The motor vehicles industry, however, provides also in this case the
exception to the rule.
Summarizing so far, it seems that there is evidence of a converging trend in gross hourly
wages. In Table 3.3 we have repeated the exercise from Table 3.2 for hourly labour costs.
Note that the dispersion in hourly labour costs is significantly lower than the dispersion
in gross hourly earnings. Whereas the coefficient of variation for gross hourly earnings was














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.21Did zwage convergence occur? T/ie experience of EC-5 53
cent only for hourly labour costs. The same is true for labour costs expressed in PPPs
exchange rates. Thus, wage dispersion is smaller when one looks at labour costs as com-
pared to gross hourly earnings.
Note also, that, on balance, the trend in hourly labour costs, converted by the current
official ECU exchange rate, is roughly similar to the trend in gross hourly wages. Most
industries show a strong diverging trend in the 1970s, which reverses in 1978/79 to conver-
gence, and, finally, seems to turn back into (slight) divergence again after 1985. The excep-
tions to this trend are the same as in the case of gross hourly earnings. Thus, if one is
interested in the development of relative wage dispersion, gross hourly earnings and
hourly labour costs seem to yield almost identical results.
The trends for labour costs expressed in PPPs are also identical to those in gross hourly
earnings. Note that, at the end of the 1980s, the dispersion in PPP wages has decreased to
less than 10 per cent.
Table 3.4 gives an indication of the magnitude of the pay differential between countries for
the same sectors of industry. Consider first the pay differential for the all-industry average.
Expressed in the current official exchange rate, Germany clearly should be characterised
as a high-wage country during the entire period of observation. Interestingly, Germany's
relative position declined steadily until 1985, but after that year German wages increased
again relative to the EC-5 average. The Netherlands and Belgium are both average at the
beginning and the end of the period, but had wages that were substantially above the ave-
rage in the 1970s. In the 1980s, their relative position declined again. Italy and France clear-
ly should be characterised as low-wage countries for the entire observation period. As far
as Italy's experience is concerned, note that this country seemed to catch up with the high-
wage countries during the 1960s, but that its relative position seems to deteriorate again
in the 1970s, a development which is probably due to the exchange rate turbulence of that
decade. In the 1980s, however, Italy's relative position seems to have improved consider-
ably. For France, on the other hand, one may observe a steady decline in its relative posi-
tion, the beginning of the 1980s marking an exception to this trend.
Expressed in PPPs, the above picture changes but marginally. Germany remains a high-
wage country whose relative position declines until 1985, and improves afterwards. Dutch
wages are also substantially above average, but after 1975, The Netherlands' position seems
to deteriorate. Belgian wages are around average at both the beginning and the end of the
observation period, and seem to be above average during the 1970s. Furthermore, the PPP
wages confirm Italy's catching up with the high-wage countries, and we do not observe the
set-back that occurs if one would express wages in current exchange rates. Finally, the PPP
wage definition also confirms France's decline towards the average during the beginning
of the 1970s, be it that this decline seems to be less dramatic than according to the current
exchange rate definition of wages. Thus, it seems that the decline in the relative dispersion
of wages may be traced back to reduced differences between the highest and the lowest
wages in the EC.
If we look at individual industries in greater detail, the general all-industry picture is
roughly confirmed. During the 1964-1985 period, German supremacy, both measured in
current and PPP exchange rates, seems to decline in all (but one) industries and seems to
increase again after 1985. Although there is a sharp increase in German relative (to EC-5)
wages in some industries after 1985, the relative position of German industry wages is not
as high as it was in 1964. Belgian wages increase relatively in the 1970s, and seem to de-
crease after 1980. The same pattern may be observed for Dutch wages, except that the
decline of relative wages seems to set in a few years earlier than in Belgium. In the 1964-85
period, Italian PPP wages seem to catch up substantially in most sectors, and seem to fall54

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.02 1.31 0.87 0.71 1.09
1.03 1.27 0.84 0.75 1.10
1.12 1.17 0.80 0.78 1.13
1.12 1.19 0.85 0.79 1.05
1.06 1.21 0.91 0.83 0.99































back slightly after 1985. Measured in current exchange rates, Italian relative wages go down
in the 1970s, increase sharply at the beginning of the 1980s and fall back marginally after
1985. French relative wages, both measured in current exchange rates and PPPs also show
a setback in the 1970s, a recovery at the beginning of the 1980s, and a small decline again
after 1985.
In sum, we may conclude that the available material indicates a movement in the direction
of wage convergence. This tendency is less visible if we employ current official ECU ex-
change rates, but is clearly observable in case wages are expressed in PPPs and constant
(1985) exchange rates. Obviously, the convergence of wages is the result of a relative de-
cline in Germany's relative position and an improvement of Italy's relative position in the
EC-5 wage hierarchy.Did uwge convergence occur? The experience of EC-5 57
3.3.2 Wages in EF771 countries
In the previous sub-section we discussed the development of wage differentials in the EC-5.
It would be interesting to see in how far the developments reported above are unique for
the EC-5 region and whether or not they carry over to other areas as well. In this respect,
a comparison of EC-5 wage developments with the developments in another major
integrating area naturally comes to mind. Fortunately, the SAF wage database contains
sufficiently long and relatively complete series on gross hourly wages in five EFTA coun-
tries, uiz. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Austria.*
In Table 3.5 we analyze the rank ordering of sectors in these countries. We observe a
similar pattern as we came across in the EC-5. Once more, one may identify notorious low-
wage sectors like textiles, leather, and wearing apparel industries. In the high-wage and
intermediate-wage sectors, the degree of similarity is much less than in the EC-5. Further-
more, note that, as far as the stability issue is concerned, quite a bit of capricious turbulence
may be observed in some countries. The Norwegian, Finnish and Austrian wage structures
are clearly the most stable. However, in Sweden, we observe that the 1964 number one
industry (printing and publishing) is replaced by an intermediate-wage industry (paper and
paper products) in 1985. In Switzerland, an intermediate-wage industry manages to
penetrate into the top of the wage hierarchy. Finally, some industries appear to be in the
top of the wage spectrum in most countries. These are: printing and publishing, basic metal
industries, and metal products.
Table 3.6 reveals the coefficients of variation for gross hourly wages and highlights some
interesting similarities and differences with the EC-5 experience as well. Let us again start
with the all-industry average. Measured in the current official ECU exchange rate, the wage
disparity in EFTA-5 decreases between 1964 and 1989 from some 29 to 17 per cent. This im-
plies a reduction of wage dispersion with approximately one third, and stands in contrast
with the development of the EC-5 wage differential. In addition, we may observe that
EFTA-5 dispersion was much larger (almost twice as large) than EC-5 wage dispersion in
1964. At the end of the observation period, however, wage dispersion in the two areas have
become roughly the same (15 and 17 per cent for EC-5 and EFTA-5, respectively). Note
also, that EFTA-5 wage dispersion tended to increase until 1969, and starts to decrease after
that year. In the 1969-89 period one may observe a steady and continuous decline in wage
dispersion.
Measured in PPPs, the data reveal a considerable convergence. Apart from the 1968/69
period, which marks a short and marginal divergence, the coefficient of variation decreased
from some 47 per cent in 1964 to some 14 per cent in 1989, a reduction of approximately
two thirds. Hence, it appears that the EFTA-5 PPP wages converged to a much larger
extent than the EC-5 PPP wages, where the reduction amounts to roughly one third of the
initial wage dispersion.
In the individual sectors of industry, the above described pattern shows up in the majo-
rity of cases. Note that the dispersion, measured in current official exchange rates, is higher
in EFTA-5 than in EC-5 in practically all industries at the end of the observation period.
However, EFTA-5's achievements in terms of current and PPP exchange rates are certainly
not less impressive than those of EC-5, and it seems fair to conclude that EFTA-5 wages
converged at least as much as did EC-5 wages.
* Below we do not focus attention on hourly labour costs in EFTA-5, since these data are far
from complete and sufficiently long series could not meaningfully be produced.Table 3.5 Rank ordering of EFTA-5 gross hourly earnings (EFTA-5, ISIC industrial sectors)
Food, beverages & tobacco
Textiles
Wearing apparel, except footwear
Leather and products of leather,
leather substitutes, fur and footwear
Wood & wood products, incL furniture
Paper and paper products
Printing, publishing & allied products
Chemicals and chemical, petroleum,
coal, rubber and plastic products
Non-metallic mineral products,
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'*'** See explanatory notes to Table 3.ZTable 3.6 (Continued)





































































































































































































































































































































































**' ^ See explanatory notes to Table 3.ZDid uwge convergence occur? The experience 0/ EC-5 61
3.3.3 Labour cos/ per mam/ear
In this sub-section we shall discuss the development of labour costs per manyear. The data
for this analysis were taken from the Mrfiona/ /iccoun/s, De/ai/ed TaWes by Branch, which are
published by Eurostat. This source contains sectoral data on a variety of variables and has
been published by Eurostat on a regular basis since 1970. The yearly labour costs were
calculated by dividing the amount of compensation of employees by the total number of
salary earners in manyears. The wage rates that were obtained in this way pertain to 14
NACE R-25 manufacturing sectors.
In Table 3.7 we have listed the coefficients of variation for the sectors under considera-
tion. For each sector, we converted wages by the official current ECU exchange rate and
the PPP exchange rate (definitions 1 and 2, resp.). Let us start with the all-industry average
wage for the manufacturing sector (NACE 3). Expressing wages in current ECU exchange
rates, we observe a marginal decline in dispersion in 1970, but a strong increase in disper-
sion after that year. This diverging tendency continues until 1978/79, which marks the start
of a strong convergence in wages. This converging trend continues until the end of the
observation period. All in all, wage dispersion decreases from 11 per cent in 1970 to some
5 per cent in 1989, which implies a reduction of more than half of the initial dispersion.
The dispersion of PPP wages shows a continuous trend downwards. In 1969, dispersion
equals 13 per cent, and this percentage seems to decline to some 8 per cent in 1989, which
is a reduction of approximately 40 per cent. There is a short and marginal increase in
dispersion after the second oil shock in 1979, but that event could not reverse the structural
downward trend in the direction of convergence. Hence, it seems fair to say, that the yearly
labour cost information strongly supports the converging trend that we found for gross
hourly wages and hourly labour costs.
By and large, the individual manufacturing sectors display a similar pattern. In most cases,
dispersion expressed in both exchange rates seems to decline. Exceptions to this tendency
may be found in the following cases: a. for wages expressed in current exchange rates, dis-
persion increases in the chemical sector (NACE 17), agricultural and industrial machinery
(NACE 21), and transport equipment (NACE 28); b. for PPP wages, dispersion increases
in the chemical sector (NACE 17), agricultural and industrial machinery (NACE 21), and
office and dataprocessing machines, precision and optical instruments (NACE 23). There-
fore, it seems safe to conclude that wages have converged in the vast majority of cases.
Table 3.8 lists the labour costs in each country relative to the EC-5 average. These data
reveal some interesting similarities and differences with the gross hourly wages and hourly
labour costs. Firs/ o/a/T, note that the German supremacy in the hourly wage hierarchy lar-
gely disappears if we look at labour costs per manyear. German wages are, over the entire
observation period, roughly equal to the average EC-5 wage rate. However, some German
branches clearly show a lower or higher wage than the EC-5 average. Significantly below
average are the ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metal (NACE 13), the electrical goods
(NACE 25), the food, beverages and tobacco (NACE 36), the textiles and clothing (NACE
42), and the paper and printing (NACE 47) industries. Distinctly higher than average are
agricultural and industrial machinery (NACE 21), and the transport equipment (NACE 28)
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Table 3.7 (Omfmued)
Note:
" The sector classification codes refer to the following NACE R-25 sectors:
30 Manufacturing products
13 Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
15 Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
17 Chemical products
19 Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
21 Agricultural and industrial machinery
23 Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
25 Electrical goods
28 Transport equipment
36 Food, beverages and tobacco
42 Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
47 Paper and printing products
49 Rubber and plastic products
48 Other manufacturing products
^ Definitions of wages used:
(1) nominal wages at current ECU rate
(2) nominal wages at PPPs
Second/y, note that French wages are generally higher than average, although there seems
to be a decreasing tendency in French relative wages. This result is in contrast with what
we found for hourly wages and labour costs, where it was concluded that French relative
wages were below average. Apparently, the weekly hours of work offered by French wor-
kers exceed those of German workers.
For Italy we find a confirmation of its convergence towards the average. In many sectors,
this convergence is quite substantial, indeed. Although most Italian sectors show a set back
in the 1970s, convergence re-emerges in the 1980s, and more than makes up for the loss
which marked the 1970s.
Finally, Dutch and Belgian wages also reveal a similar pattern as what we found for
hourly wages and labour costs. Expressed in current exchange rates both countries have
considerably higher wages than the average in the 1970s, and experience a decline again
in the 1980s, although the magnitude of this decline varies per sector. PPP wages in The
Netherlands were clearly above average in the 1970s, and subsequently declined towards
the average. In some sectors, Dutch wages even decline below average, and occasionally
even below the level of Italian wages (agricultural and industrial machinery, transport
equipment, and other manufacturing products). Except in the transport equipment and tex-
tiles and clothing industries, Belgian wages remain higher than the average.
In sum, we may conclude that our data imply a considerable decline in EC-5 wage differen-
tials. This decline is primarily caused by Italy's catching up with the average, and with a
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In this chapter we analyzed the development of the wage differential in the five most
important founding countries of the EC. We worked with a relatively high level of aggrega-
tion, notably NACE 2 digit and ISIC 2 and, occasionally, 3 digit industries. Although our
data material is therefore quite crude, we found some interesting tendencies. These may
be summarized as follows:
a. for gross hourly wages and hourly labour costs:
- expressed in current official ECU exchange rates, wages did not show much conver-
gence in the EC-5 region. However, since current exchange rates to a large extent
reflect inflation differentials between countries, one should be extremely careful in the
interpretation of dispersion measures based upon this method of comparison.
- expressed in PPP exchange rates, we found evidence of a considerable convergence in
wage rates. This convergence takes place in the vast majority of industrial sectors and
is primarily due to low-wage countries which catch up with the EC-5 average and
high-wage countries which fall back to the EC-5 average.
b. as far as yearly labour costs per manyear in the EC-5 area are concerned, we also find
clear and convincing evidence of convergence according to both exchange rate defini-
tions of wages.
c. Finally, we found evidence of convergence in the EFTA-5 region as well. Thus, it
appears that convergence was not restricted to the EC, and that this phenomenon is seen
between other countries than EC-5 as well.CHAPTER
SOME EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we pointed at three regularities in the available data material.
As far as a country's internal wage structure was concerned, we found that there is a
considerable stability in that wage structure. As far as an international comparison of
the wage structure was concerned, the evidence indicated a considerable amount of
similarity between countries. Finally, as far as the development of (international) wage
differentials was concerned, we found considerable evidence of international wage con-
vergence, be it that existing wage differentials did not totally disappear and therefore
also seem to be quite persistent.
The three dimensions of wage differentials which are mentioned above have been dis-
cussed in two branches of economic literature. The theory of labour economics has pri-
marily dealt with the explanation of the stability and similarity of wage structures. Inter-
national trade theory has primarily adressed the persistence and development of inter-
national wage differentials. This chapter's purpose is to review the most important con-
tributions from both branches of the literature. Since our point of departure is a trade
theoretical one, contributions from that part of the literature will receive most of our
attention.
The theory of labour economics offers two types of explanations for the stability and
similarity of wage structures, uzz. competitive explanations and non-competitive expla-
nations. In explanations of the first type, factors like compensating wage differentials
and different quality levels of workers are emphasized. In explanations of the second
type, factors like labour market institutions, insider-outsider relations and firms' abilities
to pay economic rents have surfaced as explanatory variables. These studies will be sur-
veyed in section 4.2.
In the international trade literature four types of study have addressed the problem
of the persistence and development of wage differentials. All these studies could, in one
way or another, be regarded as tests of (certain aspects of) the factor price equalisation
theorem. Firsf, one could try to find out whether or not the most important assumptions
underlying factor price equalisation theory are fulfilled. This kind of test has occupied a
substantial part of the empirical literature and will be the topic of section 4.3.70
The second kind of test that has been used assumes that the conditions underlying
factor price equalisation theory are fulfilled and consists of a test of the imp/ica/ions of
that theory. These implications will be discussed in section 4.4. In addition to that, we
shall try to improve on these studies and attempt to evaluate their contribution. We
shall conclude that, with a few exceptions, their nature is ad toe, rather than based on
optimising behaviour on the part of economic agents. Thus, one could argue that these
studies do not test the predictions of the theory they are pretending to test.
The f/nrd kind of model takes the microeconomic production and cost theory as a
starting point and attempts to derive values for the Stolper-Samuelson elasticities direct-
ly from estimates of the parameters of production or cost functions. These studies,
which shall be discussed in section 4.5, are able to yield precise estimates of the distri-
butional effects of trade policies.
F/wfl//y, one could try to estimate the parameters of a growth model, to see how this
model explains factor price behaviour, and to investigate whether or not it predicts a
convergence of factor prices when trade is liberalised. Section 4.6 contains a discussion
of a model that is inspired on models of the development of regional wage differentials
in the USA. The model concerns aggregate wage differentials and is applied to the
founding countries of the EC.
4.2 The theory of wage structures
In the previous chapter we found evidence of a considerable similarity and stability of
the national wage structures in the EC-5 and EFTA-5 regions. This finding is by no
means a peculiarity of our study and has been well-documented in the literature (cf.
Butler (1967), Saunders and Marsden (1980), Papola and Bharadway (1970), OECD
(1965, 1985), Reder (1962), Molle and Van Mourik (1989)). Many of the studies addres-
sing the problem of international wage structure comparisons have confined themselves
to the measurement of wage differentials as such, and do not pass beyond mere specu-
lation as to the causes of the tendencies they claim to observe, for instance the influence
of economic integration. An exception is Bouteiller (1971), who put forward and tested
some hypotheses about industrial structures of wages in each national economy. He
found that in each of the five founding countries of the EC, the variation of earnings a-
mong industries was, on average, reasonably well explained by the same factors, name-
ly: sectoral differences in labour productivity, the quality of labour, the percentage of
females, the concentration degree of industries, and a measure of the capital-labour ratio
of each industry. Bouteiller's study suffers from two serious drawbacks, however. Ffrsf,
like most studies, it limits the explanation to separate national wage structures and,
therefore, cannot be said to have tested a theory of international wage differentials.
Second, Bouteiller's empirical analyses are based on cross-sectional evidence, whereas a
theory of international interindustry wage differentials would give an indication of the
temporal adjustment process. However, the question of the temporal development of
wage structures is left untouched in his analysis.
Recently the OECD (1985) gave a new impetus to the study of this matter by explain-
ing the changes in relative wages with the help of a model, in which changing produc-
tivity, concentration of sectors, changing import penetration and export performance,
and changes in the value of shipments were significant explanatory variables. However,
the differences among countries in the sizes of coefficients and the mix of explanatory
variables, and the fact that of the European countries only the UK has been considered,
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In Molle and Van Mourik (1989*) several studies were brought together which gave a
fresh look on the matter. The empirical analyses for the EC countries revealed that sig-
nificant wage differentials between these countries still existed in the 1970s and 1980s.
The analysis showed that there are three high-wage countries, viz. The Netherlands, Bel-
gium and Germany. The countries with wages below EC-average were France, the U.K.
and Italy. As to the sectoral composition of international wage differentials, the conclu-
sion seemed warranted that although there have been some changes in the European
wage structure in the 1970-1985 period, high-wage countries tended to remain high-
wage countries, whereas low-wage countries also tended to keep their position in the
wage hierarchy. Despite the fact that there seems to have been a narrowing of wage dif-
ferentials in some sectors, the overall picture was one of stability.
As far as the internal wage structure in these countries is concerned, the overall
picture was also one of stability. It turned out that high-wage sectors generally remain-
ed being so in the course of time and that low-wage sectors also tended to keep their
position in the bottom of the wage hierarchy.
As Vasille (1989) has shown, these results hold, regardless of the definition of wages.
The sectoral wage hierarchy, whether expressed in terms of (gross) hourly earnings or
hourly labour costs, or in terms of worker compensation per manyear proves to be
rather stable in the course of time, although there are countries where the magnitude of
the sectoral wage differential has declined.
The question arises, of course, what factors might account for the observed similarity
and stability of the wage structure. Broadly speaking, one could argue that wages are
the result of competitive forces, i.e., interaction of demand and supply, and non-compe-
titive forces. As far as competitive forces are concerned, a distinction between factors
determining the supply and factors determining the demand for labour may be useful,
as Molle and Van Mourik (1989*) have suggested. As far as non-competitive forces are
concerned one might think of the influence of the institutional structure or culture and
traditions.
Supp/y determining forces causing sectoral wage differentials that have been promi-
nent in the literature are the following. Firs/, imperfect intersectoral mobility of labour
precludes reallocation of labour in response to a wage differential when the returns ex-
ceed the costs of such a movement. As a consequence, factor price differentials will per-
sist, even in the long-run. Second, the skill structure is another important supply deter-
mining force of branch wage differentials. As Vasille's (1989) analysis has confirmed,
high-wage industries frequently require higher skills from their workers than lower-
wage ones. In this respect, an interesting correlation that has been found on many occa-
sions is the one between the high wages for skilled and unskilled workers. Industries
that make an intensive use of skilled workers frequently tend to pay high wages to their
unskilled workers as well.
Closely related to the skill factor is that of human capital accumulation at the work-
place, or average length of service of workers. A worker who remains in a company's
employ for a long period of time probably receives a good deal of on-the-job-training,
an investment which may be expected to pay off in the form of higher wages. The im-
plication is that such demographic factors as the age distribution of workers employed
by an industry may be important for the analysis of wage intersectoral differentials.
T/iird, the gender composition of a sector's workforce is an important determinant of
wage differentials. It is a well-documented fact that females are traditionally over-repre-
sented in such industries as textiles, clothing, etc. Consequently these branches will have72
an ample supply of workers, and their wages will not rise above the all-industry ave-
rage.
As far as demand determining factors are concerned, Vasille (1989) has confirmed that
productivity is a factor which has a significant influence on the sectoral structure of
wages. Productivity in turn depends heavily on the industry's capital-labour ratio and
the possibilities of substitution between these factors of production. Technical progress
is another factor. That element has been neglected in most empirical analyses of long-
term developments in sectoral wage structures, although such concepts as rate and bias
of technical progress were originally developed in a study on the theory of wages
(Hicks (1932)). A final factor operating on the demand side is the size of establishments.
Most probably, individual branches of industry show significant differences on that
score. Several conditions might work towards higher wages in industries with relatively
large firms. For one thing, large firms might be able to employ a high proportion of
skilled workers. For the other, if they occupy a monopoly position, this will enable them
to charge higher prices than under perfect competition, which would normally result in
higher wages, as Dunlop (1944) already has pointed out. Vasille (1989^) has presented
some evidence in support of this hypothesis.
An important msfzfwfiomi/ or non-competitive factor operating on the supply side
which may account for the stability of wage structures is the nature of collective bar-
gaining.' Two outcomes, both leading to a stable wage structure, may be envisaged in
this respect. If wage bargaining is strongly centralised, i.e., wage agreements being con-
cluded in nation-wide negotiations, the outcomes are likely to be moderate wage
changes in industries with high productivity growth rates on the one hand, and relative-
ly high wage increases in sectors with relatively low productivity growth rates. If, on
the other hand, bargaining is relatively decentralised, imitation effects may become
more important. In that context, the so-called wage-leadership hypothesis has become
popular, according to which high pay increases in strong industries will be imitated by
weaker ones. Needless to say, such a development, too, readily results in stable wage
structures.
The efficiency wage model constitutes an other interesting recent example of models
emphasizing non-competitive factors explaining the wage structure. Starting point in
this literature is the observation that it may be beneficial for high-wage firms to pay
wages in excess of marginal labour productivity and that it would be unprofitable to cut
these high wages. According to this literature, reducing wages may in itself be beneficial
for the firm, but the resulting decline in productivity might be a considerable cost asso-
ciated with wage reductions. The efficiency wage literature has put forward several rea-
sons why firms might find it profitable to pay efficiency wages (see, o.a., Katz and Sum-
mers (1989)). Among others, we may point at the firms desire to deter the workers from
shirking, high costs for monitoring workers' performance, labour turn-over costs, ease of
recruiting, and adverse selection.
Another possible explanation for the inter-industry wage structure which emphasizes
non-competitive elements is offered by the so-called insider-outsider theory. According
to this theory, wages are the result of a bargaining process in which firms and their "in-
siders" share the economic rents from insider employment. Consequently, when firms
stand to lose considerably from a breakdown of these negotiations, insiders' wages will
' The importance of labour market institutions as a determinant of labour market perform-
ance was stressed in, o.a., Bruno and Sachs (1985), Calmfors and Driffil (1988). See also Seidel
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be higher. Thus, insiders' power is an important factor determining wages. Insiders'
power in turn depends on industry specific conditions, like profit opportunities, pro-
duction technology, industry concentration and workers' market power in their
industries. Therefore, it is likely that inter-industry wage differentials reflect these
differences in sectoral conditions.
Apart from the supply and demand determining factors mentioned above, Jacobs
(1989) has pointed at some non-economic factors determining the wage structure. Con-
ceivably, such factors as tradition or ideas of fair pay exert some influence on the struc-
ture of wages. Tradition may account for wage differentials that are not justified by pro-
ductivity differentials or other objective economic criteria, but represent a society's con-
servative tendency to preserve relics from the past. Fair pay ideas frequently converge
in governments and through them exert some influence on the structure of wages. In-
flexible ideas of fair pay have given rise to protection of weak industries on many occa-
sions, thus securing higher wages than would have been achieved otherwise under con-
ditions of international competition.
4.3 The debate on factor intensity reversals .
In the preceding section we saw that most empirical studies explain wage structures
using productivity or some approximation of this, plus some non-competitive factors as
explanatory variables. It is a remarkable feature of the empirical literature, however,
that non of the studies mentioned has attempted to explain wage differentials using the
elements from the theory of international trade mentioned in Chapter 2. In this respect,
the most obvious candidates for such an explanation are limited mobility and the
existence of factor intensity reversals. In this section we shall concentrate on the latter
and try to formulate a position as to the empirical relevance of factor intensity reversals.
Although Ohlin, did not pay much attention to the possibility of factor intensity rever-
sals, other authors after him did. In his paper on factor price equalisation, Lerner (1933)
showed awareness of the possibility of factor intensity reversals, in that he drew several
figures in which isoquants would intersect more than once. However, he also expressed
the believe that this case would be highly unlikely in reality. This position was initially
also taken by the majority of Lerner's successors. In this respect, Samuelson argued that,
though an interesting theoretical possibility, factor intensity reversals would not be very
likely as an empirical phenomenon. It was not until Leontief's (1953, 1964) studies on
the factor content of US foreign trade that economists started worrying about the
possibility of factor intensity reversals.
At the same time it was realised that the strong factor intensity assumption was
rather unrealistic. Harrod (1958) expressed it as his belief that this assumption makes
the whole notion of factor price equalisation inapplicable to reality. In this respect,
Pearce (1959) also pointed out that an increase in the number of factors would increase
the possibility of factor intensity reversals. As a matter of fact, factor-intensities are ex-
tremely difficult to measure once there are more than two factors. To eliminate the large
number of potential cross-overs, very special production functions might be necessary,
so that one might end up having a theory without any empirical foundation whatso-
ever.
Since the concept of factor intensities becomes rather troublesome in the case more
than two production factors are distinguished, all empirical analyses of factor intensity
reversals limit the number of factors to two. A special problem in the first empirical stu-
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function should be capable of displaying the reactions of factor-intensities on changes in
factor price ratios for every distinguished commodity and should have no a priori res-
trictions as regards to the value of the elasticity of substitution. The CES production
function, which was introduced by Arrow, Chenery, Minnas and Solow (1961) (hereaf-
ter: ACMS) seemed particularly well-suited to meet these requirements. As is well-
known, the Cobb-Douglas production function always exhibits a unitary elasticity of
substitution. This implies that although the distribution coefficients might differ be-
tween sectors, all sectors would still exhibit an elasticity of substitution of 1. However,
this need not be the case with the CES function. The CES function can be written as fol-
lows:
Y = [ail/*!
Since factors are rewarded their marginal products, we may also write for sector i
where l/(fi;+l) is the elasticity of substitution o.
Taking double logaritms yields: '
log (K/L); = Ojlogtai/c^i + Ojlog(w/r);
Now recall that in the case of factor intensity reversals, the capital-intensities in indus-
tries i and ;' will be the same in the cross-over point, so that we have
log (K/L)j = Ojlog(ai/ct2)j + Ojlog(w/r);
log (K/L)j = Ojlog(ai/ct2)j + Ojlog(w/r)j
and log(K/L)j = log(K/L): from which we can solve for w/r and obtain the following
expression
log(w/r) = -
This equation shows at which factor price there will be a reversal of factor intensities. In
case this factor price would be a very "realistic" one, we say that factor intensity revers-
als are in the "relevant range", and therefore they may be very likely to occur in reality.
In a book on this subject, Minnas (1963) has tried to obtain plausible empirical esti-
mates for the parameters of the production function using cross-section data from 19
countries. The estimated values for otj, 04 and o for the six industries in his sample are
reported in Table 4.1. An inspection of this table clearly reveals that the coefficients
found by Minnas differ across industries, indicating that factor intensity reversals might
certainly occur.
In Table 4.2 the cross-over points that were found to be within the relevant range are
given. These relate to five industry combinations. The relevant range was constituted by
the highest and the lowest possible factor price ratio in the sample.Some empin'cfl/ regu/ariries 75
Table 41 Production function parameters in Minnas' study































Source: Minhas (1963), p. 35.
Table 42 Cross-over points in Minhas' study
$w/r $K/L
? Textiles-Non-ferrous metals 1,350 1,720
- Dairy Products - Pulp and Paper 2,136 4,117
i Dairy Products - Non-ferrous Metals 8,665 11308
^ Pulp and Paper - Basic Chemicals 5,370 9,997
Basic Chemicals - Grains Mill Products 20,400 30,410
Source: Minhas (1963), p. 38.
In addition to the evidence mentioned above, Minhas performed a separate test of the
relevance of factor intensity reversals. He noted that if the assumption that the optimal
capital-labour ratio in industry i is always greater than that of industry ;' (no matter
what factor price ratio prevails), i.e., the strong factor intensity hypothesis, were true,
then the rankings of industries by their capital intensities in each of the two countries
should match, even when these countries were having widely different relative costs of
capital and labour. This turned out not to be the case.
Leontief (1964) questioned Minhas' method of indirectly estimating the elasticity of
substitution from the marginal productivity condition for labour alone, while not at the
same time also using the marginal productivity condition for capital. This argument had
also been elaborated in the celebrated ACMS article, where the authors found substan-
tial evidence for factor neutral differences in production functions for similar commodi-
ties between the USA and Japan. They showed that under these conditions, the mea-
surement of the elasticity of substitution from wage, employment and output data is not
valid, because this will lead to biased estimates for o. Therefore, the elasticity of substi-
tution must be measured using data on output, wages, employment, capital utilised and
rates of return to capital. Although a co-author of the AMCS article, Minhas completely
ignored these results.
Fortunately, however, Minhas included data on rates of return in his study, which en-
abled Leontief, together with the implied K/L ratios, to re-estimate the elasticity of sub-
stitution avoiding the bias resulting from factor neutral differences in productive effi-76 C/wpter 4
ciency. This he did for 21 industries in stead of the 6 industries considered by Minnas.
Thus he was able to conclude that "Of the theoretically possible 210 crossover points
( ) only 17 are found to be located within the range of factor price ratios spanned on
the one end by those observed in the United States and on the other by those reported
from India" (1964, p. 242), and hence that the elasticity of substitution did not differ
significantly from one, and that the empirical support for the existence of factor
intensity reversals was not so evident as on might be led to conclude on the basis of
Minnas' study.
The literature following this controversy between Minnas and Leontief has firstly
concentrated on attempts to prove that either one of these authors did make a point.
Secondly, there have also been attempts to criticize the whole concept of factor intensity
reversals arguing that the concept of factor intensity only makes sense in the two factor
framework and that this concept of factor intensity becomes meaningless in an empirical
model distinguishing more than just two factors. In this respect, Leontief argues that
Minnas treated the manyears of labour in the various countries of his sample as if it
would concern a perfectly homogenous factor of production. In the case it is realised
that labour may be very heterogeneous and may be very different internationally (India
vs. USA) then this would make Minhas' results even more implausible.
4.4 Studies relating foreign trade and wages
In an interesting article, Gremmen (1985) put forward a different test of the factor price
equalisation theorem for the EC countries. Gremmen's methodology was also used by
Mokhtari and Rassekh (1989), who applied it to the OECD area. Gremmen's article
was a reaction on a paper by Tovias (1982), in which the latter had posed himself the
question whether factor prices had tended to converge in the EC since the Rome Treaty
had become effective. Calculations of the coefficient of variation of inter-country
intra-industry wage differentials in the EC for the years since 1958 led Tovias to con-
clude that convergence had indeed taken place until 1968 but that after that year wages
tended to diverge again.
Gremmen, however, argued that Tovias used a black box, that is, Tovias' conclusion
of converging wages was not accompanied by any statistical evidence that this conver-
gence was a possible result of the establishment of the EC. Ideally, a statistical relation-
ship should exist between, say, the reduction in intra-EC tariff barriers and the behavi-
our of wages. Gremmen argued that there should be a quantifiable relationship between
the extent to which the integration process had proceeded and the convergence of
wages. He measured the degree of integration by a variable indicating the intensity of
trade relationships between countries, i.e., the sum of the average propensities to import
each-others product. Owing to the lifting of trade barriers, this variable should obtain a
higher value as the integration process proceeds. Next, Gremmen argued that, in case of
a high trade involvement, differences in the capital-labour ratios between countries
should be less capable of explaining wage differentials between countries. Hence, their
coefficient in an equation explaining wage differentials should be insignificantly diffe-
* Studies confirming Leontief's finding are, e.g., Hutcheson (1969), and conclusions similar to
Minhas are, among others, to be found in Yeung and Tsang (1972).
* Gremmen's method has applied to the problem of the relationship between commodity
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rent from zero, whereas the coefficient of the trade intensity variable should be signifi-
cant. The results of the empirical analysis confirmed the expectation of an insignificant
coefficient of the capital labour ratio and a significant coefficient of the trade intensity
variable. The elasn'citofy the international wage differential with respect to the trade in-
tensity variable had a value of approximately 0.7, implying that a one per cent increase
in trade intensity would result in a 0.7 per cent decline in the international wage diffe-
rential between any two countries.
In Van Mourik (1987) we have argued that Gremmen's approach, although ingenious,
suffered from four limitations, which might make his hypothesis not entirely consistent
with the theory it is supposed to test. Firs* of all, Gremmen's analysis confined itself to
an investigation of the relationship between wages and trade intensities. It would have
been interesting to extend the analysis to also include profits and wage/profit ratios. Se-
cond/y, Gremmen regressed nominal wage differentials as a function of the capital-stock
calculated on a sort of replacement cost basis. That is, he deflated the capital-stock but
forgot to do the same with wages. Obviously, this could cause biased regression results
because the data on nominal wage differentials are seriously distorted by different infla-
tion rates in the 1970s and it is not a pnorf clear to what extent these different inflation
rates were offset by subsequent exchange rate changes. The insignificance of the coeffi-
cient of the capital-labour ratio might well be explained by this procedure. Tfnrd/y, as
the literature on the North-South wage differential in the USA has revealed, the
expectation of an insignificant K/L ratio is incorrect. Using some simple mathematics of
production functions one can show that, in a one commodity-two factors setting (like
Gremmen's model), and in a perfectly competitive situation, wage differentials must
necessarily be determined by differing factor endowments, that is, by different overall
capital-labour ratios. In that case, as we saw in Chapter 2, factor prices cannot be solved
without referee ncto the factor market clearing conditions. If wage differentials are
absent, this simply implies absence of differences in capital-labour ratios. Thus Grem-
men's contention that "in cases where trade involvement is high the significance of the
capital-labour ratio should be low" (p. 281) does not necessarily hold. FowrfWy and
/ïna//y, it would be interesting to see in how far Gremmen's results are dependent on
the specification of this trade intensity index, which was as the sum of the countries'
average propensities to import each-others goods. On sound grounds he also might
have used country /'s imports to country / as a percentage of country f's total imports,
summed with the same quotient for country ;'. Only in case such alternative indices
produce the same results one could accept his conclusion that the "presented material
did not provide an argument to doubt the validity of the Factor Price Equalisation
Theorem" (Gremmen 1985, p. 84).
In view of the remarks made above, we suggested to extend Gremmen's analysis
such as to take the above remarks into account. Therefore, we re-estimated several
variants of the Gremmen model. All variants we have estimated had the following
general structure:
inCfyFj) = a + p,ln(kj/kj) + fclnftrty + m
where: .? < :
F = factor price in country i or /';
tr^j = trade intensity index between country i and ;', lfc=2,2; •.-,-••> >t, •
kj ; = capital-labour ratio in country t or /; s.'-
ct = constant;
Uj = stochastic error term. ? ,. v : .•>?;.. '••"•• .•::.. -..>..78 C/wp/er 4
The factor price variable was specified alternatively as:
1. nominal wage levels;
2. real wage levels;
3. nominal wage-rental ratios;
4. nominal rental (profit) ratios.
The trade intensity index was specified alternatively as:
1. the sum of the countries' marginal propensities to import each others goods (=tr]j,
Gremmen's index), and
2. the sum of country i's imports to country ;' as a percentage of country i's total
imports and the same quotient for country ; (=tr?J.

































































































Note: t-values between brackets
Source: Van Mourik (1987).
These alternative specifications, leaving us with 8 equations to be estimated, were esti-
mated for the same period as Gremmen's estimation and were also applied to the
founder countries of the EC. In addition, we re-estimated Gremmen's equation, that is,
we regressed nominal wage differentials as a function of the deflated capital-labour
ratio, using both Gremmen's trade intensity index and the alternative specification.Some empirica/ re^u/anfies 79
Hence, we estimated a total number of 10 equations. The number of observations is also
210.
The results of the estimations are given in Table 4.3. The first point that draws the at-
tention is again the remarkable difference in the sign of the trade intensity variable. In a
number of instances our estimations yield conflicting signs with respect to the alterna-
tive specifications of the trade intensity indices. In addition, in most cases the significan-
ce of this variable is rather low, at least compared to the significance of the capital-la-
bour ratio, whereas the elasticity of wage differentials with respect to changes in the
trade intensity index is in nearly all cases less than the seven percent Gremmen found
in his analysis. As a minimum, our results indicate that the relationship between trade
intensity and wage differentials is not so straight-forward as Gremmen assumes.
Secondly, it goes without saying that the differences in capital-labour ratios appear to
be highly significant in all our estimations. However defined, the capital-labour ratios
do seem to be quite important determinants of both nominal and real wage differentials,
as well as differences in the wage/profit ratios and profits. In accordance with the theo-
ry, the sign of this ratio is positive for the explanation of wages and wage/profit ratios
and negative in case of profit differences.
The results presented here therefore indicate 1) that the relationship between trade
intensity and factor price differentials might be ambiguous, and, 2) that the overall capi-
tal-labour ratio remains an important determinant of factor price differentials even when
the integration process has proceeded as far as it has in the Common Market.
To summarize, Gremmen's hypothesis concerning the trade intensity variable is very
ingenious indeed. However, his expectation of an insignificant capital-labour ratios in
not very plausible and needs modification. In our estimation of the model we found
capital-labour ratios to be extremely important determinants of international wage diffe-
rentials. Unfortunately, the relationship between trade and factor price differentials can-
not be established on the basis of the data used by Gremmen. Therefore, before embark-
ing upon the postulation of any hypotheses as to the influence of an increased volume
of trade on wage differentials it would, in our opinion, be necessary to investigate
whether the conditions for factor price equalisation are likely to be met in the European
Community. In this respect, estimation of the parameters of production functions would
be the first logical step. The second step could then consist of determining the influence
of increased trade relations between countries. Thus it is not denied that increasing
trade relations lead to decreasing wage differentials, but that trade intensity must be
considered in conjunction with differences in capital-labour ratios.
4.5 Production and cost function studies
There have been a (relatively small, but growing) number of studies that have
addressed the distributional impact of trade policies by directly or indirectly estimating
the parameters of cost or production functions. Since we shall adopt this approach our-
selves in Chapters 5-7, a review of these studies might be a fruitful exercise.
Burgess (1975) used the duality between transformation and cost functions in order
to asses the distributional impact of tariffs in the US. He distinguished two outputs,
durables and non-durables on the one hand and non-government services and structu-
res on the other. His cost function was defined on the assumption that the production
process requires capital and labour inputs, as well as imported intermediate inputs. Bur-
gess estimated two model specifications. In the /t'rsf, he assumed a joint technology in80
outputs, which is at the same time characterized by a separability between outputs and
inputs. In the second model specification, technology is assumed to be non-joint in both
inputs and outputs, the model thus being identical to the one presented in Jones' (1965)
seminal paper and with which all trade theorists are familiar. The incidence of a tariff in
Burgess' model occurs through the price of imported intermediate inputs.
From the joint production model specification, Burgess concluded that US tariffs tend
to make labour better off. The same conclusion was obtained for the non-joint model
specification. Although both models therefore yield similar predictions, the reason be-
hind this result differs for each model. In the joint model, labour's gain is a consequence
of the complementarity between capital services and imported intermediate inputs:
tariffs raise import prices, which in turn increase the demand for labour while at the
same time reducing the demand for capital. In the non-joint model, the labour-intensive
sector (services and structures) uses relatively small amounts of imports. As a result,
tariffs raise unit costs more in the capital-intensive sector, thereby forcing down capital
costs and raising wages.
Learner (1984, pp. 207-214), using a production model which is non-joint in outputs,
estimated the impact of tariffs on the behaviour of wages. Learner distinguished be-
tween three kinds of labour, piz. profession/technical workers, nonprofessional literate
workers and illiterate workers. The approach to the estimation of the distributional im-
pact of tariff changes rested on Samuelson's reciprocity relations between the Stolper-
Samuelson effect and the Rybczinski effect, which asserts that the derivative of final
output y; with respect to the total supply of factor x^ is equal to the derivative of the
return to that factor with respect to the output price, i.e., dyVdx; = dw;/3p:. Bearing this
reciprocity in mind, it is evident that the Stolper-Samuelson effect may be estimated
either directly by linking factor and output prices, or indirectly through the Rybczinski
effect. Since product prices exhibit a substantial degree of collinearity, Learner estimated
the Stolper-Samuelson effect indirectly.
Learner (1992) uses the same methodology to assess the wage effects of the US-Mexi-
can free trade agreement (NAFTA). He assumes that this agreement will reduce the
relative price of labour-intensive goods in the US. Learner conducts several experiments
which indicate that low-skilled US labour is likely to loose between $ 232,- and $ 9,312,-
per year. Conversely, skilled US labour is likely to gain between $ 959,- and $ 30384,-.
Finally, US capital stands to gain between 0.01 and 0.67 per cent as a result of the free
trade agreement. Learner admits that these results are rather tentative, but remarks that
a reduction in earnings of low-skilled US workers of some $ 1,000,- per year is very
plausible.
Learner's results were reviewed with skepticism in Lawrence and Slaughter (1993).
They also find considerable evidence of an international convergence of wages but sug-
gest that this development has little to do with international trade. Inspection of Ameri-
can wage and terms of trade data leads these authors to the conclusion that the Stolper-
Samuelson process did not have much influence on American relative wages in the
1980s. Rather, they suggest that the convergence of wages is the result of the nature and
extent of technological progress as well as the declining productivity growth in the
American service sectors.
An interesting study is Kohli's (1991, ch. 10) version of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuel-
son production model. Although Kohli estimated this model on US aggregate national
accounts data and therefore does not pertain to the EC, his study is worth mentioning
since the structure of his empirical models is based on the models of international trade.
Kohli distinguished consumption goods and investment goods, which were assumed to
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tensive production techniques, whereas consumption goods were capital-intensive. Kohli
found that an increase in the price of investment goods would lead to an absolute re-
duction in the renta] price of capital, and an absolute increase in the price of labour. The
relevant Stolper-Samuelson elasticities* took values of approximately -2.0 and +1.8, res-
pectively. Also, an increase in the price of consumption goods was found to result in an
absolute fall in the remuneration of labour (Stolper-Samuelson elasticity: app. -0.9) and
an increase in the rental price of capital (Stolper-Samuelson elasticity: +3.0). Kohli ad-
mits that these estimates might be unreasonably large, but attributes these results to a
rejection of the hypothesis of non-jointness in input quantities. However, it should be
added that elasticities in excess of one are by definition the rule in the context of a
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, as was shown by Jones' (1965) magnification effect.
Kohli also estimated the parameters of a specific factors model. To our knowledge,
this is one of the very few tests available in the empirical literature of this trade model.
Capital was assumed to be sector specific and labour was assumed to be the mobile
factor. Interestingly, the estimates seem to give support to this model. An increase in the
price of both investment goods and consumption goods would tend to increase the
price of labour, be it less than proportionally (relevant Stolper-Samuelson elasticities:
+0.55 and +0.45, respectively). An increase in the price of consumption goods tended to
increase the price of capital more than proportionately (Stolper-Samuelson elasticity:
appr. +12). However, an increase in the price of investment goods would tend to reduce
the price of capital in that sector, which is a rather strange result.
Kôhler (1991) also used the specific factors model to predict the income distribution
effects of Austrian pre- and post-Tokyo Round tariff protection. In his analysis, he did
not only focus on nominal tariff protection, but also considered the influence of the en-
tire tariff structure, i.e., effective rates of protection. Thus, Kôhler explicitly introduced
the existence of intermediate goods. It turned out, that the tariff structure of the Aus-
trian economy seemed to have a moderate (nominal) wage increasing effect, the nomi-
nal tariff exceeding the nominal wage increase in a number of sectors. The implication
of this is that tariff protection might involve a real wage loss for Austrian workers. As
far as (sector-specific) capital rentals were concerned, Kôhler found that even small
nominal tariffs might have substantial effects on the capital rental. The sectors that were
most favourable effected by tariff protection witness capital rental increases of well over
a hundred per cent. These sectors also happened to have comparatively high tariff rates.
Conversely, the least affected sectors turned out to have low tariffs.
In an international comparative empirical study of factor prices, Kopits (1982) at-
tempted to establish a relationship between factor prices and factor endowments. He
found that the evidence on factor price ratios was broadly consistent with the view that
these reflect relative factor endowments. In addition, the relatively large and systematic
variation in factor prices seemed to reflect the insufficient mobility of factors of pro-
duction across national borders. This conclusion was also applicable to the EC where,
due to the absence of integrated factor markets, significant differences between factor
prices were found. Since Kopits found a stronger price-quantity relationship for labour
than for capital, he concluded that there are probably greater impediments to labour
•* The Stolper-Samuelson elasticity of the rental price of capital with respect to the price of
investment goods measures the percentage change in the rental price of capital when the price
of investment goods changes with 1 per cent. Similarly, the Stolper-Samuelson elasticity of
wages with respect to the price of investment goods measures the percentage change in wages
when the price of investment goods changes with 1 per cent.82 Owpfer 4
than to capital movements. Finally, Kopits also found clear evidence that factor prices,
at least in the long run, seemed to be responsive for changes in commodity prices.
In a study testing the factor price equalisation theorem, Dollar ef a/. (1988) investiga-
ted cross-country differences in labour productivity at the industry level. Their study in-
volved thirteen countries and twenty-eight industries. As might intuitively be expected,
they found considerable international differences in labour productivity. Their evidence
seemed to suggest that the factor price equalisation model might not be device to ex-
plain these large international differences in labour productivity and that a model incor-
porating the economies of scale hypothesis helped considerably in explaining the devia-
tions from the predictions of the factor price equalisation model. However, they obtain-
ed the best results by employing a model in which they assumed constant returns to
scale and which allowed for differences in technology used in production. This suggests
that industries in different countries use different techniques in production and that for
this reason factor prices are not equalised. Incidentally, this result emerged since all
countries that tended to have higher overall capital-labour ratios predominantly tended
to use capital-intensive techniques. That phenomenon is, it will be recalled from our dis-
cussion in Chapter 2, not consistent with the factor price equalisation model and will re-
sult in higher labour productivity in capital abundant countries.
Dollar c.s. also found that among the largest industrial countries in the world, diffe-
rences in labour productivity had narrowed substantially in the post-war period. They
could not explain the convergence of labour productivity by changes in the employment
mix across industries. Dollar c.s. also rejected the hypothesis of converging K-L ratios. It
turned out that the US had a large productivity lead in a// sectors of industry in 1963
and that the US was using more capital per worker in all industries. Dollar c.s. prima-
rily explained the international variations in labour productivity in terms of variations
in technology. Consequently, they explained the convergence in labour productivity as a
result of the international diffusion of technology. Technologically backward countries
tended to imitate technologies from the more advanced ones and were thus able to
catch up with the more advanced countries.
To sum up our findings, we can conclude that production and cost function models
seem to provide a useful framework for analyzing the interrelationship between factor
prices and trade. However, the empirical models that have been developed in the recent
empirical trade literature differ in their individual specifications and do not allow us to
make dear-cut inferences as to what production factor will stand to gain and what pro-
duction factor will stand to loose after a liberalization of trade.
4.6 A North-South model of aggregate wage differentials applied to the EC
4.6.1
In this section we review a model that was developed in Van Mourik (1989). We shall
confine the attention to the founding countries of the EC and will ask try to answer the
question how the convergence of wages in these countries could be explained. Taking
the simplest possible model as a theoretical starting-point, we commence with the iden-
tification of the sources of the wage differential. This is done for several reasons. First of
all, before we present a more sophisticated multisectoral model in the next chapter, it
might be interesting to test the theory of factor price behaviour using the simplest pos-
sible (i.e., one sector) model. If the results are encouraging, the laborious undertaking ofSome empinca/ reguian'//es 83
the estimation of a multisectoral model is justified. Second, aggregate wage data are
readily available in the statistics.
The plan for the section is as follows. First, we shall briefly outline the structure and
comparative statics of the model in the next subsection, which is followed by a brief dis-
cussion of the estimation results and predictions of the model in section 4.6.3. For
details concerning the estimation and model predictions, the reader is referred to Van
Mourik (1989).
4.6.2 i4« esfrmaWe mode/ o/ uwge dr/ferenfia/s
Before we noted that, although a clear tendency of international wage convergence may
be discerned, international wage differentials are quite persistent. This is also true for
regional wage differentials, whose existence is well-documented in the literature. In the
USA, for instance, the wage differential between the north and the south has attracted a
lot of attention, and inspired many researchers to build models that could explain this
phenomenon and its development.^ Unfortunately, the latter is hardly true for the EC
wage differentials. In principle, models explaining the magnitude and development of
the US north-south wage differential could be used to explain the EC experience as
well.
The model that we shall employ below, is based on these analyses of the regional
wage differential in the USA, where there has been a tendency to explain these differen-
tials along very neo-classical lines. Gallaway (1963), for instance, found that differing
capital labour ratios were a prominent cause of the regional wage differential. This
result was confirmed by Scully (1969), who extended the Gallaway model to incorporate
human capital as well. He found that differences in human capital endowments may ex-
plain a substantial part of the wage differential, whereas differences in physical capi-
tal-labour ratios seemed to exert only a minor influence. It is an interesting feature of
Scully's study that, by 1958, the physical capital-labour ratio was on average higher in
the South than in the North. This fact had also been found by other students of the
North-South wage differential (see, e.g., Gallaway) and would imply, other things being
equal, that the South would have a higher wage rate than the North. However, this was
not the case and may be due to the existence of differences in production functions as
was shown in Scully (1971) and Batra and Scully (1973).
Differences in production functions may arise for various reasons. F/rsf, they may be
caused by different elasticities of substitution. A low value of the elasticity of substitu-
tion, for instance, implies that the employers will hardly display any reaction in terms
dismissing labour after a wage increase has occurred. This will increase the possibility
of wage increases. On the other hand, a high value of the elasticity of substitution
means that a small increase in the price of labour is immediately followed by large
amounts of labour being laid off and substituted by capital, and may therefore be said
to limit the scope for wage increases.
Second, countries may experience different rates of technological progress, or expe-
rience the same rate of technical progress but with a different bias. High-wage countries
with a higher rate of technical progress than a low-wage country will have a higher rate
of growth of wages than the low-wage country. Likewise, a labour-saving bias of techni-
* References include Fuchs and Perlman (1962), Gallaway (1963), Moroney (1970), McCulloch
and Yellen (1977), Scully (1969, 1971), Smith (1975, 1976), Polzin (1972), Ghali rt a/. (1978), and
Hanham and Chang (1981).84 C/wpter4
cal progress in the high-wage country and a capital-saving bias in the low-wage country
will inhibit a movement towards factor price equalisation, we shall soon come back to
these statements.
T/iird, different growth rates of endowment ratios may affect the development of the
wage differential between countries. Low-wage countries enjoying a higher growth rate
of the overall capital labour ratio will have higher wage growth rates than high-wage
countries with low capital-labour ratio growth rates.
The above mentioned influences on international wage differentials may easily be illus-
trated with the aid of a simple production model.* Below we shall formulate such a
model in general terms and in the next sub-section we shall apply it to the EC-5 expe-
rience.
Consider an economy i producing a single output with the following linear-homo-
geneous production function:
Yj = Fi(Kj,Lj,t) = Ljfj(k;,t) •% (4.1)
where Yj denotes the output of the economy, K^ denotes capital, L; denotes labour, k; =
Kj/Lj, and t refers to the level of disembodied (neutral or non-neutral) technical pro-
gress. The subscripts i and ;', which will be omitted hereafter when they are not strictly
necessary, refer to countries i and /.
In the case inputs are rewarded their marginal products, and the supply of produc-
tion factors is fixed, one may write
Wj = fj - k;f:
. •,-(,>v^-->. •..•-.-, • = (4.2)
Whenever a wage differential exists between two countries i and /', and in case this
wage differential favours region i, we write Wj = yw:, where Y > 1. Thus the wage diffe-
rential may be written as
y = (fi - kjf)/(fj - kjf) (4.3)
This equation shows the most elementary sources of international wage differentials. It
implies that the latter may be due to differences in the capital-labour ratios and to diffe-
rences in the technology used in production.
As we are mainly interested here in the development of this wage differential, it is
useful to "dynamise" the model. Recall first, however, that the elasticity of substitution
is for both countries defined as
o = (dk/duXu/k) = (FKFLAFFKL) > (4.4)
' The methodology of the model developed in this section follows that of Batra and Scully.
Thus we will confine the attention in the explanation of wage differentials to the effects of diffe-
rent capital-labour ratios, differences in elasticities of substitution, and technological progress.
The formulation of the model developed in this section, however, is taken from Ferguson (1979),
who developed a general model of technical progress which may easily be applied to the
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where a) is the wage-rental ratio, and where F^ and FL are defined in the usual way as
the partial derivatives of F with respect to K and L, respectively.
Now let us define the rate of technical progress, denoted by R, as the partial deriva-
tive of F(K,L,t) with respect to time. Thus the rate of technological progress is simply
defined as the proportionate rate of growth of output in time, while keeping the quanti-
ty of the various inputs constant, or stated mathematically (Ferguson (1979, p. 225)):
R = F,/F = (KFK, + LFL,)/(KFK + LFL) («)
As the reader may well recall, Hicks analyzed technical progress by its effects for rela-
tive factor efficiency or by its effects on the ratio of the marginal product of capital to
that of labour. He classified technological progress as labour-saving, neutral or capi-
tal-saving in the case at a constant capital-labour ratio its effect is to increase, leave un-
changed or decrease the ratio of the marginal product of capital to that of labour. Sup-
pose that technical progress can, in our model, best be described in Hicks' terms. In that
case the bias of technical progress, denoted by B, may be defined by (Ferguson (1979),
p. 225): • • •, ;• . ,:,• ,; *..*,. .,.., = .,•,- . - ••- ,. ... ,..-. . ,
B = {d/dt (FK/FL)}/(FK/FL) = (FK,/FK) - (FL,/FL) . ••»-.:
Note that technical change is called Hicks neutral, in case B = 0, labour-saving (capi-
tal-using) in case B > 0, and capital-saving (labour-using) in case B < 0.
Assuming perfect competition and making the appropriate substitutions one may
eventually arrive at the following expression for the rate of change of wages (see Fergu-
son (1979), pp. 224-227, for the derivation of this result):^
w = R - PB + (P/o)k (47)
where f$ refers to the partial elasticity of output with respect to the capital input or,
stated alternatively, capital's share in production. Throughout the paper a hat (*)
denotes a proportionate rate of change, i.e., w = (dw/w)(l/dt).
Since we are interested in the rate of change or the direction of the movement of the
wage differential between countries / and ; and as Wj = YWj, we may write ^ = Wj - W:.
Hence
(p/Oj>fij} <4«
Although this expression may seem rather complicated at first sight, it can be very in-
structive when several simplifying values for its parameters are considered alternatively.
First, let us assume that the standard conditions of an elementary textbook on interna-
' Note that we took the formula for Y from Batra and Scully, but that the expression for the
rate of change of wages was taken from Fergusoa In doing so, one obtains a different formula
for the rate of change of wages than the one used in Batra and Scully. This is motivated by two
reasons. Fi'rsf/y, Batra and Scully's formula for the rate of change of wages does not distinguish
between the rate of technical progress on the one hand and the bias of technical progress on the
other. However, despite this omission in their analysis, they do discuss the effects of differential
overall rates of productivity growth (Batra and Scully (1972, p. 383)). Second/y, their formula for
the rate of change of wages is derived under the assumption of equalised rental rates between
regions. That assumption does not underlie the formula used here.86 *•••• C/wpter4 ••-"•-
tional economics hold, that is, assume that Oj,: = 1, {J-, = fr, and B; = = Rj j = 0, so that the
(identical) production functions are of a Cobb-Douglas type and technological progress
is absent or proceeding at the same (neutral) rate in both countries. In this case (8) re-
duces to
^ (4.9)
Now, a positive value of ^ implies that wages in high-wage countries rise at a faster
pace than those in low-wage countries and hence implies a movement in the direction
of divergence. Thus, the wage differential increases, remains constant or decreases,
depending upon whether ^ > 0, ^ = 0, or f < 0, or
?|0 if fcj|kj , > (4.10)
As f is the country with the higher wage, the convergence condition simply states that
in high-wage countries the capital-labour ratio should grow less in this country than in
country /'. Convergence of capital-labour ratios is thus a sufficient condition for the con-
vergence of wages.
Secondly, consider the case where R; : = B; : = 0 and Oj=/O:, but fy = fi. In this case (8)
reduces to
? = (Ojfcj - Ojfej) " ; v ;,-.;; .•••.•-; vi-»; .••:••.:-:. (4.11)
from which it is readily seen that ' - . - , . •- . ,
? | 0 if k/kj i o/Oj (4.12)
This equation clearly shows that a higher rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio in
the low-wage country is in itself not a sufficient condition for the convergence of wage
rates. If the high-wage country has a lower elasticity of substitution, this may offset the
influence of the higher growth rate of the capital-labour ratio in the low-wage country.
Thus, a higher rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio in the low-wage country may
go hand in hand with an increasing wage differential. Only in case both elasticities of
substitution are equal, a narrowing wage differential is guaranteed.
Let us next assume that the rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio is equal in both
countries, for instance such that kj = k = 0. In this case (8) may be converted into
(4.13)
This expression clearly shows that the wage differential increases, remains constant or
decreases depending upon whether
?10 if {R; - PjBj} |{Rj - PjBj) '. W-l*
If technical progress is neutral in both countries (B; • = 0) this requirement is simply
synonymous with region i having a higher, equal or lower overall rate of productivity
growth or technical progress. If, however, the rates of technical progress are equal but
technical progress is biased in both countries, things become more complicated. The
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7| 0 if PjB- - ftB^ 10 < ,--. v fe- ;v *..,-> ,-.,fcrf i (4.15)
When both ft and ft are positive, the convergence condition is always fulfilled when Bj
> 0 and B: < 0, or, in other words, with technical progress labour-saving in country t
and capital-saving in country ;', a converging trend in wages is always assured. Notice
that in the case technological progress is labour-saving in both countries, the condition
for convergence is equivalent to country ! having a larger labour-saving bias than coun-
try ;'. In the case technical progress should turn out to be capital-saving in both coun-
tries, this bias should be stronger in country / if convergence is to occur.
Let us finally turn to the most general case. Here, the condition for divergence, stabi-
lity or convergence of the intercountry wage differential is given by
7| 0 if {R, - ftBj + (ft/Oi)fesJ | {Rj - PjBj + (pj/Oj)tj» (4.16)
Summarizing so far, one may safely state that the development of intercountry wage
differentials may be attributed to at least ten factors, viz., ÎL kj, O;, Oj, R^, R:, Bj, B:, ft,
and ft. One may infer from the model that the influence of a high rate of growth or the
capital-labour ratio in a low-wage country is counteracted by . .
1. a relatively low rate of technical progress;
2. a (relatively stronger) labour-saving bias in technical progress; , ; :.
3. a relatively high elasticity of substitution;
4. a relatively low initial share of labour in national income.
4.6.3 £mp/n'ca/ app/icaf/on of Me mode/
In Van Mourik (1989) we have applied the above model to the development of the wage
differential in the five main founding countries of the EC and tried to infer empirically
plausible values for the a's, B's and R's. This enabled us to answer the question
whether production structures in these countries were such as to favour a movement to-
wards factor price equalisation. The analysis was conducted with data which were taken
from the Nafrona/ /iccounte Sfafisfics, /\^re^fl/es published by Eurostat. The period of
investigation was 1959-1979.
Table 4.4 shows the average annual development of labour costs per manyear in the
1959-1979 period. Not shown in that table is the fact that, during the period of inves-
tigation, The Netherlands is the country with the highest labour costs per worker,
followed by Belgium and Germany. In 1959, Italy was a low-wage country. Table 4.4
reveals that, while not being exceptionally dramatic, a convergence of wages occurred in
the case of Italian wages, i.e., Italian wages increased at a faster pace than wages in all
other countries. Italian wages, which were about 56 per cent of the EC average in 1959,
had steadily increased to some 66 per cent at the end of the observation period. Belgian
and German wages as a percentage of the EC average remained relatively stable, while
French wages decreased from above average to slightly below average. Finally, Dutch
wages increased from approximately 115 per cent of the EC average to 120 per cent.
Turn to the capital-labour ratios now. Inspection of the growth rates of K/L ratios
reveals that the countries with the highest increase in wages (Italy and The Netherlands)
did not have the highest growth rates of capital-labour ratios. This is paradoxical, since
the standard model of factor price equalisation would predict that a high growth rate of88
wages be accompanied by a high growth rate of K/L ratios.® Hence, it does not seem
unreasonable to suggest that the convergence which has taken place in the course of
time was not so much the result of converging K/L ratios, and that other factors must
be held responsible for the high growth rates of wages in The Netherlands and in Italy.
Table 4.4 also reveals estimates of the elasticity of substitution, O;, and the bias of
technical progress, Bj for each country. These estimates were obtained using the fact that
(optimal) capital-labour ratios are a unique function of (w,t), so that k = k(co,t), where (o
is the wage-rental ratio.' Total differentiation of this relationship yields (Takayama
(1974), p. 632, Batra and Scully (1972), p. 579):
k, = (4.17)
where again Oj > 0 and where Bj = (l/kj)(dkj/3t)dt = (F^/F^"^^^) | 0. The term
(l/kj)(dkj/dt)dt is the change in the capital-labour ratio due to a change in the shift para-
meter t and refers to a situation where factor prices are kept constant. It is by definition
equal to the Hicks measure of the bias of technological progress. Positive values of B
indicate a labour-saving bias of technical change, negative values imply a capital-saving
bias, and a value of zero points at neutrality. -•:;> , •










































Equation (4.17) was estimated using OLS. The resulting estimates for the elasticities of
substitution are presented in Table 4.4. Note that the elasticities that were found all had
positive signs, and took values well below 1. Also note that the elasticity of substitution
had a rather low value in the case of Italy, whereas its value was found to be sub-
stantially higher in the high-wage countries The Netherlands, Belgium, France and Ger-
many. Compared to empirical studies of technical progress relating to other countries,
the estimated values of o do not appear unreasonable (for instance, David and Van de
Wundert (1965), p. 377, found a value of 0.32 for the US manufacturing sector).
As far as the bias of technological progress (B) was concerned, all values of B turned
out to be positive, except in Italy. This implies that technological progress has been la-
bour-saving in four cases, and that Italy has experienced a (relatively large) capital-
saving bias in technical progress.
® Similar paradoxical developments were also found for the USA, see, e.g., Borts (1960).
' We refer to Van Mourik (1989) for a comprehensive discussion of all data used in the esti-
mations, as well as the estimation procedures and a discussion of the results.Some empfn'ca/ 89
The last column of Table 4.4 reveals the estimates for the overall rate of technical
progress. This parameter was calculated following a methodology suggested by David
and Van de Klundert (1965).'° The calculated values of R, which are independent of
our estimations of the values of B, reveal that in addition to her favourable bias, Italy
also had the highest rate of growth of total productivity (3.4 per cent). The Dutch rate of
technical progress (2.7 per cent) is slightly higher than the average rate of technical
progress in the EC (2.4 per cent) and may thus be said to have contributed to the high
rate of growth of wages in that country. France, Belgium and Germany experienced
relatively low rates of technical progress. ,--, :• ,-: . ?- .•••»- ?

















































Let us turn to a discussion now of how the values of all parameters have interacted and
in how far they might be responsible for certain developments in intercountry wage dif-
ferentials. In Table 4.5 we have listed the values of the various constituent elements of
'" In order to obtain an estimate of this parameter, the overall rate of factor productivity
growth re-written as (see David and Van de Klundert (1965), pp. 363 and 384)
RSORL + PRK W.18)
where a and P again refer to labour's and capital's share respectively, and where RL and R^ are
the efficiency growth parameters of labour and capital. It's also a well-known result from the
literature on technological progress, that in case of linear-homogeneous production functions the
percentage rate of growth of output, Y, may be written as (see, among others, David and Van
de Klundert (1965), p. 362)
Y = a(t + RL) + P(K + RK)
Recall next, that P = 1 - a, so that (20) may be reduced to
R = (XRL + PRK = (Y - L) - (l-a)(K - 0 : .,, ,
(4.19)
(4.20)
This equation contains elements which are directly observable from our statistical data.
" Differences in this table are due to rounding, calculations were made using 7 decimals.90 C/wpter 4
equation (4.16). This allows us to infer which wage determining factors have been most
important in the various EC-5 countries. Before, it was already concluded that converg-
ing K/L ratios could not completely explain the development of these wage differen-
tials. As far as the influence of differences in elasticities of substitution are concerned,
the following remarks are at order. Low estimates of the values of the elasticities of sub-
stitution in low-wage countries would, taken at itself, favour a rapid convergence of
wages, provided that the K/L ratios would have the same rate of growth as in the
high-wage countries.
However, as is shown in Table 4.5 (column 3), the different magnitudes of the o^s in
combination with the large differences in the values of the P's have very large numeri-
cal consequences for the effects of a 1 per cent increase in K/L ratios. In the countries
with the highest proportionate increase in wages, i.e., in Italy and The Netherlands, the
relevant quotient of these parameters (p/a) amount to 0.42 and 0.65 respectively, where-
as the mean for the EC countries is 0.56. For Italy, this implies that the positive influen-
ce of a low elasticity of substitution is strongly counteracted by a relatively high share
of labour in GNP. For The Netherlands the opposite holds: the relatively high quotient
of p/o may have been important for its relatively high increases in wages. Notice also
that the estimate of a for France does not explain the French transition from a
high-wage country to a low-wage country.
The influence of the bias of technical progress on the development of wage differen-
tials is perhaps the most interesting result of the calculations. Recall from Table 4.4 that
all countries except Italy had labour-saving biases in their technical progress. According
to expression (4.16) this typical Italian bias in technical progress might be a prominent
counteracting force, offsetting the Italian disadvantage of a relatively low p/a quotient.
This bias favours an Italian catch-up with the high-wage countries. As far as The
Netherlands are concerned, the magnitude of the bias of technical progress cannot be
held responsible for the high growth rate of wages. Needless to say, that the influence
of a favourable bias in Italian technical progress was reinforced by a relatively high rate
of overall productivity growth (R), which also tended to favour a catch-up with the
high-wage countries. Finally, note that as can be seen in the one but last and in the last
column, the model predicts surprisingly well. The average prediction error, defined as
the difference between the actual and the estimated value divided by the estimated
value, is 5.0 per cent only. Only in the case of Belgium, the model predicts an average
wage that is 12 per cent too high, while Dutch and French wages are estimated 5.8 and
7.8 per cent too high, respectively. In the case of Italy and Germany, the prediction error
is less than one per cent.
Our results concerning the Italian catch-up movement are consistent with other lite-
rature on the subject. In this respect, the similarities between our results and the ones
obtained in the study by Dollar c.s. (1988) is perhaps most worth mentioning. Recall that
they also found different techniques in use in production in the various countries of
their study and they concluded that as far as there has been a convergence, this would
most probably be caused by the international diffusion of technology. It is obvious, that
our results are not inconsistent with such approach to international differences in labour
productivity.
It should be emphasised, that the model's prediction error on a year to year basis might
be substantially higher, since the time series of wages exhibit considerable cyclical variation over
the estimation period. However, the model's purpose is to predict the rate of change of wages
of a longer period of time, and not to predict the cyclical behaviour of wages.Some empin'cfl/ regu/anfies 91
To summarize then, one might conclude that aggregate wage differentials may be the
result of different factor proportions, as well as differences in the elasticities of substitu-
tion and overall rates and biases of technological progress. The parameter estimates
reveal that the empirical values of the elasticity of substitution are such as to favour a
movement in the direction of wage convergence, but that this movement is counteracted
by the various values of labour's share in national income. An important conclusion of
our analysis is that Italy's catching up with the other countries is primarily due to its
rate and bias of technical progress, and cannot be explained by a faster rate of growth
of K/L ratios relative to the other countries.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter discussed several empirical studies that have surfaced in the literature on
international wage developments. We started with studies on international wage struc-
ture comparisons, which have produced similarity and stability of wage structures as
main conclusions. These tendencies have in general been explained by traditional factors
as skill- and industry-mix, labour productivity, and various institutional factors. None of
the studies surveyed made an effort to incorporate elements of international trade
theory.
The explanation of the international convergence of wages has mainly been the
domain of trade theoretical studies. In these studies, elements of trade theory have been
incorporated in a variety of ways. To start with, there are studies in which the most im-
portant assumptions underlying trade theory have been tested. Since these studies are
too few in number to warrant any firm conclusions, we are not able to say wether or
not factor intensity reversals are an empirically relevant phenomenon. Other studies
have tested the implications of trade theory. These studies, which are also scarce, have
not produced unambiguous results as to the wage effects of economic integration.
More promising therefore are those studies in which the parameters of production
technology as estimated and used to produce inferences as to the wage effects of trade
policies. We discussed two avenues which have been pursued in the literature. The
results of both types of studies are that trade policies have clearly discernable income
distribution effects, but that in addition to trade policies, other factors like technical pro-
gress should be taken into consideration as well.
A basic drawback of all studies presented in the present chapter concerns their inabi-
lity to outline the distributional effects of economic integration. To model these effects
in detail requires a multi-sectoral model of the economy. To develop that kind of a
model shall be the purpose of the next chapter.
- r-.DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CUSTOMS UNIONS
5.1 Introduction
The model presented at the end of the previous chapter suffers from at least two draw-
backs and might be criticized on these grounds. Firs/, the model fails to capture the
integration effect on the development of wages. Second, the one-sector nature of the
model precludes a disaggregated treatment of the labour markets. The present chapter
seeks to improve upon both of these deficiencies, in that its aim is to present a multi-
sectoral general equilibrium model that is capable of predicting the factor price effects
of the establishment of customs unions. The parameters of the model presented below,
will be estimated in the next chapter, and the parameter estimates will be used for the
simulation of the effects of the EC on factor prices in Chapter 7.
Below we construct a general equilibrium model in which the production sector pro-
duces an arbitrary number of products « with the aid of two primary factors, capital
and labour, and with the aid of m intermediate inputs, which may be obtained both
from domestic and foreign suppliers. The industries all operate under constant returns
to scale. Perfect competition is assumed to prevail in all markets. Invoking the Arming-
ton assumption, a production equilibrium characterised by the existence of intra-indus-
try trade may be supported. Both a short-run and a long-run version of the model will
be presented, the distinction being dependent on the role of intersectoral factor mobility.
The distributional effects of economic integration are modelled through differential
changes in the prices of final products and intermediate inputs emanating from various
(foreign) sources, which are inherent in the process of integration.
The analysis of this chapter will show that one should be careful in applying trade
theorems to situations of integration, since a convergence of factor prices is not neces-
sarily guaranteed in all conceivable cases. Much seems to depend on the concrete repre-
sentation of technology.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the assumptions underlying
the model, as well as its general structure. In section 5.3 the comparative statics of the
short-run version of the model will be presented. Section 5.3.1 presents a general discus-
sion of these comparative static effects of trade policies. Then, in section 53.2, the short-
run distributional effects of the imposition of a common external tariff in a customs
union will pass in review. Section 5.4 contains the long-run comparative static effects of
economic integration. The concluding remarks follow in 5.5.94 C/wp/er 5
5.2 The model and its assumptions
The following assumptions will underlie the model of this chapter:
1. factor price responses to the creation of customs unions can be modelled by means of
a one-country general equilibrium model;
2. price of final commodities are determined with the aid of the Armington assumption;
3. firms produce outputs with the aid of primary and intermediate inputs;
4. firms are cost minimisers and determine simultaneously their requirements of all pri-
mary and intermediate factors;
5. all markets are characterised by perfect competition;
6. production technology exhibits constant returns to scale;
7. in the short run, there is no intersectoral factor mobility, whereas in the long run full
intersectoral factor mobility applies.
In this section, we shall be concerned with outlining the implications of and the justifi-
cations for these assumptions.
To analyze the factor price consequences of customs unions, one of the possibilities at
hand is the use of a general equilibrium model, incorporating at least six commodities
and at least three countries. The use of general equilibrium models rather than partial
equilibrium models may be justified on a number of grounds. Firs/, they have as an ad-
vantage that the factor price equations reflect the maximizing behaviour on the part of
both consumers and producers. Second, using general equilibrium models implies that
one might avoid the pitfalls associated with the od /IOC approach which has been follow-
ed in an important part of the literature (see Van Mourik (1987) for an example). 77izrd,
the factor price equalisation and Stolper-Samuelson theorems refer to general equili-
brium economies, and it is therefore hard to see how partial equilibrium models could
accurately describe the factor price responses to the establishment of customs unions.
Partial equilibrium models are incomplete and may result in misleading outcomes, since
they do not take intersectoral resource pulls into consideration. Hence, they may either
under- or overestimate the factor price responses. Four//i and /ïnû//y, general equilibrium
models enable one to fully exploit the duality theorems of international trade theory. In
this chapter, the duality between production and cost functions will be used.^
To capture the effect of economic mtegraffow on factor rentals in a general equilibrium
context, one should in principle take notice of the discriminative nature which is inhe-
rent in preferential trading agreements like customs unions. To recall, customs unions
imply that member countries abolish the trade restrictions which have hitherto existed
among themselves, whilst at the same time imposing a common external tariff uzs-a-vis
non-participating third countries. Needless to say, a model analyzing the distributional
consequences of customs unions would have to take this "three-level-ness" into account.
Obviously, the most satisfactory way to do so would be to model these consequences in
a three-country general equilibrium framework.
The main problem associated with "conventional wisdom" general equilibrium
models of preferential trading agreements is that they do not allow for the possibility of
all conceivable trade patterns. A true general equilibrium model of economic integra-
' A summary of these duality theorems may be found in, e.g., Diewert (1974). Applications to
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tion, however, should have at least three countries and six commodities and allow for
all possible potential trade flows. Earlier general equilibrium models of economic inte-
gration could mostly not meet this requirement, since they only allowed for a trade
pattern that was characterised by trade between just one member state and the outside
world, and therefore one member country would never trade with a third country. The
main reason for these models' peculiar prediction of trade flows lies in the application
of the small country assumption. Since only one of the foreign countries will have the
lowest price, the home country will only trade with one of the two potential foreign
partners. This characteristic has made these models of preferential trade unduly unrea-
listic. Although Wooton (1986, 1988) developed a more general model of preferential
trading that could accommodate to any pattern of trade, it is not unfair to say that the
progress that has so far been made with three country models of trade is extremely low.
Therefore, application of three country models to distributional problems does not seem
to be particularly appropriate at this stage of the art. Besides, the complexity of relation-
ships in three country models precludes general statements, and may not produce
tractable relations for estimation purposes.
To overcome the difficulties mentioned here, we propose to formulate the problem in
terms of a one country model which is capable of discriminating between partner and
non-partner countries. The loss incurred by this treatment of the distributional impact of
customs unions is that the feedbacks and interdependences that exist in a three country
world are washed out from the model. The discrimination between the foreign union
partner and the non-partner will be modelled with the aid of the Armington (1969) as-
sumption. According to Armington, imports from different sources cannot usually be
considered as perfect substitutes, both for each other and for domestic products. The
small country assumption, however, implies that goods from all sources are perfect sub-
stitutes, which means that foreign price changes will always be passed-through imme-
diately and completely. The Armington assumption, on the other hand, implies that
foreign price changes will only be followed when there exist substitution possibilities
between domestic and foreign goods. In addition, the strength of the pass-through will
vary with the extent of these substitution possibilities.
Armington distinguished between goods and products. "Goods" refer to commodity
classes and consist of a collection of products. Thus, cars may be considered as goods
and German, French, etc. cars may be labelled as products. Armington assumed that
consumers maximise their utility in two stages. In the first stage, the consumer allocates
a part of his budget to the goods that may be distinguished. In the second stage, the
consumers decide what particular products they will buy.
In Armington's model, the price index for goods is a linear-homogeneous function of
the prices of the products which make up that good. In the literature, two functional
forms for the aggregator functions for goods have surfaced, notably Cobb-Douglas and
CES functions. Assume that a commodity class contains three products, then a CES
price aggregator function might be defined as follows
p = [dipi*
where p = the price index for the good under consideration, <ij = the market share of
product i, i = 2^23, Pi = the price of product j, and p is a substitution parameter. Note
that the elasticity of substitution between the various products is given by o = (l+p)/p,
which may take any value between 0 and °°. Total differentiation of this expression
gives the relative change of the price index, so - •--., ••••• ; •••p = a,pi + Ojpj + CI3P3
where a hat "*" denotes a relative change (e.g., £ = dp/p). This equation says that the
price changes for goods are a weighted average of the changes in the prices of indivi-
dual products that make up that good, the weights being the respective market shares
of the products.
Now let pi be the home country's product price and let P2 and P3 be the foreign
countries' product prices. Country 1 can establish a customs union either with country 2
or country 3. Since products are no perfect substitutes, a change in foreign prices due to
the change in the tariff policies uis-fl-p/s foreign nations will not be passed-through com-
pletely in the domestic country. To be more specific, the domestic product price change
will be a weighted average of the foreign product price changes, the weights being
again the market shares of the foreign products on the domestic market, so
Thus, countries having larger market shares in the domestic market will also have a
stronger influence on domestic product price changes.
As Norman (1990) points out, the Armington assumption is normally used in perfect-
ly competitive models. Below, we shall therefore assume the existence of perfect compe-
tition on all markets. It should be noted, however, that much attention has been given
recently to the development of models of trade and imperfect competition (for a review,
see Helpman and Krugman, 1985). In this respect, two kinds of model have surfaced.
One explains trade from the existence of external economies of scale (which are compat-
ible with perfect competition), the other explains trade from internal economies in com-
bination with imperfect market structures like monopolistic competition. The two cha-
racteristics form independent explanations of trade. Some authors, like Smith and Ven-
ables (1992), seem to suggest that economic integration, by its very nature, involves the
elimination of market segmentation and should therefore be studied with imperfectly
competitive models allowing for the existence of (internal) economies of scale. For main-
ly practical reasons, we shall not follow this suggestion below. Models of imperfect
competition in principle need not fundamentally reverse the "signs" of the factor price
responses due to the creation of customs unions, although there is clear evidence that
the magnitude of the effects is influenced (see Norman, 1990). The computational
burden, on the other hand, increases substantially when elements of imperfect competi-
tion and economies of scale are added to the standard general equilibrium trade model.
Let us now turn to the behaviour of producers and the related issue of the characteris-
tics of production technology. Firms are assumed to minimise costs. They produce their
products with the aid of two primary factors, capital (K) and labour (L), and with the
aid of intermediate inputs. The latter may be obtained from domestic and foreign
sources. The primary input vector is denoted by x, the intermediate input vector by X,
outputs for final demand by y, primary factor prices by w, and intermediate input
prices by q. The production sector of the economy employs two primary inputs, capital
and labour, which are fixed in supply (K and L resp.). The model assumes that imports
may consist of both final commodities and intermediate inputs. This treatment of im-
ports, which follows Burgess (1974, 1976), Kohli (1978) and others, may be justified on a
number of grounds. Most importantly, it recognizes that most internationally traded
goods are intermediates. Even finished goods delivered to households generally under-
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sing of intermediate imported goods before their final delivery requires the use of
domestic primary production factors. The effect of trade barriers on the distribution of
factor income occurs through the changes in import prices, which will, given the speci-
fication of technology, alter the competitive returns to primary factors. As Diewert and
Morrison (1989) point out, a major advantage of treating imports as intermediates is that
one needs to model the private production sector only and that the difficult problem of
modelling the consumer sector is sidestepped in this way. True, a complete general
equilibrium model would specify demand functions for final outputs, and a balance of
payments budget constraint ensuring that total income is exhausted for purchases of
outputs. However, we shall assume that this constraint is not operative, for instance be-
cause balance of payments imbalances are financed through capital movements.
There is another advantage which results from modelling the distributional impact of
trade policies through the prices of intermediate inputs, since the inclusion of interme-
diates implies that one will study the impact of effective in stead of nominal protection
rates. As is well known from the theory of effective protection, effective rates provide a
more adequate impression of the factorial protection than nominal rates. Usually, this
theory employs the assumption that the industries under consideration are unable to
substitute one input for another. Below, we shall not make the restrictive assumption of
fixed production coefficients, but we do follow the assumption of more sophisticated
versions of the theory of effective protection, which states that substitution possibilities
of capital and labour on the one hand for intermediate inputs are exactly identical. This
is what is usually referred to as the assumption of functional separability between pri-
mary inputs and intermediate inputs.
We assume next that the aggregate technology of the economy can be described by a
joint cost function C(y,w,q), which denotes the minimum cost of producing a vector y of
outputs when the pnmary factor prices w and prices of intermediate inputs are given
by the vector q. Thus the joint cost function is defined from the transformation curve
T(x,X,y) = 0, in such a way that C(y,w,q) = min^ w'x + X'q, subject to T(x,X,y) £ 0,
where x is the vector of primary inputs^ and X is the vector of intermediate inputs. The
output prices are given, and so are the prices of intermediate inputs. C is a real ex-
tended function, which is well defined for all sets of positive primary factor prices and
intermediate input prices. The joint cost function is monotonically increasing in prices
and quantities, concave in input prices and convex in output quantities (see Diewert
(1974) for a proof).
Under conditions of perfect competition in all product and factor markets, as well as
constant returns to scale, the production sector achieves an optimal output vector by set-
ting the marginal cost of production equal to marginal revenue or the price. Thus the
inverse output supply curves can be obtained by partial differentiation of the joint cost
function (Hotelling): pj = Cy = dC(y,w,q)/dyj. Also, as is well known, the partial deriva-
tives of the joint-cost function with respect to primary input factor prices gives the
factor demand equations (Shephard), so that x^= C^ = 3C(y,w,q)/dWj, or, since full-em-
ployment will be assumed K = C,.(y,w,q) and L = C^(y,w,q~).~As is well-known, the full
employment conditions implicitly determine the factor prices. Finally, note that Xj =
dC(y,w,q)/dq:, where X; = the economy's total use of intermediate input /.
Let us, for the sake of simplicity, rule out the possibility of jointness in the techno-
logy of production and also assume that technology exhibits constant returns to scale. In
that case the cost of producing all outputs equals the costs of producing each output
separable (see Hall, 1973, for a proof): C(y,w,q) = y,c'(w,q) +...+y^c"(w^), where yj is
the output of sector 1 and c' is that sector's uni/ cost function. The unit cost function is
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to be non-negative, twice differentiable over w > 0 and g > 0, homogeneous of degree
one in its arguments, concave in its arguments and non-decreasing in its arguments.
The reader will observe that the number of commodities in this model may exceed
the number of primary factors and that, as a consequence, the pattern of production and
trade for this country may become indeterminate. Although this could imply that it is
impossible to infer the direction of change in the resource allocation as the result of a
change in the tariff structure, it does not preclude inferences concerning the direction of
change of factor prices. Indeed, the latter are determined by commodity prices under
perfect competition, and therefore if tariffs will induce changes in these commodity
prices, we are in principle able to predict the impact of changes in the tariff structure on
factor rentals. -
As far as the possibilities for intersectoral factor mobility are concerned, two approaches
may be found in the literature. Firsf of a//, one may assume complete intersectoral factor
mobility. In the standard textbook 2x2 setting, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem will pre-
dict that the factor used intensively in the import sector will gain (in real terms) from
the imposition of a tariff, while the other factor will loose. Since capital and labour are
considered to be perfectly mobile across sectors, intersectoral differentials in wages and
capital costs will be absent, and consequently there will be a conflict of interest between
labour and capital in the economy.
In reality, however, we do observe intersectoral factor price differentials which means
that (some of) the conditions for factor price equalisation are not met. Among these, the
possibility of intersectoral immobility of production factors has been at the centre of inte-
rest. In the second approach, the specific-factors model, developed by Jones, Mussa and
others, it is assumed that there is only one mobile factor (labour), whereas the other
factor is completely immobile, i.e., used only in the production of a particular sector.
The model therefore in fact assumes the existence of three factors, w'z. one mobile
(labour) and two immobile factors (capital), so that the number of factors outgrows the
number of goods. In that case, as is well-known, the possibility of factor price equalisa-
tion reduces to a fluke (see, o.a., Dixit and Norman, 1980, chapter 4). Furthermore,
factor price equations can no longer be solved independently of the factor market
clearing conditions.
As far as the influence of protective measures is concerned, the specific-factor model
predicts that the imposition of a tariff will result in an increase in the real reward of the
specific factor in the import sector, while at the same time reducing the real income of
the specific factor in the non-import sector. The real earnings of the mobile factor
(labour) will fall in terms of the commodity whose relative price has risen, and rise in
terms of the commodity whose relative price has fallen. Thus, the question of whether
or not labour actually benefits from protection is reduced to an index-number problem:
in case the share of imported commodities in the budget of workers falls short of the
percentage increase in the price of the imported commodity, labour will gain in real
terms; in case the reverse holds, labour will loose in real terms.
Using these insights, Albert and Vosgerau (1989) were able to show the implications
of imperfect intersectoral factor mobility for the European integration process. Their
argument, in short, is that if the reallocation process would cost either time or money,
factor prices were very likely to diverge in the short-run and need not necessarily con-
verge in the long-run.
Burgess (1980) extended the standard specific-factors model to include interindustry
flows. He concluded, that the inclusion of intermediate goods would free that model
from its neo-classical ambiguity, and that "(u)nder plausible economic circumstances aDisfribuh'ona/ consequences o/ customs «nions 99
tariff will raise (or lower) the real wage measured in terms of every commodity even
when labour is the only freely mobile factor"(1980, p. 784). Burgess' conclusion follows
from the very fact that the inclusion of interindustry flows increases the number of
arguments in the cost function. As a result more substitution elasticities than the one be-
tween labour and capital determine the distributional effects of trade policies.
In this chapter we shall use both the assumption of intersectoral factor mobility and
the assumption of intersectoral factor immobility. F/rsfiy, we shall investigate the factor
price reactions under a regime of complete intersectoral factor immobility. This is what
we refer to as "the short run". Second/y, we shall invoke the assumption of full inter-
sectoral factor mobility, a situation we shall refer to as "the long run".
53 Short-run factor price effects of hade policies
In this section we shall outline the effects of trade policy measures on factor prices,
under the assumption that both capital and labour are fully sector specific. Complete
sector specificity implies that identical factors need not earn the same reward in all
sectors. The justification for this sector specificity is that factors cannot be expected to
move when the economy is hit by an external (or: policy) shock. Capital is frequently
embodied in the form of machines that have been designed to produce a particular kind
of output. Labour frequently also has sector specific skills and frequently cannot move
to another sector overnight. Reallocation of factors therefore takes time to occur. Recall
that in the standard version of the specific-factor model, only one factor is allowed to
move between sectors. The specific factor will gain when tariffs are imposed. In our
short-run model, which has no mobile factor at all, one might therefore expect that all
factors would gain after the imposition of tariffs, since the value of marginal product of
all specific factors will increase. Hence, contrary to the standard specific-factor model
we expect to find that the neoclassical ambiguity is absent in our model. This result is
independent of the inclusion of intermediate inputs in our model. Burgess (1980), in his
earlier mentioned study, also found the possibility of absence of the neoclassical ambi-
guity when the specific-factor model was expanded to include intermediates. His results
do rely on the assumption of intermediate goods, however.
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we shall start our analysis ignoring the
Armington assumption and assume for a moment that we are dealing with a small
country (subsection 5.3.1). This will demonstrate the importance of such production
technology characteristics as elasticities of substitution. Then, we explicitly introduce the
Armington assumption in subsection 5.3.2 to capture the effects of economic integration
on factor prices.
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5J.1 S/iorf-run comparaître stefics^
The following set of equations describes sector behaviour completely. First observe that
under competitive conditions, prices should equal unit costs (zero profit condition) in all
i (=l,..,n) sectors of the economy. Thus the commodity market clearing conditions are:
-i c'(Wj,Tj,q') = PJ for all i = 2,..,n > T . •?: = (5.1)
where c'(..) is the i-ffc sector unit cost function, Wj = unit labour costs in sector i, r; =
unit capital cost in sector i, and where q' is the vector of (given) prices of the interme-
diate inputs. The intermediate inputs may, in principle, be obtained from different sour-
ces, uiz. domestic and foreign producers. Note that the treatment of these intermediate
products in the cost function is formally identical to that of the primary inputs, that is,
the intermediate inputs are also treated as "specific" factors.
The derived conditional demand for labour must equal the fixed supply of labour. As
is well-known from Shephard's lemma, the first partial derivative of the unit cost-
function with respect to the wage rate, i.e., dc'/dw; = c^,, gives the per unit demand for
labour in sector z (Samuelson (1953), Diewert (1974)). Multiplication of per unit demand
for labour with the output level gives total labour demand in sector i, which should be
equal to total labour supply (labour market equilibrium):
As far as the production factor capital is concerned, multiplication of the first derivative
of the unit cost function with respect to the capital rate and y; gives:
Kj (5.3)
The model described in eqs. (5.1M5.3) consists of 3xn equations in 3XM unknowns, tfiz.,
yj, Wj and rj, for i = l,..,n. Since both capital and labour are sector specific, system (5.1)-
(5.3) may be written as a block-diagonal matrix, in which each block constitutes an urn
matrix of its own. Therefore, there is no interdependence in the behaviour of sectors,
other than the interdependence occurring through intermediate inputs. The computatio-
nal advantage of this block-diagonal structure of the system is obvious: it allows us to
solve for output and factor prices in every individual sector, without taking this interde-
pendence into account. Below we solve the system for sector f.
The equations (5.1M5.3) are always valid. Shocks resulting from tariff policies in-
fluence final commodity prices and intermediate input prices. To see how primary
factor prices will respond after these shocks, totally differentiate the system (5.1M5.3) to
obtain relative changes of the variables. Turn to equation (5.1) first.
* The model presented in this section is completely different from a joint production model.
To recall, the latter are models in which «vry sector produces a// commodities. The model in
this section is characterized by a non-joint production technology. Yet the reader will observe
the remarkable similarity between the results derived in this section and those obtained in a
joint production model. C/. Burgess (1976) who discusses the results in case of a joint production
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Giw^i + 9^j = pi - 1 0j 4: r = l,..,n / = I,..,m ft':? ->,^ w (5.10
j=i ^i ' •
In these equations, a hat "*" indicates a relative change (i.e., & = dx/x), 8^ represents
the cost share of labour in sector i, 0^ represents the cost share of capital in sector i, and
0; represents the cost share of intermediate input / used in the production of sector f.
The right-hand side of equation (5.1') shows that tariffs, through their influence on
the prices of intermediate inputs will affect the entire tariff structure. According to
Woodland (1982, p. 117) the right-hand side of eq. (5.1') is the effective rate of protec-
tion. These effective rates of protection play the same role as the prices of final goods in
the standard textbook analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson effect. Note that effective rates
of protection need not necessarily be positive; in the case the share of intermediates in
the production of outputs is high, and intermediates are at the same time taxed more
heavily than final commodities, effective rates of protection may well be negative.
Equations (5.2) and (5.3) may be totally differentiated to obtain (set dK~dL;=0)
where e-^ refers to the i-f/i sector price elasticity of demand for the /-fh factor with resp-
ect to the k-th factor price, e.g., E^, = c^.(r/c,J,). Note that, except by coincidence, e|^ *
The system (5.1')-(5.30 may be re-wntten if we make use of the Allen-Uzawa partial
elasticities of factor substitution (hereafter AUES) between the /-f/i and Jt-//i factor in the
production of the f-r/r commodity. The AUES are defined as usual, i.e., (Woodland
(1982, p. 3D),
As is well-known, the matrix of AUES is a symmetric matrix, implying o-^ = oL As is
pointed out by Woodland (1982, p. 31), the following relationship between AUES and
the (own- and cross-partial) elasticities of demand for the primary and intermediate
factors must hold:
Using the definition of the AUES, one may also write:102 Chapter 5
(5.3")
Eqs. (5.2") and (5.3") may be combined to give










(> 0, see below)
Equations (5.5) and (5.6) completely describe the short-run reaction of primary factor
prices to changes in final commodity prices and intermediate input prices. As the equa-
tions reveal, the solution of the model is a rather complex function of the AUES own-
and cross-partial elasticities of substitution between pairs of inputs, as well as the factor
cost shares. However, some simplifications facilitating the interpretation of eqs. (5.5) and
(5.6) are possible. Let us begin by evaluating the sign of the determinant Aj. Since it ma-
kes no difference whether we evaluate this determinant for the case of one intermediate
input or m intermediates, let us confine ourselves, for the sake of simplicity, to the case
of a production technology that utilises only one intermediate. Firsf/y, the product Gj^fyr
must be positive. Second/y, as was noted above, the matrix of AUES is a symmetric
matrix. Thzrd/y, we know that the cost function is linear-homogeneous and concave in
factor prices. The latter implies that the Hessian matrix of second-order partial deriva-
tives of the cost function is negative semi-definite (see, Takayama (1987), p. 141, and pp.
151-52, nl3). Therefore, the matrix of AUES own- and cross-partials, I', is also negative
semi-definite, that is, xT'x < 0, for not all x = 0. Thus, the expression ^consequences 0/ customs unions 103
can be written as -(-2oJ^ + oj, + o^,). This expression in brackets is negative since it
<0
and it follows that Aj > 0.'
FourfWy, the possible effects of trade policy are constrained by the fact that all own-
partial AUES are negative whereas the cross-partials may both be positive and negative
(they may usually be expected to have positive values, however). In addition, as is well-
known, weighted sums of the own- and cross-partial AUES must be zero. This implies








Thus, not all factors can be complements, and, in our case, at most one cross-partial
AUES can be negative.
Fi/r/i/y, note that all own- partial AUES are always negative, whereas the cross-par-
tials may take both positive and negative values. In the normal case, however, one may
expect that most factors are substitutes instead of complements. Thus, in the majority of
cases we may observe that the relevant cross-partials are positive. That would suggest
that (oj^, - oy and (o^ - o^,) are normally positive.
Sûr/Wy and /z«fl//y, as is pointed out in Woodland (1982) and Jones (1975), the stan-
dard theory of effective protection assumes that the production technology is characte-
rised by functional separability between primary inputs on the one hand and interme-
diate inputs on the other. Early discussions of this theory were concerned with the very
restricting case of production functions exhibiting fixed coefficients, so o\^ = o_ = 0. In
less restrictive formulations, effective protection theory simply assumes o^_ = o^, S 0,
which means that there exist substitution possibilities between primary and interme-
diate factors, be it that both primary factors will react equally strong to changes in the
price of intermediates.
Below, we shall follow the practice of the theory of effective protection and assume
that a = o > 0. This implies that (5.5) and (5.6) reduce to
j^, - o^ipi - IjOiq^jl .: (5.5')
These equations show that the effects of trade policies may occur through two channels,
the first of which relates to the changes in the prices of final commodities, and the
second of which occurs through the influence of changed intermediate input prices.
These reactions may be called "direct" and "indirect" Stolper-Samuelson effects. Note
that these effects have opposite signs: whereas a lower price of final commodities has a
* Note that the inclusion of m intermediate inputs in the cost function increases the number of
zeros to m in the vectors with which the L-matrix is pre- and post-multiplied, and does not
change the conclusion of the negative semi-definiteness of the I-matrix.104
negative effect on both factor rentals, the decline in prices of intermediate inputs will
tend to increase the prices of both primary factors. Ruling out the exceptional possibility
of negative effective rates of protection, the abolition of tariffs will cause p; - Eftq.Qij < 0.
Thus, the elimination of tariffs opens the possibility that both factors are made' worse
off. It follows therefore that both primary factors do not have conflicting interests in the
short-run.* Also note that the strength of the reaction of both factor rentals need not be
identical in quantitative terms. The magnitude of the change in both factor rentals is
determined by the own elasticities of substitution and the primary factor shares. If the
share of capital is relatively large and the own elasticity of substitution of labour is rela-
tively large as well, labour's loss will be larger than capital's loss.












The model discussed above may also be illustrated graphically. Consider Figure 5.1,
where we have drawn the iso-cost curve for sector i in the factor price space. The curve
c'(w,r,g) indicates the set of factor prices for which unit cost is equal to the price. The fi-
gure shows four iso-cost loci, labelled 1, 2, 3 and 4. Since c'(..) is concave in factor
prices, the curve is convex, and since c'(..) is increasing in w, the curve is downward
sloping. Let us start with the situation in which iso-cost locus 1 is valid. Due to Shep-
hard's lemma, the gradient vector (indicated by an arrow) represents the optimal input
vector, i.e., the gradient vector is perpendicular to the support plane at any point of the
* The possibility of conflicting interests between factor owners arises only when labour and
capital are complements in stead of substitutes, causing oj^ < 0. That might imply of^. - ojj > 0
and o}^, - o^,^, < 0, and therefore result in opposite factor price responses after trade policy
measures are implemented. It should be noted, however, that this possibility is a rather extreme
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iso-cost line (see Woodland (1982), pp. 46-47). The gradient vector represents the input
vector per unit of owfpuf. Let Vc'(w*,r*,q) be the endowment vector which is relevant for
the sector under consideration. Then observe that, due to factor market equilibrium, the
vector of optimal factor prices is given by w* = (w*,r*).^ As the graph reveals, in this
initial equilibrium, the factor price vector coincides with the endowment vector.
Now assume that tariffs are abolished as a result of which ô= - E:6^P;i < 0. In this
J Hi 1
case there will be less money available for payments to primary factors and the iso-cost
locus will shift inwards. In the exceptional case where o^,,. = oj^ and at the same time
fyw = fyr' a movement along the ray OA will occur, and the new equilibrium might, for
instance, be given by B. However, that is usually not the case. Factor price reactions
must normally lie in the Ow*Ar* area. Hence, there may be biased shifts in the direction
of either factor, but both factors must necessarily loose. If labour's loss is smaller than
capital's loss, an allocation given by C might occur. Under the assumptions made above,
an allocation like D is not feasible, since it would imply an increase in the price of
labour rather than a decrease.*
In sum, we have found that in the case capital and labour are both sector specific, the
precise nature of the factor price response to a tariff depends on the concrete features of
technology as embodied in the unit cost function. However, under plausible assump-
tions, both factors are likely to loose as a result of a liberalisation of trade. That result
strips the standard textbook version of the specific-factors model of its neo-classical
ambiguity and is in line with Burgess' (1980) modification of the spedfic-factors model,
in which intermediate goods are also an essential feature and in which the absence of
the neoclassical ambiguity is the result of the introduction and treatment of intermediate
inputs in the production process.
5.3.2 dpfuring f/ie integration everts
Above we have discussed the problem of the distributional effects in a one country set-
ting. We should now proceed to extend the analysis and investigate what relevance the
previous section bears to the problems of economic integration. If we would follow the
practice of well-known textbooks on economic integration, we might simply formulate
the problem in a two-country world. Below, we shall analyze the distributional effects
of customs unions, which are, as the reader will recall, agreements between two or
more countries to abolish mutual tariffs on imports and by which a common commerci-
al policy with respect to non-union members is imposed. The dominant view concern-
ing the distributional effects of these customs unions is that, since they constitute a step
closer toward free trade, factor prices must necessarily converge after their creation (see
* The graph illustrates the well-known fact that, in case one or more factors are specific, we
need the factor market equilibrium conditions in order to solve for w.
' Allocation D is only possible if we would not have made the assumption of functional sepa-
rability between primary inputs and intermediate inputs. According to Ramaswami and Srini-
vasan (1971) this is the general case the theory of effective protection should address. Note that
this case may, for instance, occur when labour and intermediates are complements, so that o'. -
o\vq- > 0. The decline in tariffs on intermediate inputs will in that case exert a direct upwards in-
fluence on wages through eq. (5.6). However, there will also be an indirect effect in that the de-
cline in tariffs on intermediates increases the demand for those inputs. But since labour and
intermediates are complements, the demand for labour will also increase, causing the wage rate
to increase further.106
in this spirit, e.g., Molle (1990)). That view of distributional effects strongly resembles
the classical view on the welfare effects of customs unions, which was replaced by the
Vinerian trade creation/diversion analysis. According to Viner, the customs union may
be detrimental to welfare when the (negative) effects of trade diversion are not suffi-
ciently compensated by the (positive) effects of trade creation. The dominant view con-
cerning the distributional effects of customs union formation could be modified in an a-
nalogous way as the classical view on the welfare effects of customs union formation.
That is, in the short run, the formation of customs unions need not necessarily result in
a convergence of factor prices, but might also produce a divergence of factor prices.
Before we substantiate this claim, it should be recalled, that the small country assump-
tion proper is no longer feasible since we are now dealing with three countries. One
must therefore invoke another assumption regarding the price formation in the home
country. Assume that the Armington assumption is applicable, and that the percentage
change in home country price of output i, that is p^, is a weighted average of the
relative price changes of the same commodity imported from countries 2 and 3, so
* = 23 (5-7)
In this equation, the subscript 1 refers to the home country, and the subscripts 2 and 3
refer to the potential foreign customs union partners. The prices are tariff-inclusive
prices. We assume that the prices for potential partner countries are given/
Now to analyze what happens with international factor price differentials after for-
mation of a customs union, let us introduce some simplifying assumptions and some
stylised facts, which limit the number of possible outcomes. The first simplifying as-
sumption is that we shall restrict the number of intermediate inputs to two in every
sector. One intermediate input is purchased from a union member producer, the other
from a third country producer. The second simplifying assumption is the small country
assumption, which implies that the prices of final commodities and intermediate inputs
are given for the union members. The first stylised fact concerns the non-equalisation of
factor prices. Some countries tend to have high wages, whereas others may be classified
as low-wage countries. In the EC context, a country like Italy is an example of the latter,
the Benelux countries and Germany constitute an example of the former. The second
stylised fact concerns the circumstance that most countries have different tariff regimes.
Some countries, like Italy and France, tended to have high tariffs when the EC was
' The assumption of given foreign prices could be criticized on the grounds that the prices p^
are used both as endogenous and as exogenous variables, depending upon the situation under
consideration. When the home priœ change is calculated, the partner and non-partner country
prices are exogenous. At the same time, when the partner country price change is calculated, the
home country price is used as exogenous variable. Clearly, this is an unsatisfactory procedure,
since one does not take the interdependence between the two prices into account. However, it
should be noted that the only way to endogenize both prices at the same time is that the model
would be formulated as a genuine three-country model in which a// demands and supplies
determine prices. Unfortunately, this would make the model untractable and analytical solutions
for all endogenous variables would yield extremely complex expressions, which would be
difficult to interpret. As a justification for our treatment of foreign prices, the reader is referred
to Dramais (1984), who studied the international interdependence between prices. He found that
increases in import prices may have a substantial impact on domestic prices, but that the
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formed, whereas others, like the Benelux countries and Germany, tended to have low
tariff rates.
With these remarks in mind, let us focus on the reaction of wages following the
formation of a customs union in. The reduced form equation for wages is
and ; = 1,..^ (5.8)
This equation is valid for both the high-wage and the low-wage country. Let us discuss
the most important elements affecting the change in wages one by one and try to see if
it is possible to single out some cases which might be considered to bear the greatest
relevance for the experience of the EC. In the previous section, we have already out-
lined the role of the AUES. Suffice it to say, that the sign of the right-hand side of (5.8)
may crucially depend on whether or not capital and labour are substitutes or comple-
ments. When they are substitutes, 0^,-0^ must be positive, and when they are comple-
ments, af^-o^ might (but need not be) negative.
As far as price movements are concerned, several key factors may be identified. First
ami /oremos/, market shares for final commodities are important. In the case the union is
created between countries that hardly traded so far, the effects of the elimination of
tariffs will be smaller than in the case of high pre-union market shares for the foreign
partner country. Second, note that the entire structure of nominal protection is impor-
tant. Below, we shall ignore the exceptional case of negative effective rates of protection.
T/iird, note that the way in which the common external tariff is calculated, as well as the
pre-union tariff rates are key factors in the overall reaction of prices. Usually, a common
external tariff (CET) is calculated using some kind of average for pre-union tariff rates.
In the EC, the CET was calculated as the simple arithmetic average of all member coun-
tries tariff rates. The implication of this averaging procedure is different for countries
with high tariffs and countries with low tariffs. For tariff-shy countries, like the Benelux
countries and Germany, the imposition of the CET implied higher tariffs, whereas for
tariff-prone countries like France and Italy, the average outside tariff at their borders
tended to increase due to the imposition of the CET.
Equation (5.8) may be used to derive the wage effects of the imposition of the CET.
In Table 5.1, eight possible wage effects are listed after the CET is imposed. In the first
four cases, it is assumed that capital and labour are substitutes (cases 1 and 2) or com-
plements (cases 3 and 4) in bof/i countries at the same time, and that the high-wage
country and the low-wage country pursue opposite tariff regimes in the pre-union situa-
tion. In only two out of these four cases, IHZ. cases 1 and 4, an unambiguous movement
in the direction of convergence is guaranteed. When capital and labour are substitutes,
convergence is guaranteed only if the high-wage country has high pre-union tariffs and
the low-wage country has low pre-union tariffs. In addition, when capital and labour
are complements in stead of substitutes, a pre-union tariff regime whereby the high-
wage country employs low tariffs and the low-wage country employs high tariffs will
result in a convergence of wages as well. In cases 2 and 3 on the other hand, the impo-
sition of a common external tariff will lead to a short-run divergence of wages between
the union members. In case 2, capital and labour are substitutes in both countries and
the high-wage country employs low tariffs, whereas the low-wage country employs
high tariffs. In case 3, capital and labour are complements in both countries and the
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** C = convergence of wages, D = divergence, ? = ambiguous result
Consider now cases 5 through 8, where it is assumed that capital and labour are comple-
ments in one country and substitutes in the other. Clearly, an unambiguous movement
in the direction of convergence or divergence of wages is excluded in all of these cases,
since the wage rate moves in the same direction if both the high-wage and the low-
wage country pursue different pre-union tariff regimes.
An interesting question is which of the above cases, on a pn'on grounds, one might
expect to bear the greatest relevance for the EC experience. Note that we saw above,
that, at the inception of the EC, the high-wage countries employed low tariff rates,
whereas the low-wage countries could be classified as tariff-prone. Thus cases 2, 4, 6
and 8 are likely to be most applicable to the experience of the EC customs union. Note
also, that if one would make the very reasonable assumption that capital and labour are
either substitutes or complements in both countries at the same time, cases 2 and 4
would in fact be the only relevant cases. Barring negative effective rates of protection
and non-separability between primary and intermediate inputs, these cases would imply
either a short-run divergence of wages in the customs union (substitutability between
factors of production) or a short-run convergence of wages (complementarity of factors
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5.4 Long-run comparative statics
To model the long-run behaviour of factor prices, several options exist. One could refor-
mulate the entire model allowing for perfect long-run factor mobility. In the long run,
intersectoral factor price differentials for one and the same factor cannot persist. In the
two-sector model, this implies that we should modify the factor market clearing condi-
tions:
ï4(..).y; = L (5.9)
Zcj(..).yj = K (5.10)
i=l
The commodity market clearing conditions do not change, so
-Zj9^ (5-11)
This equation is valid for all i sectors. For purposes of simplification, write these equa-
tions as
6iwW + V = p| (5.11')
where p,' is the effective protection rate. Note that in order to solve these r equations for
the factor price changes we do not need to invert the system (5.11')- Since we have as-
sumed the existence of only two factors, there is a problem of dimensionality when we
distinguish more than two goods. In that case, the solution for outputs of the sectors are
not unique and some industries must shut down until the number of industries is equal
to two. The factor market clearing conditions are therefore not needed to solve for the
factor price changes.
Obviously, the existence of a dimensionality problem is most inconvenient. Recall
that this problem did not exist in our short-run model due to the existence of perfect
factor immobility. Therefore, one solution to the dimensionality problem that immedia-
tely comes to mind is to amend the short-run model such as to take imperfect factor
mobility into account. However, this solution, which was applied by, among others,
Mussa (1982), Hill and Mendez (1982), and Albert and Vosgerau (1989), has its own pro-
blems. Mussa's paper discussed the effects of imperfect labour mobility in an n goods
framework with sector-specific capital, but his approach could not be generalised to in-
corporate imperfect capital mobility as well without loosing much of its intuitive appeal.
Hill and Mendez encompass partially mobile capital and labour in the two sector mo-
del, but their approach does not yield meaningful results for an n sector framework. Fi-
nally, Albert and Vosgerau's approach is too general to yield any estimable quantitative
relations concerning the factor price responses of trade policy measures.
Below, we shall follow a much simpler approach to model the transition to the long
run which has been suggested by Burgess (1980) and Murphy (1989). According to these
authors, the long-run factor price changes are a weighted average of the short-run factor
price changes. When, for instance, labour is free to move between industries, it may be
expected that the new equilibrium wage will settle somewhere between the highest and
the lowest wage in the absence of labour mobility. According to Burgess (1980, p. 794)
the weights are determined by the elasticity of demand for labour in the various sectorsand the shares of the labour force employed in these sectors. Thus, Burgess calculates
the long-run wage change as: ,-..•,.-..
w = jta^ (5.12)
where the weights are determined as:
with Xj = share of the labour force working in sector i and e^ = elasticity of labour de-
mand in sector i. The weights imply that, other things being equal, the higher the elasti-
city of demand for labour in sector / relative to other sectors, the closer must be the
equilibrium wage change in the vicinity of that in sector i. Also, the larger the propor-
tion of the labour force employed by sector f, the more will the long-run wage change
approximate the wage change in sector f.
The elasticity eu bears an interesting relationship to the parameters of our model. As
Burgess proves, this elasticity can be expressed as:
(5-13)
Hence it turns out that the Allen-Uzawa partials, which determined our short-run
results, continue to play a part in the long-run.
For rental rates on capital, we assume that these are also the weighted average of all
industries' rates of changes:
r= g^,, ••:•"•••••; (5.14)
where the weights are determined as: ••...-• :
with X* = share of the capital stock employed by sector i and e^ = elasticity of capital
demand in sector i, and with
eKi = -Aj/6iw (5.15)
It is worth noting, that our long-run results deviate from the ones predicted by HOS
type of models discussed at the beginning of this subsection in several respects, Firs/ of
all, in the two sector HOS context, with no intermediate goods, one factor will always
loose in nominal and real terms, whereas the other factor will always gain in nominal
and real terms. In a HOS type model which includes intermediate goods, things are no
' The reader is referred to Burgess (1980, p. 794, n. 16) for the proof.Disfribufiona/ consequences of customs «nions 111
longer that straightforward in a sense that whether or not primary factors gain depends
on whether or not intermediate inputs are "extreme" or "middle" inputs. If intermediate
goods are an extreme input, then iff capital (labour) is the middle input, an increase in
the price of intermediates causes an increase in the wage rate (rental rate) and a de-
crease in the rental rate (wage rate). However, if intermediate inputs are a middle input,
an increase in their price causes a decrease in both the wage rate and the rental rate. In
our model, an increase in the price of intermediates will, in the long run, cause a
decline in wage and rental rates. Except by coincidence, i.e., when 6^ = 8^ for all f = Ï,
n, the percentage reductions in wages and rental rates will not be equal. Thus, it is con-
ceivable that capital gains relative to labour, which will probably be the case when 9j, <
6^ in all sectors. Also, not that there may be conflicts of interest between the short-run
and the long-run interests of a primary factor.
Second/y, changes in the prices of final goods in a HOS type model with intermediate
goods also exert their influence on prices of primary factors through the factor intensi-
ties in a way described above. Once again, in our long-run model, an increase in final
goods' prices will increase both primary factor rentals, be it that the magnitude of the
increase will not be equal for capital and labour. Thus, relative changes in factor prices
are not impossible and one of the factors may even gain in real terms. We may conclu-
de, therefore, that weak Stolper-Samuelson properties will be preserved in our model.
5.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have tried to capture the factor price effects of international economic
integration and have tried to answer the question under what circumstances customs
unions might produce a convergence of factor rentals. This problem was addressed with
the aid of two models which are based on the standard textbook versions of two popu-
lar international trade model, w'z. the specific-factor model and a Heckscher-Ohlin type
model of a production sector characterised by full intersectoral factor mobility. We
modified the specific-factor model in two directions. The first change consisted of the
assumption that both factors are completely sector specific in the short run. The second
modification was the inclusion of intermediate inputs in the cost function, which, due to
the existence of intra-industry trade, gives the model a higher degree of generality than
the standard specific-factor model. The effects of economic integration on factor rentals
in this model depend on the concrete characteristics of the production technology
(AUES), factor proportions and the direction of changes in final commodity prices and
intermediate input prices. We identified a few cases where factor prices might diverge
in the short run after the creation of a customs union. Some of these cases might bear
some relevance to the short-run responses of factor prices in the circumstances at which
the EC was incepted.
As far as the long-run responses of factor prices are concerned, the possibility may
not be ruled out that international factor price convergence still does not break down
since in the reality of the EC high-wage countries were frequently tariff shy, whereas
low-wage countries were typically tariff prone at the time the EC was created. The high
wages in the Northern part of Europe could therefore not have been the consequence of
high levels of protection. Elimination of their low tariff rates could therefore not have
been a major factor hurting either labour or capital to a large extent. In the low-wage
countries imports are likely to have been capital intensive, and therefore the creation of
the EC has probably been to the detriment of capital in these countries and benefited
labour. A wage convergence in the EC, should therefore have been the result of low-
wage countries catching up with high-wage countries.ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
6.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to discuss the estimation of the parameters of the model developed
in the previous chapter. Models like the one discussed in the previous chapter have
rarely been estimated in the context of international trade theory (for succinct excep-
tions, see Learner (1985) and Kohli (1991)). It is only a recent development in the trade
literature that economists have started to estimate the parameters of general equilibrium
models. As far as empirical work in the trade literature is concerned, most efforts have
been put in the estimation of partial equilibrium models. However, the partial nature of
these models may not always be consistent with the optimising behaviour on the part of
both consumers and producers which is implied by general equilibrium analysis.
Fortunately, the increasing use of the principles of duality in trade models in combi-
nation with the development of flexible functional forms for production and cost
functions, seems to have made the estimation of a complete set of parameters of a gene-
ral equilibrium model a more tractable problem, which the growing literature in this
field testifies.^ Indeed, the estimation of our model rests on the use of a so-called flex-
ible functional form, notably the translog cost function, which will be introduced in sect-
ion 6.2. Section 6.3 is devoted to a discussion of the equations that we shall estimate. In
section 6.4 we shall discuss the data used in the estimations, as well as the estimation
procedures and other estimation technicalities. In section 6.5 the equations of the model
will be applied to the five most important founding countries of the EC, PI'Z., The
Netherlands, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy and contains
a discussion of the estimation results. We finalise our analysis with the concluding rem-
arks in section 6.6.
' Among others, we may mention Burgess (1976,1980), Wong (1988), Kohli (1991), Jorgenson
and Fraumeni (1983), Jorgenson, Gallop and Fraumeni (1987), Learner (1984), Woodland (1978),
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6.2 The functional form for the cost functions
There are numerous functional forms for the unit cost function from which one might
choose. Among others, the various functional forms distinguish themselves from one
another by the implied restrictions on the substitution possibilities between the various
inputs. As we saw before, a widely used measure of substitution possibilities between
inputs is the AUES, which is defined as
= J (6.1)
9j
where C(w,y) is the total cost function, £;: s din C;(w,y)/31n Wj is the elasticity of
demand for factor i with respect to factor price /, and 0: = W:C:/C is the cost share of
factor ;'.
The econometric literature has produced a variety of well-known functional forms.
The most widely used functional forms are the Leontief, Cobb-Douglas and CES
functions, which are characterized by elasticities of substitution which take values of 0,
1, and > 0, respectively. Due to its greater degree of generality, the CES form is clearly
to be preferred over the other forms. In our context, the CES cost function would con-
tain wages, capital costs and the prices of all intermediate inputs as arguments. How-
ever, as Uzawa (1962) and McFadden (1963) have shown, the CES function cannot very
easily be extended beyond the two input case, since substitution among more than two
inputs implies very strong restrictions on the substitution possibilities for these inputs.
To date, the most popular functional form for cost functions is the translog or trans-
cendental logarithmic function, which was pioneered by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau
(1971, 1973). The translog form, which belongs to the family of so-called flexible functio-
nal forms, is a second-order Taylor series approximation of an arbitrary function f(x).
The Taylor series is expanded in the powers of ln(x). Within a region of convergence,
this Taylor series expansion of f(x) will converge to the underlying function if it con-
tains a sufficient number of higher order terms. In other words, within this region of
convergence, the difference between the values of the function and its approximation
decreases when higher order terms are included.
The second-order translog cost function c(w) may be written as follows:
lnc(w) = OQ + EPjln(Wj) + tt2I(|>jjln(Wj)ln(Wj) (62)
with EjPj = 1, ty. = <kj (Young's theorem and symmetry of the Hessian) and LAJ: = 0.
Note that this function collapses into a Cobb-Douglas function in case <|>jj = 0.
Because of its generality, the translog function has several desirable properties.
Among the most important of these, one could mention that the translog function does
not a prior/ restrict the value and sign of the various elasticities of substitution, i.e., it
permits the AUES partials to differ between pairs of inputs. However, in the econome-
tric estimation of this function, the important problem arises, that the translog function
takes a quadratic form. As a result, the number of variables in the function soon in-
creases substantially, and the computational burden may be too large indeed.
The problem of too large a number of parameters for estimation may be resolved by
assuming separability of technology with respect to a certain partition of inputs, as
Berndt and Christensen (1973) have shown. Separability of the (homothetic) technology
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inputs belonging to different input groups corresponding to the partition. Thus, the
number of parameters to be estimated may be reduced significantly. In section 6.3 we
shall come back to this problem.
By logarithmic differentiation of the translog cost function, derived unit input
demand functions may be obtained in share form, i.e.,
Xj/c = q = 3c/dWj (6.3)
Now let 0^ = (x;Wj)/c. Then it follows that 0^ = (x^w^/c = 31n(c)/31n(Wj). Application
of this result to the translog cost function in eq. (5) gives
8^ = (Xoj + îfyJnCwJ V j = 1 n
Hence the share of each input in sector i is a simple linear function of the logarithm of
all input prices.
One of the advantages of the translog cost function is that one can readily estimate
the substitution matrix X. The elements of Z are obtained using the definition of the
AUES. Note from the definition of the translog function that
3*ln(c) 3 , 1 3c ^ln(c) 3,1 3c v
<)>;: = = W;Wj — I — . — I Vi#;
31n(Wj)31n(Wj) 3WJ' c 3w{
and
3/1 3c \ / 1 3c v
•a = Wj— (-. -l+l-.-lwj V / = /
3wj ' c 3w[ * c dwj
Recalling that 3c/3w; = X; (Shephard) and that Oj: = eji/8: one finds the following ex-
pressions for the AUES:
9? - ft,)/(6?) Vi = ?
Since 0: may change in the course of time, Oj: and o^ will in general not be constant, but
vary as well in time. The same is true for the factor demand elasticities, which may be
obtained by post-multiplication of the Z-matrix with the matrix of factor shares.
Other functional forms that have been proposed in the literature are mostly, like the
translog form, linear in parameter functions which have interpretations as Taylor series
approximations of the underlying cost function. Variations on these functional forms dis-
tinguish themselves either by the fact that they are not linear in parameters or by the
fact that the have no interpretation as a (second-order) Taylor series approximation.
* Note that recent literature has added a variety of functional forms to the ones discussed
here. Examples include the third-order translog form, the Generalised-Leontief (GL) form, the
square-rooted quadratic function, the generalised Cobb-Douglas function, the Fourier form, the
Minflex-Laurent form, and several others. See Kohli (1991, p. 94) for details.116 Chapter 6
The above discussion goes to show, that one may in principle choose from a wide
variety of possible functional forms. The question will arise why the translog form has
been chosen below in stead of a different functional form. To a large extent, this choice
is completely arbitrary. Although the translog function, due to its generality, is capable
of generating Cobb-Douglas and CES functions as special cases, there does not seem to
be an a priori reason to prefer this particular function to, say, the GL-form, or any other
form that satisfies the requisite theory. Indeed, as Chambers (1988, p. 159) points out,
"classical statistical theory is silent about the choice of a functional form. It presumes that
the researcher knows the most general model against which hypotheses can be tested"
(italics added). It should be evident, that the presumption of a translog form as the most
ideal functional form is implicit in our empirical analysis. However, for reasons of
space, this presumption is not tested below.^
One reason to choose the translog functional form, apart from the relative ease with
it can be estimated, is that it enables us to focus attention on those characteristics of pro-
duction which are of most interest, wz. factor shares, AUES, and marginal products.
These three characteristics of production technology are not only important for decision
making at the firm level, but also at the macroeconomic level of policy making. Factor
shares are important, since they refer to the functional distribution of income. Elastici-
ties of substitution are important, since their value determines the magnitude of the
effects of price changes on the functional distribution of income. Finally, marginal pro-
ducts are important, since they measure the efficiency of the allocation, both at the firm
level and at the macro level.
A second important reason to prefer the translog cost function to other forms con-
cerns the fact that the requirement of global concavity of these other forms frequently
reduce the flexibility of these forms when the number of inputs exceeds two.* For in-
stance, some of these forms imply that inputs cannot be complements as a result of cer-
tain restrictions. It goes without saying, that there are no fl prior/ reasons to impose this
kind of restriction on the technology.
Another problem related to the use of translog function forms is the fact that,
although the cost function will necessarily be linear homogenous in factor prices, there
is no a prion guarantee that it will also satisfy the required curvature conditions for all
conceivable observations. Strictly speaking this implies that one should check for conca-
vity in factor prices for the entire sample. For Cobb-Douglas and CES functions, this
problem does not arise, since the (global) curvature conditions are imposed automatical-
ly. We shall come back to this problem in section 6.4.2.
6.3 Estimated equations
6.3.2 Tte s/wre
In our model we assumed that the demand for the inputs of the production process can
be satisfied through primary and intermediate inputs. In this subsection, we shall focus
our attention on the treatment of the latter. Intermediate inputs, it will be recalled,
•* Following Lau (1975) one might consider the particular empirical situation as an important
indicator for the preferred functional form. According to Lau, the GL function is most appro-
priate when elasticities of substitution are low, whereas the translog is suitable in situations of
higher elasticities of substitution.
* This is particularly true for the Generalized-Leontief form.^Biif
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ight be purchased domestically and abroad. In principle, we distinguished between Jt
kinds of intermediate inputs. However, in the estimations reported below, we shall as-
sume the existence of a single composite intermediate input. The reason for this simpli-
fied treatment of intermediates is, /frst of all, a very practical one: not all the relevant
data are available for a sufficiently long period of time and for a sufficiently diversified
number of sources. Second/y, without making additional assumptions regarding the
nature of technology, allowing for a large number of intermediate inputs makes the esti-
mation of the model a cumbersome task. Imagine, for instance, a total of 200 interme-
diate inputs. The particular translog function to be estimated would contain an impos-
sible number of parameters and would be very difficult, if not impossible, to estimate.
In addition, the cost minimisation problem could certainly not be solved overnight.
The problem mentioned above was addressed in a seminal paper by Armington
(1969). According to the latter, imports are generally considered as homogeneous com-
modities, which are mostly aggregated into a single commodity. This procedure, which
is quite common in trade models, implicitly assumes perfect substitutability between
imports coming from different sources. However, if one does not accept the assumption
of perfect substitutability, one should in principle distinguish between imports coming
from different sources as being different products, and the utility maximisation process
of the consumer becomes quite complicated indeed. Armington solved this problem by
distinguishing between "goods" and "products". Commodity classes were referred to as
goods and goods produced in a particular country were referred to as products. Making
use of this distinction, Armington showed how the consumer utility optimisation pro-
cess might be split up into two stages. In the first stage, the consumer would allocate
his budget over the goods that might be distinguished. In the second stage, the budget
available for the various kinds of goods would be allocated to the products that might
be distinguished. The first stage is normally also referred to as upper level optimisation,
the second as lower level optimisation.
As was shown by Armington, a necessary and sufficient condition for this two-stage
optimisation process is that there is a (weak) separability between the distinguished com-
modities. The Armington approach has frequently been applied in so-called import allo-
cation models. For reasons outlined above, we are not able to invoke the Armington as-
sumption in our estimations. This Implies that we shall confine ourselves to the first
stage of the Armington optimisation process. We shall assume, that producers minimise
the costs of capital, labour and intermediate goods. Making use of Shephard's lemma,
this will enable us to derive demands for these factors.
Hence, one must find the parameters of the cost function c'(Wj,rj,qj). The translog ex-
pression for this function is
ln(c) = Po >; ,; ^^ „ >j J^ ^
+ Vty^n(Wj)ln(rj) + V^ln(w;)ln(cfc) + V*|>,Jn(rj)ln(w;) + V^ln(rj)ln(qi)
+ V^^n(qi)ln(Wi) + V^n^Mr;) (6.4)
with
IjPj =1
<t»ii = <t»;ï OV =
2j<t>ij =0 (;,; =
£i<t>ij = 0 0V =118 Oiap/er 6
The inverse conditional factor demand functions can be obtained in share form by
partial differentiation of the translog cost function. For labour, for example, this implies
0iw = Pw + j
For capital, one finds
«ir = Pr + 4>n>(Wj) + (J^n^) + ^ln(qj) (6.6)
Finally, for the intermediate input, we have
©iq = Pq + <t>q><Wj) + V"^ + V"^ (6.7)
Thus, we are left with three share equations to be estimated. The model contains 12
parameters to be estimated. However, the symmetry and equality restrictions which are
imposed upon it, result in fewer parameters to be estimated. Since P^+p^+P = 1, we
know that P = HP^+P,.). Furthermore, we know that 4>ww+<t>wr+4>wq = 0, so that <|)^ = -
<4>ww+O- Similarly, <t>ww+<t>rw+<t>qw = 0' so that <J>^ = -ty^+^rJ' ^d so on. Finally,
we have <J>^ = <)>„„•' 0™ = <tV' ^nd 0wq = <t*qw Thus we aie left with 5 out of 12 parame-
ters to be estimated. Since the three factor shares add up to unity, the system (6.5)-(6.7)
is linearly dependent. As a result, the covariance matrix becomes singular and one share
equation must be dropped for estimation purposes. Fortunately, as Barten (1969) has
shown, the estimation is invariant with respect to the equation which is deleted. Hence,
the equation to be dropped may be selected arbitrarily by the researcher. In our estima-
tions below, we drop the share equation for intermediate inputs. Note, that the share
equations (6.5M6.7) are linear in the logarithms of all input prices.
6.3.2 The rrenfmCTif of fee/mica/ c/iange
We begin with a very general treatment of (biased) technical change, allowing the
model to exhibit various patterns of technical change. Technical change may be
incorporated into the model in a variety of ways (for details, see Kohli (1991)). Below
we shall assume that technological change occurs through a shift parameter t in the cost
function. This implies that we shall use time t as a proxy variable representing the state
of technology. Since production technology is assumed to exhibit a putty-putty nature,
technological progress may be classified as disembodied in the model. The implication
of this treatment of technological change is that primary and intermediate input prices
held constant, costs will change as time elapses.
The treatment of technological change that we propose is very general and allows
several patterns of technical change to occur. Thus the model allows for both biased and
neutral technical change. Recall from Chapter 4 that in the literature, the bias of techno-
logical change is most frequently modelled using Hicks' definition of biases. Call the
bias of technological change for input i in sector ; B^. According to Hicks, technological
change is said to be /-factor-using if it increases the value share of the input at constant
input prices, or if B- > 0. If, on the other hand, technological change results in a declin-
ing share of factor i, it is called /-factor saving, which implies B- < 0. Finally, if technolo-
gical change does not influence the value share of factor i in sector /, i.e., B;: = 0, then
technological progress is said to be neutral with respect to factor z.
The bias of technological change may thus be determined as follows:of f/ie mode/ 119
36;:
Since the cost function is considered to be linear homogeneous in factor prices, we
know that
Ej 6jj = 1 for all i
and hence
Zj Bj- =1 for all i
Disembodied technical progress may be introduced into the cost function in a variety of
ways (see, e.g., Kohli (1991), pp. 103-106 and pp. 312-321). Below we shall adopt the
simplest possible assumption, notably that the technology shifts in time, that is, we add
a time index to the cost function, so
c = c(w,r,q,t)
The technology shift in time can occur in either direction, which makes it inaccurate to
impose a pnon" restrictions on the shift. The reader will recognize our approach to incor-
porate technical progress as the one followed by Binswanger (1974), Jorgenson and
Fraumeni (1983), and others.
Taking the technological shift into consideration in out translog cost function changes
this function into
ln(c)= po+f
with an additional restriction
ïj«fc, = 0 (i,/
The inverse conditional factor demand functions can be obtained in share form by
partial differentiation of the translog cost function. For labour, for example, this implies
For capital, one finds
8i, = p, + •^inCwj) + ^nfri) + ^Wqj) + •«* ^ (6.10)
Finally, for the intermediate input, we have
0^ = P, + «qwWWi) + ^>(Tj) + $^(qj) + *,,t , (6.11)120 C/wp/er 6
The inclusion of technical progress parameters increases the number of parameters to be
estimated to 7 (out of a total number of 15).
6.4 Data and estimation techniques
6.4.1 77K? data
Most of the data for our estimations were taken from Eurostat's Mrt/ona/ /iccounfs,
Defaifcd Tab/es ty Branch. The cost functions in the model were estimated for the manu-
facturing sectors from the database. In classifying economic sectors, Eurostat uses two
nomenclatures: Nace R25 and Nace R44, which correspond to a subdivision of sectors
into 24 and 44 sectors, respectively. In all our estimations, we have used the R25 classifi-
cation. These sectors are listed in Table 6.1.
The data which are available in the database concern the following variables: actual
production and value added (factor cost and market prices) at constant and current
prices, total yearly compensation of employees, employment data (occupied population
and number of salaried employees), imports and exports by branch at current prices
(and partly at constant prices), gross fixed capital formation by branch, and fixed capital
stocks, also at constant and current prices, we shall comment on these variables before
continuing the discussion of estimation results.
First of all, note that the data on production value and value added imply a value for
intermediate products used in the production process. These intermediates have both
domestic and foreign origins. Since the value of production data are given only in cur-
rent prices, we could not calculate a price deflator for intermediate inputs. However,
since GDP price deflators for all sectors were available in the database, this enabled us
to construct a price deflator for intermediates through aggregation. The aggregation pro-
cedure for price indexes was the Thornqvist index, which is a discrete approximation of
the translog form, as Diewert (1971) has pointed out. The translog or Thornqvist index
is defined as:
q, = VŒ;(Sj,+S;,.,)(lnqj, - lnq^,.,) (6.12)
where q, = the translog price index for the intermediates in period t, qj, = the price of
intermediate component i, and Sj, = the share of intermediate component f in period t.
The components that we have used to calculate the intermediate input price index are
the prices of energy, all manufacturing goods, building and construction, market ser-
vices, and government services. The Thornqvist index has been used in the empirical
literature by many authors, among which Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1983), Kohli (1991),
and others. Although its main use has been the international comparison of outputs, in-
puts, and productivity, it has also been applied for the purpose of measuring prices
(see, e.g., Aw and Roberts (1988)). The primary disadvantage of working with this
Thornqvist approximation of the true intermediate prices is that this procedure yields
the same intermediate input prices for all sectors of industry. Therefore, differences be-Estimation qf t/œ mode/ 121
tween industries in the intensity of the use of certain intermediates are not accounted
for, other than through the intermediate's shares.^
Table 6.1 Manufacturing sectors according to the NACE R25 classification in the



















































Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, «her|
than radioactive
Non-metallk minerals and mineral products
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery and transport
equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery




Food, beverages and tobacco i
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear j
Paper and printing products ;
Rubber and plastic products
Other manufacturing products I
The awges used in our estimations were calculated as the total compensation of em-
ployees divided by the number of wage and salary earners. Thus, for each sector, we cal-
culated:
total compensation of employees in sector ;
' number of employees in sector ;
where the number of wage earners corresponds to annual averages. The total compensa-
tion of employees covers all payments in cash and in kind made by the employers in
remuneration for work. Among others, these payments include gross wages, employers'
social security contributions, and imputed social security contributions. Obviously, the
wage rate obtained in this way varies per sector. The existence of these intersectoral dif-
ferences in wages is consistent with our assumption of imperfect (short-run) intersecto-
ral factor mobility.
* Obviously, it would have been preferable to use different intermediate input price indices
for different sectors. However, as we remarked above, these price indices are not readily availa-
ble, nor can they be calculated for each sector on the basis of the available data. Therefore we
had to use the kind of proxy discussed in the text.122 * ' C/iap/er 6
For the calculation of capita/ costs, several procedures have been suggested in the lite-
rature. Some authors have suggested to measure capital cost by relating both operating
surplus and depreciation allowances to the capital stock. Thus, capital cost could be
defined as
depreciation + gross operating surplus
fixed capital stock
Several alternative definitions of capital cost have been suggested in the econometric
literature. For instance, capital costs can be based on gross operating surplus, deprecia-
tion plus a theoretical user cost of capital. The latter is usually defined as the return on
save investments. Various procedures can be applied to calculate the theoretical user
cost of capital. Some authors have suggested that firms base their investment decisions
on the short-run safe real rate of return. Alternatively, one might use the long-run real
interest rate. However, both rates of return have fluctuated considerably over the period
of investigation, primarily due to large fluctuations in the inflation rates. For this reason,
some authors prefer to use a long-run theoretical user cost of capital which is constant
(see, e.g., Dargay (1987) and Kohli (1991), p. 118). Kohli, for instance, fixes the safe rate
of return at 4 per cent.
Dargay (1987, p. 21) uses another definition of capital costs. She defines capital cost
as
Tj = Pj(o+6)
where p. = the price of investment goods, o = operating surplus or the rate of return,
and 6 = the depreciation rate.
The real capital stock is usually taken as the quantity of the capital service input.
Combination of total costs and the capital stock then allows one to calculate the price
for the capital service. The capital stock figures which are supplied by Eurostat are
based on the perpetual inventory method (PIM), and have as a very important advan-
tage their harmonized nature (i.e., they are calculated for all countries using the same
definitions). The implementation of PIM implies that the capital stock is primarily deter-
mined by investment data and the average life time of capital goods. To calculate the
average life time, Eurostat uses a log-normal survival function.
Unfortunately, our database does not allow the use of these theoretically more ad-
vanced definitions of capital costs. Since depreciation allowances were not available or
could not be calculated in our database, we were forced to use the simplest possible
definition of capital costs. This definition of capital costs relates operating surplus to the
fixed capital stock and is also known as the entity concept of capital cost or profit rates.
It has been used by several other authors who used the same capital stock data as we
did (see Mortenson (1984), pp. 35-36). How this influences our estimation is hard to tell,
but obviously entity capital cost will be lower than capital costs which are calculated in
the more sophisticated manner enunciated above. In principle, this could lead to values
for <()^ that are biased in an upward direction and therefore to biased (upward) estima-
tes of the own AUES for capital.
The data values for wages, capital costs and intermediate input prices were all nor-
malised to 1 in the starting year.Estimation 0/ t/ie mode/
6.4.2 Estimation fec/mica/i'ties
In this subsection we shall outline the econometric procedures that were followed in
order to obtain estimates of the translog cost function system described above. The
translog cost functions were empirically implemented by estimation of eqs. (6.8M6.10).
The stochastic specification of the model included the specification of additive distur-
bance terms for each of the equations. These additive disturbance terms reflect alterna-
tively random errors in cost-minimizing behaviour or random influences of excluded
explanatory variables. It may be expected, that the disturbance terms for the different
equations are related and the estimation method should in principle allow for non-zero
contemporaneous correlation between the error terms.
Let us assume that the vector of error terms for the three equations is denoted by Û,
and that Û, is normally distributed with zero mean and with associated variance-cova-
riance matrix £2, i.e.,
f 1 if t = S ' .v •: --.. : ; • •' ,
Û, - N(0^2) s.t. E(û,,ôp = S* Q ok = <
I 0 if t * s
In this specification, the error terms have a constant variance-covariance matrix. In addi-
tion, it allows for non-zero correlation between contemporaneous error terms in the
equations. Finally, we assume zero intertemporal correlation between all error terms.
Since the share equations must add up to unity, the estimated disturbance covariance
matrix is singular. As we saw above, the most common method to overcome this pro-
blem is to drop one of the estimating equations from the system. In our estimations, we
dropped the share equation for intermediates.
As the equations had identical coefficients, the system of equations had to be estima-
ted simultaneously. We used the full-information maximum likelihood estimation proce-
dure in order to get our estimates of the parameters. We used (single equation) OLS
estimates of the parameters as starting values for the FIML procedure which is available
in versions 4.0 and 4.1 of the TSP package. The full-information maximum likelihood
estimator is consistent, and, given the normality assumption, normal asymptotically.
Furthermore, the FIML estimation is invariant with respect to the equation that is
dropped. The algorithm used is GAUSS, which is a gradient method that uses exact
analytical derivatives of the likelihood function.
We should devote a few more words to the problem of the curvature conditions which
should be met by the estimated cost function. One should in principle check whether or
not the estimated cost functions satisfy the required curvature conditions. This check
should be performed for all observations in the sample. As Diewert and Wales (1987)
pointed out, estimates of cost functions have sometimes failed to meet the curvature re-
quirements. The implication for a cost function that is found to be convex rather than
concave, for instance, is that the researcher finds a maximum rather than a minimum
for this function, and that the implied factor shares may become negative. Needless to
say, this would deprive the estimation results of economic meaningful ness and rele-
vance.
Fortunately, the econometric literature has produced several clues as to how to solve
this intricate problem when it should arise. As the reader may well recall, concavity of
the cost function can be checked by inspection of the Hessian of the cost function c(.).
The cost function will only be concave if and only if this Hessian is negative semi-defi-124 Owp/er 6
nite. This condition may also be expressed in terms of the matrix of substitution elastici-
ties, £. Given that costs are positive, a necessary and sufficient condition for the Hessian
of the cost function to be negative semi-definite is that the matrix of substitution elasti-
cities itself is negative semi-definite.
Wiley, Schmidt and Bramble (1973) proposed a technique to impose the correct cur-
vature conditions on the cost function.^ This technique imposes concavity /ocaWy. In
other words, the technique does not guarantee that the cost function will also satisfy the
criterion of global concavity. In principle, as Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1983) have
shown, concavity may also be imposed globally, but the disadvantage of that procedure
is that it destroys a good deal of the flexibility of the functional form. As Wiley,
Schmidt and Bramble point out, a matrix A is negative semi-definite if it can be written
as
A = - T.T'
where T = [T^] is a lower triangular matrix. Thus, in the 3x3 case, we have
Ml 0 0
0
This matrix can be used to reparametrize the estimating functions. The implication of












Now recall that the elasticities of substitution have been defined as follows:
O;w =
for ; * it
for ; = it
The next step is to normalize the values of all input prices in the year in which violation
of the concavity occurs to 1 and the value of the time-trend (which is the technical pro-
gress parameter) to 0. Then it can immediately be seen from the share equations that 8:
= Pj at that point. Therefore, at this point we may write
' Note that Kohli (1991) uses this technique intensively.Estimation of the mode/ 125
°ik • ,. o, ox/o, for/ = Jt (/Jt =
Now set P = [Pj], B = diagfp] and A = BIB, with Z evaluated at the point of violation of




A necessary and sufficient condition for L to be negative semi-definite is that A itself is
negative semi-definite. This can be ensured by setting
A = -TT
Hence, the reparametrisation results in the following estimates for the parameters:^
•tw




The above reparametrisation only guarantees local concavity. Therefore, once concavity
has been imposed locally, one needs to check whether concavity will hold for all obser-
vations. As Kohli (1992) points out, it is frequently sufficient to impose the curvature
conditions at the point that seems to be the most serious offender.
6.5 Estimation résulte
This section presents and discusses the results obtained from the econometric estimation
of the model parameters. We estimated the model using the data described above. We
start with a presentation of the estimated coefficients of the model and proceed with a
discussion of the implied elasticities of substitution between factors of production.
Table 6.2 reveals the estimation results for the parameters of the three-equation sys-
tem of Hicksian conditional factor demand functions for Germany. The value shares are
obtained by relating the payments to a factor to the value of total production. We esti-
mated the parameters for the 13 manufacturing industries in the database. The estima-
tion period was 1970-1986.
One may observe that the majority of parameters are significantly different from zero
in all of the industries. As to the interpretation of the parameters, one may note the fol-
' Note that Kohli's (1991, p. 110) expression (8.15) contains some disturbing misprints, which
we did not reproduce in (6.12).126 C/wpfer 6
lowing. The parameters (P^, P|} might be interpreted as average value shares of capita]
and labour for the concerning sector. The parameters {<J>^, $,„, <t>rr <t>wq' <l>rqi °^y be
interpreted as constant share elasticities with respect to the price of the corresponding
factor. Similarly, {0^,, <|>|,) are the constant biases of technical change. Note that the para-
meters 4»^, are all statistically significantly different from zero, which makes it inappro-
priate to describe the German production technology by a Cobb-Douglas production
function.
Special attention deserve the estimates for the office and data processing machines,
precision and optical instruments sector. It turned out (see the discussion of the AUES
below) that the estimates for the cost function of this sector were not consistent with the
curvature requirements. Therefore, we had to impose concavity for this sector using the
Bramble, Schmidt and Wiley technique. The reparametrised estimates are listed under-
neath the original ones. Rather than presenting the estimates for the T parameters, we
listed the implied values of the (|>J:'S to ease a comparison of the results. The latter para-
meters were obtained with the ANALYSE procedure in the TSP package. The estimated
cost function thus satisfied the required regularity conditions, including concavity, for
all observations.
We did not report Durbin-Watson test statistics, since these have no meaning unless
they have been obtained with OLS residuals. Also, there appears to be some evidence
that the appearance of low DW values may be attributed to the imposition of the sym-
metry and homogeneity restrictions in the estimation. Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) re-
ported a substantial drop in DWs after imposing the homogeneity restrictions. Never-
theless, it should be mentioned that the calculated Durbin-Watson statistics were low
for a number of sectors, and the possibility of first-order serial auto-correlation could
certainly exist. However, attempts to correct for auto-correlation had only little effect on
the estimated parameters.
In order to evaluate the parameters of technical change, we constructed Table 63, in
which the estimated biases of technical progress are summarised. Recall that a positive
value of the technical progress parameter indicates that technical progress is factor-
using with respect to the corresponding factor, and that a negative value implies that
technical progress is factor-saving with respect to that factor. Technical progress turned
out to be capital-using in all industries included in our study and labour-saving in all
but one industry. Note also, that technical progress is intermediate-using in the vast
majority of cases. Finally, it is interesting to see that our findings are almost completely
in accordance with Nakamura's (1984) detailed sectoral cost function study on 12
branches of the German economy. The latter also reports a capital-using and labour-
saving bias in all industries. Nakamura quotes evidence from several other studies
(among others, for the Japanese economy), where a similar pattern of technical progress
was found to exist in the majority of cases. Finally, the existence of a capital-using and
labour-saving bias has been found in Binswanger's (1974) influential study on the mea-
surement of technical change biases.®
In order to analyse price responsiveness and factor substitution possibilities, we com-
puted the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticities of substitution. These are reported in Table 6.4
for two years, notably 1970 and 1985. Inspection of these elasticities shows that we
found negative own elasticities of substitution in the vast majority of cases. This is in
accordance with cost minimizing principles and is well in keeping with the results of
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Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
-0.0086 -0.0157 0.0178 0.0010 0.2911
(-0.4994) (-9.9497) (13.8446) (3.5059) (13.1980)
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
0.0906 -0.0651 0.0732 0.0021 0.6919
(0.6264) (-4.8877) (5.4Î43) (1.0167) (6.1026)
Chemical products
-Ô.0466 -0.0649 0.0577 0.0028 05253
(-1.8251) (-21.3684) (16.8494) (6.5686) (X2.6557)
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
-0.1014 -0.0861 0.O723 B.0042 0.8438
(-1.7926) (-10.4597) (8.6027) (4.5193) (183404)
Agricultural and industrial machinery
-0.0536 -0.0579 0.0545 0.0029 0.6528











Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
-0.3429 -0.1640 0.1267 0.0088 1.8964 0.1053
(-3.0854) (-13.3861) (8.7933) (4.4607) (11.4476) (13549)
Reparametrisation:
0.2414 -0.0542 0.0488 0.0042 0.3609 -0.1893













-0.1883 -0.0507 0.0582 0.0050 0.3996
(-9J2528) (-10.7633) (23.6020) (15.1469) (7.6350)
Food, beverages and tobacco
0.1356 -0.0530 0.0480 0.0017 0.3611
(3.2585) (-11.6075) (8.9909) (Z3848) (13.1402)
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
-0.0369 -0.0658 0.0588 0.0032 0.7856
(-0.9911) (-15.2201) (16.6970) (5.1787) (22.4534)
Paper and printing products
-02168 -O.0553 0.0673 0.0065 0-5902
(-5.7758) (-9.0995) (11.7147) (10.1959) (16.4472)
Rubber and plastic products
0.1409 -0.0716 0.0589 0.0016 0.8371
(2.4437) (-11.1591) (10.6999) (1.5446) (20.1297)
Other manufacturing products
-03015 -0.1057 0.0840 0.0067 1.0108












































Nature of bias for production factor
L X
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive + - +
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products + - +
Chemical products + - +
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment + - +
Agricultural and industrial machinery + - +
Office and data processing machines,
precision and optical instruments + - +
Electrical goods + - -
Transport equipment +
Food, beverages and tobacco + - +
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear + - +
Paper and printing products +
Rubber and plastic products + - +
Other manufacturing products + - +
Note: K •= capital, L « labour, X = intermediates.
+ = input-using, - = input-saving, 0 = input-neutralEsf imaf ion of fne mode/
Table 6.4 Estimated values of the Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution, 1970 and
1985: Germany
_33_ wq
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
1970 -12.0864 -5.5305 -0.1702 -1.8680 0.9464
1985 -12.9164 -5.4039 -0.1540 -3.0921 0.9223
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
1970 -1.9102 -1.3570 -0.9466 -0.0477
1985 -2.3826 -1.3706 -0.6091 -0.7251
Chemical products
1970 -3.3291 -1.8471 -0.4443 -1.6911
1985 -33068 -1.7878 -0.4875 -13950
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipme
1970 -23737 -1.3251 -0.9593 ^0.6367
ient







Agricultural and industrial machinery
1970 -3.5883 -1.5767 -0.8710 -0.5420 1.0560
1985 -3.2160 -1.5258 -0.8084 -0.9778 1.0711
Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
1970 -0.9641 #.9563 -2.1068
1985 1.1819 -1.1739 -1.0126
Reparameterisa t ion:
1970 -2.3400 -3.1911 -3.0660
1985 -3.8912 -4.5107 -1.4684
Electrical goods
1970 -2.43% -1.2724 -1.0611
1985 -2.4431 -1.1982 -1.1314
Transport equipment
1970 -23590 -1.8504 -0.5380
1985 -3.2849 -1.8721 -0.6113
Food, beverages and tobacco
1970 -7.5899 -3.6599 -0.5247
1985 -3.0933 -3.6657 -0.4393
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
1970 -3.0005 -1.8461 -0.8744
1985 -3.1157 -2.1565 -0.5992
Paper and printing products
1970 -2.6697 -2.2299
1985 -2.6005 -2.5814




















































































Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
-03085 -0.0799 0.0789 0.0078 1.7005
(-1.2754) (-10.3629) (6.7583) (2.1674) (11.4751)
Repara met ri sation:
1.0565 -O.0022 -0.0061 -0.0121 0.4683
(5.8774) (-0.1370) (-0.9482) (-49027) (1.6793)
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
-1.2219 -0.1425 0.1321 0.0206 2.6420
(-8.1381) (-10.5933) (10.3066) (9.5780) (9.5543)
Repara metri sation:
0.4854 -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0036 0.8989
(1.8996) (-0.3224) (-0.3173) (-0.9402) (3.9075)
Chemical products
•CT2517 -0.0585 0.0549 0.0058 1.3042
(-3.9955) (-5.8332) (9.5235) (6.4804) (8.5454)
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
-0.4047 -C.0493 0:0688 O0093 1.2400
(-2.1654) (-2.3564) (3.9535) (3.4633) (5.3719)
Agricultural and industrial machinery
-0.5253 -0.0815 0.0558 0.0091 1.4197
(-3.2686) (-5.8236) (3.0516) (3.6619) (8.1245)



















































Paper and printing products
-0.5722 -0.0831
(-8.8107) (-8.1908)





























































































bias for production factor
131
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, t>ther than radioactive - - +
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products +
Chemical products + - +
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment + - +
Agricultural and industrial machinery + - +
Office and data processing machines,
precision and optical instruments + - +
Electrical goods + - +
Transport equipment + - +
Food, beverages and tobacco +
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear + - +
Paper and printing products + - +
Rubber and plastic products + - +
Other manufacturing products + - +
Note: K = capital, L = labour, X = intermediates.
+ = input-using, - = input-saving, 0 = input-neutral132 C/tapfer 6
Table 6.7 Estimated values of the Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution, 1970 and
1985: Italy
I33_
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
1970 -1.8340 -1.3715 -0.6389 -0.9112 1.0077
1985 0.2168 -0.7911 -0.2469 -5.9475 1.0161
Reparametrisa tion:
1970 -3.3882 -4.1052 -0.6882 0.9468 1.0609
1985 -11.7015 -5.5012 -0.2749 0.8067 1.1270
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
1970 -0.8225 -0.6196 -1.2595 -0.9137
1985 -0.6099 -0.5462 -0.7832 -2.0043
Reparametrisa tion;
1970 -3.5936 -1.8146 -1.2349 0.9384
1985 -4.3539 -Z7261 -0.7679 0.9033
Chemical products
1970 -3.2041 -2.0679 -0.5996 -0.6827
1985 -35451 -2.6441 -0.3462 -2.4429
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
1970 -1.9016 -2.3749 -1.1219 0.1735
1985 -2.4515 -2.8816 -0.7164 -0.1944





















Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
1970 -5.1455 -$.1096 -1.8474 -0.8964 1.0479
1985 -3.6678 -6.3925 -1.0224 -0.8445 1.0271
Electrical goods
1970 -3.4101 -1.7826 -0.9658
1985 -3.4094 -2.7792 -0.6544
Transport equipment
1970 -2.4301 -1.9566 -0.6683
1985 -2.0784 -1.9338 -0.5883
Food, beverages and tobacco
1970 -3.2396 -10.4094 -03454
1985 -4.0908 -9.0102 -0.2928
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
1970 -2.4769 -1.8174 -0.6915
1985 -2.3268 -2.2715 -0.6137
Paper and printing products
1970 -2.1953 -1.8194 -0.7291
1985 -2.1933 -2.1698 -0.5914
Rubber and plastic products
1970 -1.8107^ -2.2252 -0.8616
1985 -1.9198 -2.4360 -0.6210
Other manufacturing products
1970 -1.4014 -1.4581 -0.7588
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Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
0.2226 -0.0137 0.0149 -0.0018 0JZ890 0.0350
(13512) (-3.9602) (8.0186) (-0.8279) (2.2451) (2.6609)
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
-0.2082 -0.0532 0.0690 0.0060 1.2564
(-2.2055) (-14912) (4.9649) (4.3889) (18.2186)
Chemical products
-O1857 -0.0488 0.0778 0.0058 0.5097
(-2.7440) (-11.9807) (22.1589) (5.9692) (10.2743)
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
0.4708 40.0057 -0.0001 -0.0050 0.9293
(3.2600) (-0.3165) (-0.0087) (-Z5474) (6.7287)
Agricultural and industrial machinery
-0.1788 -0.0414 0.0531 0.0048 1.0015









Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
0.6701 -0.0481 0.0405 -00099 2.0556 -0.0040




















Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
-0.0800 -0.0266 0.0387 0.0031
(-1.1365) (-1.3705) (3.2940) (3.0884)
Paper and printing products
•0.3109 -0.0496 0.0493
(-0.5211) (-0.2400) (0.8277)










































































bias for production factor
L X
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive +
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products + - +
Chemical products +
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment + - +
Agricultural and industrial machinery + - +
Office and data processing machines,
precision and optical instruments - - +
Electrical goods + - +
Transport equipment + - +
Food, beverages and tobacco + - +
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear + - +
Paper and printing products +
Rubber and plastic products + - +
Other manufacturing products + - +
Note: K = capital, L = labour, X = intermediates.
+ = input-using, - = input-saving, 0 = input-neutralEstimation of t/œ mode/ 135
Table 6.10 Estimated values of the Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution, 1970 and
1985: Belgium
r







Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
1970 -2.0976 -1.7441 -1.3592

























Agricultural and industrial machinery
1970 -3.1588 -1.8678 -1.0091














































































































































Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
0.0584 -0.0595 0.0667 0.0021 0.5402 0.0832
(0.7888) (-14.5911) (21.7798) (2.0179) (4.8297) (Z0460)
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
-0.2854 -0.0887 0.08Ô7 0.0072
(-4.9416) (-8.1303) (93387) (8.2849)
Chemical products
02205 -0.0317 0.0593 0.0003





ifetal products, except machinery and transport equipment
-0.2825 $.0448 0.0563 dO061 09883
(-3.0668) (-5.5468) (7.1131) (4.6350) (18.2493)
Agricultural and industrial machinery
0.0465 -0.0760 0.0531 0.0004 10.9974
































Food, beverages and tobacco
-0.0164 -0.0244 0.0289 0.0019
H (-0.2677) (-7.9314) (7.9178) (2.1000)





Paper and printing products
-0.Ï023 -0.0509 0.0465
(-1.3487) (-3.3577) (4.0413)
JRubber and plastic products
||; -0.1243 -0.0646 0.0532
•f (-2.2968) (-7.1245) (12.7481)
Other manufacturing products













































































Nature of bias for production factor
K L X
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and data processing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
Paper and printing products
Rubber and plastic products
Other manufacturing products
Note: K = capital, L = labour, X = intermediates.
+ = input-using, - = input-saving, 0 = input-neutral136 C/wprer 6
Table 6.13 Estimated values of the Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution, 1970 and
1985: The Netherlands
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
1970 -2.4370 -1.9855 -0.5054 -0.7544 0.9385
1985 -2.7455 -1.9893 -0.3884 -1.4970 0.9203
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
1970 -1.9559 -1.5294 -0.9470






1970 -2.4406 -2.2973 -0.5831 0.3137
1985 -2.9808 -3.1685 -0.2001 -1.5289
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
1970 -3.2991 -1.7227 -0.8830 0.0124
1985 -3.3888 -2.1114 -0.6991 -0.2490
Agricultural and industrial machinery
19% -3.3440 -5.2030 -5.0603 -1.0547







Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
1970 -4.9006 4.2243 -1.6851 -1.2551 1.8847
1985 -10.2309 -3.1860 -1.4807 -3.6662 3.0447
Electrical goods
1970 -2.4670 -1.6889 -0.9071
1985 -2.5798 -1.8974 -0.7458
Transport equipment
1970 -a 1.3975 -2.7741 -0.6087
1985 -19.1252 -3.5440 -0.4339
Food, beverages and tobacco
1970 -5.9034 -6.2780 -0.2690
1985 -7.5431 -6.5825 -0.1997
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
1970 -6.3865 -2.3859 -0.5080
1985 -6.3296 -3.3465 -0.3885
Paper and print ing products
1970 -3.862D -1.8165 -0.7558
1985 -4.0605 -2.0699 -0.6331
Rubber and plastic products
1970 -3.3968 -1.4149 -0.7441
1985 -3.6787 -1.6778 -0.5275
Other manufacturing products
1970 -3.5565 -1.7098 -0.7474





































































Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
-0.3342 -0.0402 0.0563 0.0069 0.6231 0.0317
(-3.4486) (-8.4682) (9.4279) (4.6841) (7.0133) (1.6639)
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
-0.4663 -0.0690 0.0696 0.0094 1.0823
(-2.3149) (-5.6972) (3.8577) (3.0921) (7.4303)
Chemical products
-<U470 -0.0441 0.0507 0.0044 0.8019
(-1.6964) (-5.0899) (4.9478) (3.3921) (6.0354)
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
-0.2877 -0.0604 0.0619 0.0064 1.1290
(-4.8215) (-4.7514) (9.5310) (7.9991) (8.4197)
Agricultural and industrial machinery
-0.1374 -0.0412 0.0397 0.0039 1.0509









Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
-0.8100 -0.0497 0.0980 0.0151 0.9615 0.0468
(-9.3743) (-5.1793) (11.4083) (120021) (5.8871) (1.6259)
1 goods
-(16476 -0.0429 0.0625 0.0110
(-4.8080) (-6.9156) (63118) (5.4161)
Transport equipment
-O2517 -0.0321 0.0333 0.0044
(-3.7483) (-3.2543) (10.6415) (48651)
Food, beverages and tobacco
-0.1887 -0.0485 0.0455 0.0048
(-22411) (-4.4730) (4.4106) (3.5260)
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
-03632 -0.0447 0.0448 0.0066
(-53745) (-3.7551) (63038) (7.0715)
Paper and printing products
-0.2511 -0.0472 0.0412
(-4.5968) (-7.5926) (10.4751)






































































Note: t-values between brackets140 ••• C/iapfer6
Table 6.15 Summary of technical progress biases: France
Industry Nature of bias for production factor
K L X
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive + - +
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products + - +
Chemical products + - +
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment + - +
Agricultural and industrial machinery + - +
Office and data processing machines,
precision and optical instruments + - +
Electrical goods +
Transport equipment + - +
Food, beverages and tobacco + - +
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear + - +
Paper and printing products •»• - +
Rubber and plastic products + - +
Other manufacturing products + - +
K = capital, L = labour, X = intermediates.
+ = input-using, - = input-saving, 0 = input-neutralEsfrmaffern of r/te mode/ 141
Table 6.16 Estimated values of the Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution, 1970 and
1985: France
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive
1970 -3.2133 -4.0683 -0.4196 -0.7530 0.8419
1985 -2.6986 -3.5686 -0.3379 -1.7931 0.7285
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
1970 -23181 -1.5854 -1.0077 -0.1753
1985 -2.5454 -1.6131 -0.8598 -0.4598
Chemical products
1970 -3.2223 -2.3234 -0.6129 -0.1625
1985 -3.9198 -2.7470 -0.3971 -1.1504
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
1970 -2.8297 -1.7799 -1.0173 ^0.1749
1985 -3.0245 -1.7671 -0.8590 -0.6101
Agricultural and industrial machinery
1970 -43552 -2.0142 -0.8609 -0.0227









Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
1970 -1.4498 -1.4457 -1.2153 0.4279 0.5073
1985 -1.5212 -1.6897 -0.9472 0.2864 0.5261
Electrical goods
1970 -2.9872 -1.7492 -0.8330
1985 -2.9994 -1.6382 -0.9087
Transport equipment
1970 -6.1292 -2.1473 -0.6086
1985 -6.4547 -2.5723 -0.5329
Food, beverages and tobacco
1970 3.6615 -4.1427 -0.3840
1985 -3.9865 -3.6624 -0.4010
Textiles and dothing, leather and footwear
1970 -43196 -2.0741 -0.6413
1985 -4.4160 -2.0705 -0.6647
Paper and printing products
1970 -4.5762 -2.5437 -0.6233
1985 -4.7513 -Z3149 -0.6539
Rubber and plastic products
1970 -2.7233 -1.4843 -0.8555
1985 -2.6203 -1.7434 -0.5933
Other manufacturing products
1970 -2.8453 -2.0316 -0.5880























































studies based on other static models. In the cases where we found positive own elastici-
ties of substitution, we imposed concavity using the Bramble, Schmidt and Wiley tech-
nique. Note also, that we find that the own elasticity of substitution of intermediates is
generally quite low in all sectors. Thus, we find that intermediates are not particularly
sensitive to changes in prices in the majority of sectors. This low price sensitivity of
intermediates is in agreement with the findings of other empirical studies (see, e.g.,
Dargay (1988)).
If we compare the own substitution elasticities of labour and capital, we find that the
AUES for capital are larger (in absolute terms) than those for labour in the majority of
cases. This also happens to be true for the own price elasticities of capital and labour.
The low value of the own elasticities for labour, which is also documented in several
other studies, might reflect an aggregation bias, since we treated labour as a homoge-
neous factor. In case we could have distinguished more types of labour (skilled, unskil-
led) the values of the corresponding elasticities might well turn out to be higher.
As far as the cross-elasticities of substitution are concerned, we find that most of
these partial elasticities between capital and intermediates and between labour and
intermediates are positive, indicating that these pairs of production factors are substitu-
tes in all cases. Note, however, also that in a large number of cases, the values of the
cross-elasticities of substitution is rather low, in many cases in the vicinity of 1. This
indicates the existence of but weak substitution possibilities between pairs of factors.
As far as the substitution possibilities between capital and labour are concerned, we
evidence of complementarity between these two factors of production in all sectors. The
finding that capital and labour are complements is remarkable, indeed, since it runs
counter to many economists' intuition. However, it is well in accordance with Naka-
mura's (1984, pp. 210-212) above mentioned study. He finds evidence of complementa-
rity in 10 out of 12 industries in his sample, substitutability between capital and labour
in only one sector, and a sign reversal in one sector as well. Admitting that capital-
labour complementarity might seem unusual, Nakamura remarks that similar findings
have been made by several other authors for Japanese and German industrial sectors.
Capital-labour complementarity therefore seems to be a quite normal finding of sectoral
production and cost function studies (most notably in the so-called KLEMS studies).
Furthermore, the finding that capital and labour are complements rather than
substitutes can be given some degree of plausibility by the following considerations.
Firsf of all, one should bear in mind that we are estimating a short-run production
model. As is well-known, substitution possibilities between capital and labour might be
rather low in the short run. Second/y, we do not distinguish between different types of
labour and our finding of K-L complementarity might reflect the existence of an aggre-
gation bias. In the applied econometric literature complementarity between skilled
labour and capital is an unusual phenomenon. Note also, that capital need not be homo-
genous. In many studies the production factor capital is split up into equipment on the
one hand and structures on the other. Th/rd/y and finally, K-L complementarity can be
reconciled with our results on the biases of technical change. Strong K-using and L-
saving biases in technical change imply that, given the prices of capital and labour, K-L
ratios will increase in the course of time as a result of this technical change. Since the
price of labour increased relative to the price of capital in all industries during the esti-
mation period, it is not surprising at all that we find evidence of K-L complementarity.
Additionally, the increase in the relative price of labour may have induced the observed
pattern of technical change, and may well have lead to a substitution of capital for
labour through an influence on the nature of technical change. Thus, the effects of tech-
nical change biases on the K-L ratio seems to be quantitatively much more importantEstimation of the mode/ 143
than the technical K-L complementarity. FourfWy, even though one might find K-L sub-
stitution in a two-factor model, this does not necessarily imply the same when more
factors of production are considered jointly. Fi/Wi/y, we should admit that admit that the
parameters and AUES of our empirical model are based on a theoretical model derived
from static equilibrium theory. This implies that the dynamics of the adjustment procès
cannot be discussed at all. In other words, we are not able to say something about the
price sensitivity of factor demand and the substitution relationships in different time
perspectives. Using static equilibrium models implies that one takes the adjustment pro-
cess for granted in that adjustment to price or output changes is more or less instanta-
neous and costless. Thus it is hard, if not impossible, to distinguish between short- and
long-run responses. Assuming that firms can switch from one technique to another
without time delays or costs is, needless to say, particularly problematic in the case of
physical capital, for instance, machinery. As is well known, capital cannot be replaced
immediately, and frequently there is a large delay before an investment results in pro-
ductive use of capital goods. In one would be able to take the peculiarities of the adjust-
ment process into account, one might find that capital and labour are substitutes in the
long run (see in this vein, Dargay (1988), chapter 6).
We now turn to a discussion of the results for the remaining countries, notably Italy,
Belgium, The Netherlands and France. Note that the parameter estimates are in general
quite satisfactory. Also, closer inspection of the results reveals some interesting similari-
ties between all countries. It turns out, /ïrst/y, that the pattern of technical change is air
most identical in all countries. We find K-using and L-saving biases in the vast majority
of cases. Second/y, we find evidence of K-L complementarity for almost all sectors in all
countries. In Belgium, this tendency towards K-L complementarity is less pronounced,
since the results for this country show several sign reversals. In Italy, three out of
twelve sectors exhibit K-L substitutability. However, one might safely conclude that in
these country, as in the others, the trend in K-L elasticities of substitution is one in the
direction of increasing "complementarisation" as time elapses.
6.6 Conclusions
The estimation of the parameters of our production model for the Nace-R25 manufactu-
ring sectors of the five most important founding fathers of the EC has given us quite a
plausible description of the production technology in these countries. We have achieved
these results by estimating translog unit cost functions. The vast majority of Allen-
Uzawa own elasticities substitution elasticities turned out to be negative, which is in
accordance with economic theory. Occasionally, we found evidence of non-concavity of
the cost function, but we were able to correct for this, at least locally. Our results
seemed to imply that capital and labour are complements in the majority of cases. Capi-
tal and intermediate inputs turned out to be substitutes, as were labour and intermedi-
ate inputs. We also found evidence of capital-using and labour-saving biases in techni-
cal change for the majority of cases. Technical change was also predominantly interme-
diate-using.
Needless to say, our results may be vulnerable to criticism on a number of grounds.
The model that we estimated is a static equilibrium model, which does not take into
account the existence of adjustment costs and time lags. Also, we assume homogeneous
capital, which takes the form of "jelly". In addition, we did not distinguish between
various types of labour. We did not take into account the existence of a non-tradedMi Oiap/er 6
goods sector.' Nevertheless, we believe that our results are a fully acceptable descrip-
tion of technology, and provide, at least as an approximation, plausible estimates for the
elasticities of substitution. The latter will be used in the next chapter for simulation
purposes.
' Woodland (1988) has shown how the effects of a non-traded goods sector may be "netted
out" of the model.TWO SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
7.1 Introduction
This chapter's primary purpose is to simulate the wage effects of the internal trade
policies of the European Community. The analysis will make use of the model that was
developed in the previous chapters, and is based on the parameters that were estimated
in the last chapter. The model is used to simulate the wage effects of the creation of the
European Community for the EC-5 region.
Two simulation experiments will be conducted in this chapter. Firsf of all, we shall
discuss the effects of the formation of the customs union in 1968. This experiment invol-
ves an exercise with the internal liberalisation of trade and the (external) imposition of
the common external tariff in the customs union. The distributional effects of the cus-
toms union will be simulated using the pre-1968 tariff rates in the various branches of
industry. In the simulation exercise, we shall assume that the Member States abolish the
customs union in 1970 and re-implement the pre-union 1959 trade policies. Second, we
shall discuss the distributional effects of the programme to complete the internal market
in 1992. These effects are determined using tariff equivalents of the most important non-
tariff barriers distinguished in the 1992 programme. The analysis of both the simulation
of the imposition of the common external tariff as well as the simulation concerning the
achievement of the internal market, are concerned with the sfahc e/jfecfs of the trade
policy changes.
The plan for the chapter is as follows. We start with a discussion of the importance
and magnitude of trade barriers in the founding countries of the EC (section 7.2). The
1958 tariff barriers in the various sectors of industry will be quantified, as well as the
non-tariff barriers that existed in the 1980s. Subsequently, simulation methodologies
which have surfaced in the empirical literature and which will serve as our example
will pass in review. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 contain a discussion of the above-mentioned
simulation experiments. Finally, in section 75 we try to evaluate the plausibility of our
findings. The concluding remarks follow in section 7.7.146 C/wpfer 7
7.2 Tariff and non-tariff barriers in the EC, 1958-1992 ~
7.2.1 Tories and fte crea/z'on of /he customs union
The level of tariffs imposed by different countries might be compared by simple
calculation of ad paforem tariff rates for each industrial branch and each country under
consideration. However, the most important problem with the calculation of these ad
wj/orem tariff rates is the incompatibility of pre-union national tariff schedules, which
employed different international trade nomenclatures and in which also some duties
tended to be expressed in specific or physical terms. Hence, comparison of tariff rates
must be restricted to those commodities which may be identified easily and which were
in addition to that consistently classified.
Specific duties are usually converted to ad ya/orem rates by relating total tariff reve-
nue in the sector under consideration to the total ci./, value of imports in that sector. In
theory, this should not lead to distorted ad pa/orem rates. The calculation of industry
averages of fld ya/orem rates is, however, extremely difficult. When highly aggregated in-
dustry classifications like the NACE-R25 nomenclature are used, problems of
aggregation are likely to arise, since the average tariff of a sector is usually obtained as
a weighted average of the desaggregated sectoral tariffs. When the tariffs are completely
prohibitive, the corresponding weight of a sub-sector will be zero, causing an under-
estimation of the true preferential impact of the aggregated tariff rate. Obviously, this
problem could be overcome by calculating unweighed tariffs, but that procedure tends
to give unfair weights to extremes as well as to relatively unimportant sectors.
The above goes to show that various factors will influence the comparability and cal-
culation of NACE-Clio tariff rates, especially average tariffs. The process of the combi-
ning of the tariffs of sub-sectors will produce averaging and weighting problems which
are very difficult to solve the wider and broader the list of goods that must be
combined.
The EC's common external tariff (CET) was calculated as an unweighed average of
member states' tariffs on various products. During the transition period, which started
in 1960 and which formally ended in 1970, external and internal tariffs were adjusted
simultaneously, be it at a different pace. Thus the trade preferences conveyed by the
tariffs varied considerably during the transition period. The elimination of tariffs pis-o-
OT'S partner countries started in July 1960, and the adjustment of external tariffs to the
level of the CET started in 1963.
For estimates of tariff rates we based ourselves on El-Agraa (1980). From this source
we derived data on nominal tariffs for sectors. Table 7.1 (column 1) lists for each EC-5
country the nominal tariff rates for final products. As a comparison between these coun-
tries reveals a well-known fact, notably that France and Italy were basically tariff-ridden
economies, whereas the Benelux countries and Germany might be characterised as
tariff-shy. The elimination of internal tariffs therefore implied that the latter countries
were given larger preferences than the former. On the other hand, the Benelux and Ger-
many were obliged to raise their external tariffs vis-a-wis the outside world considerably,
on average some twenty per cent. The approximation of external tariffs to the CET was,
however, at the same time accompanied by a twenty per cent reduction through the
GATT Kennedy Round negotiations of 1960-62. In 1963, the reduction in internal tariffs
roughly matched the approximation to this GATT negotiated newly imposed external
tariff in these countries. The entire operation of eliminating internal tariffs and fully ap-
proximating to the CET was completed on July 1, 1968, one and a half year ahead of
schedule.Tax» simulation 147
Table 7.1 Average ad-wi/orem (equivalents of) tariff barriers (1958) in the industrial


























Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and




Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing,
leather and footwear
Paper and printing products
Rubber and plastic products
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and




Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing.
leather and footwear
Paper and printing products



























































































































































































Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and




Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing,
leather and footwear
Paper and printing products
Rubber and plastic products
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and




Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing,
leather and footwear
Paper and printing products

































































































































































(1)" (2) (3) (4) (5)
13 Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and
metals, other than radioactive 9.0 19.3 3.0 0.63 0.68 9.4
15 Non-metallic minerals and
mineral products
17 Chemical products
19 Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
21 Agricultural and industrial machinery
23 Office and da ta processing machines,
precision and optical instruments
25 Electrical goods
28 Transport equipment
29 Food, beverages and tobacco
42 Textiles and clothing,
leather and footwear
47 Paper and printing products
49 Rubber and plastic products
*' The columns refer to the following information:
(1) Nominal tariffs;
(2) Effective rates of protection;
(3) Nominal tariffs on intermediate goods;
(4) Share of intermediates in the production (1959);
(5) Share of EC-5 imports (1970);
(6) Common External Tariff.
^ Calculated as the unweighted average of country tariff rates, minus 20% Kennedy
Round reductions in tariffs.
^ Estimate; based on information from Deardorf and Stern (1990) and Laird and
Yeats (1990).
Source: A.M. El-Agraa (1980), p. 65, Balassa, (1966), p. 762-63, Eurostat,


































































Table 7.1 also reveals data on effective rates of protection (column 2). This information
was taken from Balassa's (1967) study on nominal tariffs and effective rates of pro-
tection (ERP) in 1959 for the Common Market countries.' We required the information
' We made certain corrections to Balassa's data due to apparent inconsistencies in his
material. First of all, Balassa's data on nominal tariff rates show a considerable variation for the
BENELUX countries. This is a most peculiar finding, since these countries had established a
customs union already as early as 1948 and were supposed to have identical tariffs. Therefore,
we did not use Balassa's estimates of these tariff rates and had to avail of El-Agraa's (1980)150 C/ioprer7
on effective rates of protection to calculate the nominal tariffs on intermediate inputs.
Since Balassa's effective rates of protection were based on Eurostat's first (1959) series of
/npuNOufpw/ Tabks for the EC-5 region, we were able to use the input-output coeffi-
cients from these tables to calculate nominal tariff rates on intermediate inputs. We ob-
tained these nominal tariffs on intermediate inputs using the well-known formula for
the ERP (see, e.g., lindert (1986)), i.e.,
ERF = **^ (7.1)
in which: ERPj = effective rate of protection in sector i, tj = nominal tariff on sector i
goods, t: = nominal tariff on intermediate input from sector ;', and, finally, a^ is an in-
put-output coefficient that represents the value added share of intermediate input ; in
sector i. We used the /npuf-Ourpwf Tab/es to obtain information about ajj and were thus
able to obtain estimates of t. Obviously, all the usual qualifications and criticisms apply
to the use of the above formula for effective protection, most notably the criticism that
the assumption of fixed input-output coefficients for situations of both protection and
trade is not particularly realistic. This is an assumption that leads to an unpredictable
bias.*
Table 7.1 also lists the share of EC-5 imports in each country and the CET for each
sector of industry. These data have been included in the table in order to facilitate the
interpretation of our simulation results.
The information discussed above confined itself to a presentation of nominal and ef-
fective tariffs. Thus, we reduced the establishment of the customs union to a mere exer-
cise in tariff realignments. However, it should be recalled that, during the transition
period, tariffs were not the only trade impediment that were removed between Member
States. We should mention in particular the removal of internal quota's, which were not
compliant with the Rome Treaty. Art. 3, title a, in principle called for the abolition of all
customs duties, quantitative restrictions and all trade measures having a similar effect.
In our simulation experiments reported below, we were not able to simulate the effects
of the abolition of internal quota's, simply because quantitative information on the
effects of quota's were not available.
7.2.2 Non-fan^ barriers and r/w 1992 programme
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) may be defined as all government measures not being tariffs
and quota's, that affect volume, structure and direction of international trade in goods
and services. NTBs may take a host of forms, among others, they usually refer to
variable import levies, (in-)voluntary export restraints (VERs), discriminating govern-
ment procurement policies, countervailing and anti-dumping duties, technical standards,
frontier delays, differences in VAT rates, and so on. In the EC, things like quota's and
all kinds of import levies have been abolished with the creation of the customs union in
the 1960s. However, in 1985, it was realised, that many barriers still existed in the Corn-
estimates. Balassa's relationship between ERPs and nominal tariffs was subsequently imposed
on El-Agraa's nominal tariffs, which resulted in our own estimates of ERPs. Strange as it may
sound, these did not deviate from Balassa's estimates in a large number of cases. Second/y,
Balassa's sector classification is more detailed than ours, so we had to calculate average tariffs
for a number of sectors. • •
* See Balassa (1967), p. 764.simuJafion expen'men/s 151
munity. In that year, the EC Commission published its so-called White Paper "Compfe-
fmg tfie /«terna/ Marfer, which contained a list of almost 300 non-tariff barriers to trade.
These were considered to be at the basis of the fragmentation of the European market
and were held responsible for Europe's losing competitive ground to the Americans and
the Japanese. The White Paper particularly emphasised physical barriers (like border
controls), fiscal measures (like VAT and excise tax differences), and technical and other
regulatory barriers (standards and product testing).
The impact of all barriers distinguished in the White Paper is simply to raise the cost
of production of goods and services (intermediate and final) and to restrict the ability of
enterprises to compete both internationally and against firms from the EC. With the
adoptation of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the first major amendment of the
Rome Treaty, the EC adopted a comprehensive plan to do away with the bulk of its
non-tariff barriers. The SEA stipulated that the Community should aim to complete the
internal market no later than December 31st, 1992.
The EC Commission initiated several studies in which the potential welfare effects of
the completion of the internal market have been evaluated, the Cecchini report and the
more detailed Emerson report (1988) being the most well-known. The Emerson report
primarily discusses microeconomic effects of the completion of the internal market, and
makes the familiar distinction between short-term or static (stage 1 and 2) and long-
term or dynamic effects (stage 3 and 4). >
NTBs may statistically be represented in several forms (see, among others, Laird and
Yeats (1990), ch. 2). The usual methodology applied in empirical studies to quantify
non-tariff barriers is either coverage ratios or so-called tariff equivalents.^ The most im-
portant drawback of the use of coverage ratio is their inability to quantify the economic
effects of the application of non-tariff barriers. To make these inferences, one will need
the price impact of the non-tariff barriers.*
Estimates of the price effects of the completion of the internal market programme on
a sectoral and country basis are not readily available in the literature. Although many
aspects of internal market completion have been discussed at great length in the S/««fres
on ffie Cost o/ Non-Europe (CEC, 1988) for individual measures or sectors, a detailed ac-
count of expected price changes for all sectors and all countries is lacking. The most
complete source in this respect is the Cawley and Davenport (1988) study on the partial
equilibrium effects of internal market barriers in the EC, in which an attempt is made to
estimate the expected cost reductions due to the internal market programme. Although
these authors immediately admit that the use of a partial equilibrium analysis conceals
possible spill-overs between sectors and that a general equilibrium approach would
therefore be preferable, they were forced to work with a partial equilibrium model for
each sector under consideration, since general equilibrium exercises are simply not
•* Cbrerage ratios result from the "inventory approach" to non-tariff barrier measurement. The
most notable example of this approach is UNCTAD's Data Base on Trade Measures, which con-
tains detailed information concerning the nature of measures, at who or what it is directed, and
as of when it has been in effect.
* The calculation of tariff equivalents of NTBs is also fraught with many difficulties. Apart
from the fact that different definitions and methods are employed by different authors, NTB ad
pa/orem tariff equivalents seem to be extremely unstable and vary from year to year. A notable
example that immediately comes to mind is the textiles and clothing sector, where NTBs have
been tightened to a large extent in the last two decades and in which the incidence of NTBs has
consequently changed significantly. In addition, several new NTBs have been added to the
existing list.152 Owpter 7
available in the literature. Cawley and Davenport are also not able to disentangle the
interaction effects of all individual barriers which are involved in the 1992 programme,
and therefore acknowledge the possibility of overlaps and double counting. Finally, they
distinguish between cosf and pnce reductions. In sectors characterized by significant
market imperfections, prices may be expected to fall further than cost reductions, reflec-
ting the reduction in excess profits due to increased technical efficiency and fiercer com-
petition.
Cawley and Davenport present sectoral data on price reductions for the entire Com-
munity. They distinguish three stages in the liberalisation process. The first two stages
deal with static effects of the internal market, the third with dynamic effects. Below, we
shall focus only on the first two stages.^ In stage 1, administrative (border) formalities
which result in higher costs for producers, public authorities and consumers are abo-
lished. For firms, these costs, among others, consist of the internal administrative costs
borne by importing and exporting firms, which include the staff and the paper work
associated with importing and exporting. In addition, firms bear external costs, such as
the costs of hiring the services of customs agents. Finally, the loss of time due to delays
caused at the borders could also be used more productively and therefore represents
forgone revenues. For the governments the costs mainly consist of the resources
involved in maintaining and staffing customs posts.
The administrative formalities which are abolished in stage 1 do not only pertain to
border formalities, but also include the impact of the abolition of discriminatory govern-
ment procurement policies on prices. These costs are not confined to the extra outlays
that the government or public authorities must make because they do not buy from the
cheapest source. They also consist of the static welfare loss which is involved in allow-
ing relatively inefficient firms to survive.
Stage 2 emphasizes the reduction in regulatory activity across the countries of the
Community. These differences in regulatory activity, among others, are primarily due to
differences in technical standards which also result in higher costs for firms, public
authorities and consumers. For firms, variation in technical standards imply that various
(unnecessary) duplications in product development will take place, that gains from eco-
nomies of scale cannot be realised, and that companies operate from a narrow national
rather than European or global base, which makes them vulnerable on the world
markets. For governments, the implication of different technical standards are, among
others, that certification and testing procedures should be duplicated, and that they fre-
quently do not get the best goods when buying from national producers. For consu-
mers, all this will result in higher prices as well as losses due to the industries competi-
tive weakness and inefficient structure.
For stage 1, Cawley and Davenport produce two sets of estimates. One set excludes
the impact of the reduction in the prices of intermediate goods, the other set includes
the effect of the reduction of the price of intermediate goods. The second set is derived
using information from Eurostat's Jnpuf-Oufpuf Tab/es. The first data set could be re-
garded as giving nominal tariff equivalents for final goods, whereas the second set
could be considered as giving an indication of the effective tariff equivalents of the bar-
riers concerned. We used the share of intermediate goods in the final goods to calculate
the nominal tariff equivalents for intermediate goods. Thus, we obtained the two series
that we shall need for the simulation experiments.
* Unfortunately, we were not able to simulate the wage effects of the third stage due to
absence of estimated price and cost changes for this stage.erpenmen/s 153
Table 7.2 Tariff equivalents of 1992 non-tariff barriers on final and intermediate goods,
effective tariff equivalents, and value shares
BELGIUM




13 Ferrous and nun-ferrous ores and
metals, other than radioactive
15 Non-metallic minerals and
mineral products
17 Chemical products
19 Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
21 Agricultural and industrial machinery 0.93
23 Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments 0.62
25 Electrical goods 0.74
28 Transport equipment 0.16
29 Food, beverages and tobacco 0.76
42 Textiles and clothing,
leather and footwear 1.04
47 Paper and printing products 0.68
49 Rubber and plastic products 0.75
0.64 0.87 0.59 0.85 154 0.69 0.81 0.65
0.87 0.45 0.85 1.54 0.29 0.55 0.79
0.47 0.21 0.94 Î.34 0.72 0.65 0.71
0.96 0.00 0.59 2.35 0.03 0.59 0.82
0.92 0.94 0.69 1.09 0.41 0.59 0.75
035 0.75 0.88 0.97 0.84 0.68 0.57
0.99 0.54 1.06 1.43 0.77 0.56 0.67
0.64 0.00 0.57 1.50 0.24 0.74 0.66
2.03 034 0.99 3.10 0.29 0.75 0.72
0.44 1.31 1.06 1.22 0.99 0.69 0.57
0.61 0.71 0.83 0.96 0.78 0.73 0.60
1.27 0.42 0.90 1.48 0.53 0.61 0.84
(1) (2) (3)
GERMANY
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.74
0.24
13 Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and
metals, other than radioactive
15 Non-metallic minerals and
mineral products
17 Chemical products
19 Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment 1.18
21 Agricultural and industrial machinery 1.09
23 Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments 0.52
25 Electrical goods 0.54
28 Transport equipment 0.23
29 Food, beverages and tobacco 0.75
42 Textiles and clothing,
leather and footwear 0.92
47 Paper and printing products 0.90
49 Rubber and plastic products 1.00
0.74 0.77 0.73 1.00 1.41 0.93 0.85 0.42
0.77 0.72 1.00 1.41 0.70 0.58 0.58
0.58 0.10 0.77 1.63 0.42 0.71 0.62
0.94 1.37 1.76 2.48 1.19 0.56 0.53
1.25 0.97 0.82 1.48 0.32 0.57 0.49
0.20 0.75 0.74 0.55 0.88 0.58 0.37
0.81 0.25 0.77 0.91 0.62 0.48 0.37
0.68 0.01 0.94 1.50 0.58 0.61 0.53
036 0.83 0.93 2.09 0.43 0.70 0.72
0.58 1.10 0.95 0.63 1.12 0.65 0.49
0.64 1.05 1.10 1.11 1.09 0.63 0.46
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Agricultural and industrial machinery 2.32
Office and dataprocessing machines.
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing,
leather and footwear
Paper and printing products
Rubber and plastic products
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Agricultural and industrial machinery 2.32
Office and dataprocessing machines.
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing,
leather and ftxrtwear
Paper and printing products
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Agricultural and industrial machinery 0.93
Office and data processing machines
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing.
leather and footwear
Paper and printing products




































































































CawJey and Davenport H 988), fables A3, A5, Bl and B2. Eurostat, p
Tafcfes, 2980, Ï9&5, fl«i cww ca/cw/aficms
Notes;
" The columns in the table refer to the following information:
(1) Stage 1 price reduction of goods excluding impact of reduction of prices interme-
diate goods;
(2) Stage 1 price reduction of goods including impact of reduction of prices interme-
diate goods;
(3) Stage 1 price reduction of intermediate goods;
(4) Stage 2 price reduction of goods excluding impact of reduction of prices interme-
diate goods;
(5) Stage 2 price reduction of goods including impact of reduction of prices interme-
diate goods;
(6) Stage 2 price reduction of intermediate goods;
(7) Share of intermediate goods(1985);
(8) Share of EC-12 imports (1985).
*> Data from 1980 inpuf-Oufpuf Tables.
^ Estimated).
As the data on price reductions relate only to the aggregate Community, the Cawley
and Davenport study does not allow us to look at the price reductions in each indivi-
dual country. Clearly, this is an unsatisfactory situation, since it may be expected that
the price reductions will vary in each country. However, since Cawley and Davenport
do provide estimates of the cost reductions in the EC-5 region, we decided to upgrade
or downgrade their figures on EC-5 price reductions with the aid of these figures. We
calculated the ratio of each country's cost reduction relative to the EC-5 average and
multiplied the aggregate EC-5 price reduction in each sector with this ratio. Thus we ob-156 Owpfer 7
tained the price reductions for each country's sectors, both including and excluding the
impact of intermediate goods' price reductions.
The disadvantage of price reductions calculated in this way is that we may over- or
underestimate the true amount of price reductions in some countries. Recall that Cawley
and Davenport argued that prices might be expected to fall more than costs because of
increased competition and technical efficiency. Thus, in member states where competi-
tion and technical efficiency increase more than the EC-5 average, we may understate
the true extent of the price reductions, whereas for the already more competitive
member states we may have overstated the true extent of the price reductions.
For stage 2, Cawley and Davenport also provide two sets of estimates of EC-5 price
reductions, one including and one excluding the impact of the reduction of prices in
intermediate goods. We differentiated these data again by county using the above des-
cribed weights that were obtained from stage 1. In addition, we applied the effective
protection formula in order to obtain nominal tariff equivalents for intermediate goods.
The resulting figures for tariff equivalents of barriers in the final and intermediate
goods markets are presented in Table 7.2.* Columns (1) and (2) of that table reveal the
expected price reductions in stage 1. Column (1) represents the price reduction of final
goods excluding the impact of the reduction of prices of intermediate goods. This infor-
mation is comparable to the final tariffs from Table 7.1. Column (2), which reveals the
expected price reductions including the impact of the reduction of the price of interme-
diate goods, is a kind of effective rate of protection equivalent, and, together with the
information from column (1) and the shares of intermediates, was used to calculate
nominal tariff equivalents for intermediate inputs (see column (3)). Columns (4)-(6)
reveal the same information for stage 2 price reductions.
The data presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 were, together with the information on elas-
ticities of substitution and factor shares, used in our simulations, to the discussion of
which we shall turn now.
7.3 Methodology for simulations
In the integration literature, there have been many attempts to quantify the trade and
welfare effects of the EC customs union. Two approaches to measurement have sur-
faced. Firs//y, there are the so-called ex ante or ana/y/fca/ studies in which knowledge of
all parameters of a concrete model is available for simulation. These ex ante studies have
been applied to the determination of the static welfare effects of customs unions. The
usual procedure in these kind of studies is to acquire estimates of the values of the elas-
ticities of demand and supply for commodities, in conjunction with information con-
cerning the prices of all trade partners as well as information concerning tariffs.® These
data are subsequently used to assess the influence of the declining partner country's
prices. The most important difficulty with this kind of analysis concerns the fact that not
* We compared our information regarding the tariff equivalents of the 1992 non-tariff bar-
riers with the information in Deardorf and Stern (1991), Table A9. These authors calculated ad
ixj/orem tariff equivalents for a large number of countries, including EC-5. In the majority of
cases, the Cawley and Davenport estimates are slightly higher than those of Deardorf and Stern.
The exceptions are ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, food, beverages and tobacco, and
rubber and plastics.
' Reviews of these studies may be found in Mayes (1978).
* The earlier mentioned Cawley and Davenport study is an example of the ex ante approach.Turc simu/afion experiments 157
all information necessary to infer the welfare effects is available, and that our know-
ledge of the determinants of international trade is far from complete.
Second/y, researchers have used so-called ex post models, which may be defined as eco-
nometric models based on historical relationships. It is usually assumed, that these his-
torical relationships do not change during the period under consideration. Therefore, the
econometric model allows the researcher to make forecasts of how the variables of the
model, such as trade flows and GDP and employment would have developed had there
been no customs union, a situation that is usually referred to as the "anfi-monde". The
residual is then imputed to the formation of the customs union, hence also the label resi-
dua/ imputation mef/iod. Clearly, one might expect that the inclusion of more explanatory
variables improves the specification of the anti-monde, but needless to say, the extra-
polation of the historical development prior to the customs union is highly questionable:
several other factors than the formation of a customs union might have been responsible
for the development of the residual.
The simulations presented below have many things in common with the above men-
tioned ex ante studies, but also incorporate elements of residual imputation. Accord-
ingly, they share many of the shortcomings of these models and should therefore be
interpreted with care. Our conclusions may be expected to have the same degree of
reliability as is customary in applied economic research, i.e., there may be some margin
of uncertainty as to the correctness of the figures, but we think their sign and order of
magnitude may be established with reasonable confidence.
At the basis of our simulations is equation (5.5) which measures the short-run wage
effects of the liberalisation of trade. Recall that
;,(^ 4> oL. - o' .
The long-run wage response to the creation of the customs union can is given by:
w= Za^ (73)
where the weights are determined as:
with A.j' = share of the labour force working in sector r and e^ = - Aj/0j, = elasticity of
labour demand in sector i.
The next step involves the establishment of a relevant anti-monde. Since we have
historical data on actual developments of wages, a comparison of the actual and pre-
dicted values might give an idea of the integration effects, i.e., the residual of calculated
and actual wages is imputed to the establishment of the customs union.
We start with an analysis of the sign-determining elasticities of substitution and
factor shares for both 1970 and 1985. Consider Table 7.3 where we have listed the calcu-
lated values of e^oj^-oy/Aj and Ij8jq.{l+(oj^.-o^,,.)/(ai^-oj,)J for all five countries.
These two terms measure the responsiveness of Wages for changes in final goods prices
and prices of intermediates, respectively. Several inferences can be made on the basis of
this table. , .Table 7.3 ^determining elasticities of substitution and factor ahareK 1970 and 1985
1970:
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines.
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
Paper and printing products







































































































































The columns have the following meaning:
(i) = e^jj/A
(2) = 6Table 73
1985
Perrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
Paper and printing products
Rubber and plastic products

















































































































































Firs< of a//, note that all these terms are positive, except in a few cases', which implies
that wages will respond positively to increases in final goods prices and negatively to
changes in the prices of intermediate goods. Second/y, note that the values of the second
term are all less than unity, which implies that the wage response to changes in the
prices of final goods is quantitatively stronger than the wage response to changes in the
prices of intermediate goods. Fz'na//y, note that, in general, the responsiveness of wages
to changes in both the prices of final goods and intermediate goods, is stronger in 1985
than it is in 1970. This is the result of (generally) increased values of the own elasticities
of substitution in 1985.
The next step is to substitute the price changes into equation (7.2). For the customs «mow,
we proceeded as follows. Referring back to our discussion of price changes in Chapter
5, we assumed that price changes could be calculated as the weighted average of
partner and non-partner country price changes, i.e.,
p = O2P2 + O)p3
where Oj are the weights (import shares) pertaining to partner and non-partner
countries, and p; are partner and non-partner country price changes due to the esta-
blishment of the customs union or the implementation of the internal market program-
me. We assumed that this formulae could be applied to both final goods' prices and
intermediate goods' prices.
With the aid of the above formulae we calculated the price changes for the the cus-
toms union implementation. In this respect, it was assumed that partner country prices
decline with the full amount of the pre-union tariff. For non-partner country prices, we
assumed that these would change with the full amount of the realignment of home
country tariffs to the ŒT. For Benelux countries and Germany this implied increases in
non-partner prices, and for France and Italy, this implied reductions in non-partner
country prices. Both partner country price reductions and non-partner country price
changes were weighed with the import shares 02 and 03.
In order to find the price changes due to the implementation of the 1992 project, we
did not make use of the above formulae. In stead, we directly inserted the final and
intermediate goods price changes from Table 7.2 in our simulations.
7.4 Static effects: the creation of the customs union
We proceeded differently in order to calculate the effects of the customs union on the
one hand and the effects of the 1992 programme on the other. Let us first discuss the
effects of the customs union. Since the available data for most countries start in 1970,
we propose to construct the anti-monde of the customs union for that year, even though
the customs union was completed in 1968. More specifically, the anti-monde could be
created by undoing the imposition of the CET and by assuming that all Member States
would return to the pre-customs union situation. A comparison of wage dispersion
between the anti-monde and the existing situation in 1970 could then be used to infer
the wage effects of the establishment of the customs union.
' These cases can be explained quite easily. In the Dutch agricultural and industrial
machines sector, the second term is negative due to relatively large values for o ' . The same is
true for the Belgian electrical goods sector in 1985. In the Belgian paper and printing industry,
the absolute value of of, is smaller than that of o{^,, causing the first term oj^.-ojj < 0 in 1985.Table 7.4 Changes (%) in prices of final goods (p), intermediate goods
monde
and in nominal wages (w); customs union anti-
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS:
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
Paper and printing products



























































































































































































9.7 5.2 16.4 3.2 2-8 4.2 14.0 6.8 27.2 1^2 7.8 253 95 6.2 153162 C/wpfer 7
In Table 7.4 we present the anti-monde changes in nominal wages for the sectors and
countries of our analysis. Note /i'rsf/y, that these changes in nominal wages are consider-
able in a number of cases, well in excess of 10 per cent. Thus, it seems that tariffs have
conferred a considerable amount of protection to the labour of all EC-5 countries.
Although this might seem unreasonable, it should be recalled that our bounds of magni-
tude for the wage effects are smaller than the results found by Kohler (1991). Recall
from Chapter 4 that he found substantial factor price effects for specific factors, which
in a number of cases exceeded 100 per cent. In addition, recall from the same chapter
that Kohli (1991) also found Stolper-Samuelson elasticities in excess of 1. Therefore, it
seems fair to say that tariffs have had a profound effect upon the nominal wages of
workers in EC-5 countries.
Second/y, consider the nominal wage responses to the implementation of the cus-
toms union. Tariff-prone countries like France and Italy, which were at the same time
low-wage countries, would experience the largest increases in nominal wages if the cus-
toms union would be abolished. Conversely, the high-wage and tariff-shy countries like
Germany and The Netherlands would experience comparatively moderate wage in-
creases. The moderate wage responses in Germany, which are related to the low level of
nominal protection, are reinforced by relatively low rates of effective protection due to
comparatively high tariffs on intermediate goods. In some cases (non-metallic minerals
and agricultural and industrial machinery), the German anti-monde wages would even
be lower than would be the case in the presence of the customs union. This is primarily
due to tariffs on intermediates exceeding those on final goods. In Belgium and The
Netherlands, the effective rates of protection are all positive and the difference between
nominal tariffs on final and intermediate goods are relatively large compared to Ger-
many, causing the wage responses in these countries to be larger than is the case in
Germany.
T/iird/y, to get an idea of the changes in real wages (expressed in domestic curren-
cies), assume that the change in the consumer price index is some kind of average of
the final goods price changes listed in the table. Note that nominal wage increases are in
all but a few cases larger than the average change of final good prices. This finding
holds true for all EC-5 countries. Consequently, workers in most sectors are confronted
with increases in their real wages, and the 1958 tariff protection also seems to have con-
ferred a considerable amount of real wage protection to the workers. Quantitatively, the
biggest real wage increases occur in France and Italy, whereas the smallest real wage in-
creases occur in Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany.
The implication of this highly diffuse pattern of nominal and real wage increases is that
abolishing the customs union would lead to a convergence of wages among EC-5 coun-
tries in at least some sectors. If we would reverse this argument, then it could easily be
concluded that the establishment of the customs union must have produced a diverging
trend in EC-5 wages in these sectors.
However, such a conclusion would be highly premature. The low-wage countries'
stronger wage response is in part due to higher price increases in these countries as a re-
sult of the anti-monde. Therefore, the establishment of the anti-monde in these countries
would generate higher levels of inflation than will be the case in the other countries.
Consequently, their PPP exchange rates would depreciate. In Germany, Belgium and
The Netherlands the opposite would occur and their PPP exchange rates would appre-
ciate. If we take these exchange rate reactions into account, the picture that emerges is
revealed by Table 7.5. In that table, we have listed the sector-wise coefficients of
variation of wages for three situations. These are: 1. the actual coefficient of163
Table 7.5 Coefficients of variation; customs
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS:
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines.
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
Paper and printing products














































































variation as measured in 1970 (see Table 3.7, pp. ?-?); 2. the coefficient of variation of
wages under the assumption that PPP exchange rates do not change; and, 3. the coeffi-
cient of variation of wages under the assumption that the PPP exchange rate changes in
the indicated above.
The data in Table 7.5 give rise to some interesting observations. If we do not adjust
the PPP exchange rates, the imposition of the customs union's anti-monde would result
in higher coefficients of variation in seven cases, and lower coefficients of variation in
five cases. Thus, it could be argued that the customs union produced convergence of
wages in seven industries and a divergence of wages in the remaining five industries.
Note, however, that most of the changes in the coefficients of variation are marginal,
and one could easily maintain that these changes are too small to be significant. Thus, if
we do not correct the PPP exchange rate for different levels of inflation following the
imposition of the customs union's anti-monde, the conclusion must either be that the
customs union had ambivalent effects of a minor order or that the wage effects of the
imposition of the customs union were negligible.
That conclusion would change rather drastically, if we do allow for a correction of
the PPP exchange rates, as columns 4 and 5 reveal. In all cases, the return to the 1959
trade policies would cause a dramatic effect on the coefficient of variation of wages.
Needless to say, the increase in the coefficient of variation is the result of an apprecia-
tion of the low-inflation currencies and a depreciation of the high-inflation currencies.
The DM and the Guilder would appreciate considerably, whereas the Italian Lira and
the French Franc would depreciate considerably. The Belgian Franc would appreciate
marginally. The result of these PPP realignments is that the German and Dutch wage164 C/wpfer 7
would increase significantly, whereas the Italian and French wages, measured at the
corrected PPP exchange rates, would fall significantly below the EC-5 average. Thus, a
return to the 1959 trade policies would significantly reinforce the pre-union wage hierar-
chy of high-wage and low-wage countries. In other words, abolishing the customs union
would substantially increase wages of the high-wage countries, and would only margi-
nally increase the wages of the low-wage countries. Consequently, it may be concluded
that the imposition of the customs union caused a good deal of convergence of real
wages.
We also calculated the long-run effects of the customs union's anti-monde. In
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 we also reveal the results of these calculations. The strongest price
reactions again occur in France and Italy, the weakest price reactions occur in Germany.
Belgium and The Netherlands have intermediate price increases. Not surprisingly,
France and Italy also experience the highest nominal wage changes, whereas Germany
would witness a very modest wage change. Belgium and The Netherlands are again in
the intermediate range. The long-run international wage dispersion seems to confirm the
short-run trends. If one does not correct the PPP exchange rate, wage dispersion
remains relatively constant. Thus, it could be argued that, in the long run, the customs
union had a negligible effect on international wage differentials. However, if we allow
for a correction of the PPP exchange rate, there is once more clear evidence of wage
convergence.
7.5 Static effects: the programme for the completion of the internal market
To calculate the factor price effects of the 1992 programme, we have used our informa-
tion concerning the price impacts of the NTBs. In the simulation, we assumed that the
abolition of the White Paper barriers took effect immediately and instantaneously in
1985. We assumed that the barriers would result in the reductions of procès of final and
intermediate goods which are given in Table 7.2. For the price reductions of final goods,
we used the information from columns (1) and (4). For the price changes of interme-
diate goods we used the information from columns (3) and (6). The effects of these price
reductions on wages are shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7.
As Table 7.6 shows, the price reactions following the implementation of the internal
market programme are very modest, indeed, certainly in comparison with those follow-
ing the imposition of the customs union's anti-monde. The expected price changes are
less than 4.0 per cent in the vast majority of cases. Consequently, the resulting wage
nominal changes are also moderate, on average something in the vicinity of some two
per cent, with few exceptions exceeding this number. Note that the strongest wage res-
ponses occur in Italy, which also happens to have the largest changes in the prices of
both final and intermediate goods.
If we compare the magnitude of the average reduction in the prices of final goods
with the magnitude of nominal wage changes, we may conclude that the real wage
changes are negative in the vast majority of cases. In addition, note that these real wage
changes are very modest, at least in comparison with the changes induced in the cus-
toms union simulation.Table 74 Changes (%) in prices of final goods (p), Intermediate goods ($ and nominal wages (tir); internal market
B D F 1 NL
qW pqW £ q # p $ # PA
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS:
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive
Non-metallk minerals and mineral products -
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machinery
Office and dataprocessing machines,
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
Paper and printing products
Rubber and plastic products
LONG-RUN EFFECTS:





















































































































































































Table 7.7 Coefficients of variation; internal i
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS:
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores
and metals, other than radioactive
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products
Chemical products
Metal products, except machinery
and transport equipment
Agricultural and industrial machiner)'
Office and dataprocessing machines.
precision and optical instruments
Electrical goods
Transport equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
Paper and printing products






























































Table 7.7 reveals the coefficients of variation. If we do not correct the PPP exchange
rate, the dispersion of wages shows no change in ten out of twelve cases, whereas in
two cases the implementation of the internal market programme would result in a di-
vergence of wages. However, in both cases the coefficient of variation increases from
0.09 to 0.10, which is a negligible change. All in all, it seems fair to say that, at constant
PPP exchange rates, the internal market programme has a negligible effect on the dis-
persion of wages.
In case we allow for a correction of the PPP exchange rate, this conclusion hardly
changes. As one may observe from columns 4 and 5, there will be a convergence of
wages in two cases, a divergence in eight cases, and a neutral result in the remaining
two cases. Again, it should be noted that the changes in the magnitude of wage disper-
sion are extremely small and may be too small to be statistically significant. Therefore, it
seems quite safe to conclude that the implementation of the internal market programme
will not result in large changes in the international hierarchy of wages.
The long-run effects of the internal market programme are revealed by the bottom
lines of Tables 7.6 and 7.7. Note that these effects are very modest, indeed. Inspection of
the coefficients of variation in Table 7.7 reveals that the internal market programme has
no effects whatsoever for the dispersion of wages. Therefore, we cannot conclude that,
in the long run, the internal market programme has a distinct influence on the magni-
tude of international wage differentials.
How plausible are our results concerning the wage effects of the internal market? Un-
fortunately, we found only one study indicating bounds of magnitude for the expectedsimu/ation expérimente 167
wage changes: Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1991) analyzed the factor demand effects
of the completion of the internal market using a general equilibrium model containing
elements of imperfect competition. They considered two policy experiments, notably a
reduction in trade barriers due to the implementation of the internal market programme
on the one hand and a reduction of trade barriers combined with true market integra-
tion on the other. They first considered the effects of these experiments on factor
demands in each country at constant factor prices. Subsequently, it was assumed that
factor markets would clear, and factor price consequences of the experiments were cal-
culated.
like our own model, Gasiorek, Smith and Venables' model is also characterized by
the use of intermediate goods. However, as far as the primary factors of production are
concerned, they assume that the economy is endowed with quantities of four factors of
production: capital, professional, scientific and managerial labour, other non-manual
labour, and manual labour. The authors assume that categories of labour are mobile
between various industrial sectors. Rather than estimating the parameters of their
model, they calibrate them using Eurostat's Detailed National Accounts database.
As far as the experiment of reduced trade barriers is concerned, they find increases
in factor demands in all countries, except for Italy and the UK, where the demand fro
some factors decreases. Professional etc. labour demand increases most in Germany and
the UK. Non-manual labour demand increases strongest in Italy. The quantitative im-
portance of these changes, however, is only modest: a few per cents. That is even more
true for the factor price reactions, which are minimal. In three countries, France, Ger-
many and Italy, the price of manual labour was found to increase, the highest increase
being 0.80 per cent (Germany) and the lowest increase being 0.03 per cent (France).
Also, the price of professional etc. labour is found to increase in France and Germany
(0.27 and 0.89 per cent, resp.), and seems to decline in Italy (-0.49). Other non-manual
labour's wages, finally, decreases in France and Germany (-0.12 and -1.02 per cent,
resp.) and increases in Italy (0.11 per cent).
In their second policy experiment, which entailed the reduction of trade barriers
and the integration of various national markets, the order of magnitude of the factor
price changes hardly differs from the first experiment. Thus, if we summarize the re-
sults obtained by Gasiorek, Smith and Venables, then we may safely conclude that the
labour market effects of the internal market programme are not particularly spectacular.
On the contrary, their results seem to indicate that the changes following the implemen-
tation of the internal market are not very likely to cause serious labour market dis-
ruptions.
That conclusion must also be true for our own internal market programme simula-
tion. Therefore, our results are not at odds with other estimates of the wage effects of
the internal market, that were obtained with a different kind of model.
7.6 A critical assessment of our results
Our results are vulnerable for criticism on a number of grounds. Firs/ of all, as far as
our customs union simulation is concerned, we have based ourselves upon the (unrea-
listic) assumption that the only effect of economic integration in Europe consisted of a
discriminatory tariff removal. Yet, as we saw before, tariffs were only one kind of trade
impediment that were removed in Europe. Needless to say, this is a highly unsatis-
factory premise, but the complete absence of data on both trade coverage and tariff
equivalents of quota's and trade measures having a similar effect for all sectors preclu-168 Owpfer 7
ded any statements pertaining to the factor price effects of these measures. Many econo-
mists, however, would say that these effects have been at least as important as the ef-
fects of the elimination of tariffs. Our results therefore underestimate the true factor
price effects of the establishment of the customs union on this score.
Second/y, terms of trade effects are ignored in our analysis. It is not possible to take
into account the reactions of third countries who did not become member of the cus-
toms union. Yet it is likely that third countries' prices have responded to the both the
creation of the customs union and the implementation of the 1992 programme, since
both changes constituted a change in external protection levels. Some third countries
may have decided to absorb these changes into lowering profit margins rather than
changing their prices.
That brings us to the more general problem of the translation of tariff changes into
prices. We have assumed that both decreases and increases in protection levels are fully
passed-through into prices. That may not necessarily the case. In addition, the accuracy
of our forecasts depends to a large extent on the reliability of our elasticities. However,
as Waelbroeck (1977) points out, the reaction of business to tariff changes may differ
from that of an equivalent price change. In the case tariff changes are not fully passed
through, our results might overestimate the wage effects of economic integration
considerably.
T/i/rd/y, our analysis does not take into account the impact of dynamic effects. How-
ever, the impact of these effects might be considerable. The reasons for the omission of
dynamic effects are twofold. Fzrsf/y, estimates of the expected price reductions due to
economies of scale or increased competition are lacking. No author has so far tried to
produce any. S«row<i/y, capturing the impact of economies of scale or increased competi-
tion requires a different modelling approach, since these effects usually involve the exis-
tence of market imperfections. However, our model does not incorporate these elements
of imperfect competition and is therefore ill-equipped to make any plausible predictions
as to the distributional effects of, say, economies of scale. As Helpman and Krugman
(1985) have shown, the model might be amended to incorporate exferna/ economies of
scale, but as these authors also showed, the general equilibrium model of trade cannot
be adapted to deal with the impact of internal economies of scale, which are typical for
most imperfect markets. Needless to say, our neglect of the impact of these dynamic
effects results in a bias whose sign and magnitude is unknown.
Fowr//j/y, one might object to the treatment of non-traded goods.™ Our model is
formulated as if non-tradeable goods do not exist. This means that our model contains a
deficiency in its specification. However, as Woodland (1988) has shown, non-traded com-
modities can easily be netted out and the results need not be biased by this omission.
Related to the issue of the omission of the non-traded goods sector is the limitation
of our analysis to manu/acfurm^ wages. In other words, we did not pay any attention to
the importance of developments in the various service sectors, even though the quanti-
tative significance of this sector is considerable, indeed, and growing. The reason for
this omission is a simple one: suitable wage data for the service sectors are just not
available for a sufficiently long period of time. Therefore, it is impossible to analyze the
extent to which developments in manufacturing carry over to the service sector.
Fi/Wt/y, our analysis focused exclusively on the liberalisation of trade, and did not
take account of the fact that the integration process in the EC went above and beyond
the stage of a mere commodity trade liberalisation process. Thus it could be argued that
10 C/. Woodland's (1988) comment on Wong's paper.Ta» srmuiaffon expen'menfs 169
our simulations underestimate the true extent of wage convergence, since factor move-
ments are usually considered to be substitutes to trade in commodities. Commenting on
the international convergence of wages, Learner (1992) suggested that increased foreign
capital formation inevitably should have lead to American wages converging with those
in other countries. In the European context, Molle (1991, ch. 10) found that direct invest-
ments tended to flow from the richer nothern European countries to the poorer
southern European countries, producing a movement in the direction of wealth conver-
gence. Assuming that marginal labour productivities depend on K/L ratios, we may
postulate that these capital flows would also tend to generate a movement in the
direction of international wage convergence. Similar remarks hold for the migration of
labour. As Molle (1991, ch. 9) shows, intra-EC-5 labour migration has become less im-
portant as the integration process proceeded, but migration from third countries to the
high-wage EC-5 countries has been considerable. In itself, this labour immigration has
tended to produce a movement in the direction of wage convergence as well.
Our remarks concerning factor mobility implicitely assume that factor movements
and trade are substitutes (see Mundell (1957)). Alternatively, it could be argued that
factor movements and trade in goods are complements in the context of the EC. Conse-
quently, as Markusen (1984) has shown, the factor price equalisation result need not
occur, and factor prices might diverge as a result of free trade. Our results would, in
that case, overestimate the true amount of wage convergence. However, as Molle (1994)
points out, no clear evidence of complementarity has been found in the EC context.
Thus it seems fair to assume that trade and factor movements have been substitutes and
that our simulations under- rather than overstate the true amount of wage convergence
due to the integration process.
Sixf/i/y, it should be noted that our simulations refer to an mterna/ liberalisation
process in the EC and that we did not take the external liberalisation of EC trade ade-
quately into account. Yet this external dimension has played a considerable part. In the
last two decades, the EC participated in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of GATT nego-
tiations and concluded a variety of trade agreements with different parts of the world.
In Europe, Mediterranean countries obtained free trade agreements or association status,
for the developing world LOME and GSP regimes are in force, and with the former
socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe association and partnership and coope-
ration agreements have been concluded or are currently under negotiation. Needless to
say, all these liberalisations of external EC trade will have implications for intra-EC
wage differentials. Although our model in principle enables us to analyze the wage ef-
fects of these external trade liberalizations, data considerations precluded us from con-
ducting the relevant policy simulations. Nevertheless, on the basis of our two policy
simulations, we think it is reasonable to assume that these external trade liberalisations
may contribute significantly to a convergence of (EC-5) wages.
SeuCTif/i, for obvious reasons we did not pay any attention to the effects of EC inte-
gration on third countries' wages. To do so implies that we would have to model these
economies as well and that would go beyond the scope of the present research project
and could very well be a project on its own. On the basis of our model, no fl priori state-
ments concerning the external wage effects of EC integration would be highly specula-
tive.
Erg/rt/j, the present model does not allow us to assess the wage effects of changes in
the institutional framework of the EC-5 member states. Yet it is unlikely, that the inte-
gration process did not have an influence on the nature and functioning of these institu-
tions. In this respect, we may refer to a study by Larre and Torres (1991), who exa-
mined the catch-up of Spain, Portugal and Greece's GDP per capita. According to these170
authors, the economies of the southern member states were at the beginning of the
1970s characterized by weak economic and social institutional structures. Their member-
ship of the EC forced them to increase the pace of structural adjustment, to improve the
functioning of markets, to introduce market reforms and microeconomic policy reforms,
and to improve the economic infrastructure. These policy changes subsequently stimu-
lated the inflow of foreign direct investment, improved the working of factor and com-
modity markets and so contributed to the economic performance of these countries. The
authors conclude that the catch-up of the southern member states depended to a large
degree on the development of market mechanisms and the improvement in the quality
of the social and economic infrastructures. Obviously, the influence of these factors can-
not be quantified in our model, but might have played a considerable role in the case of
Italy as well.
Despite all the possible criticisms and obvious limitations that can be levelled against
our analysis, we believe that the basic message of our simulations is rather insensitive to
different model specifications. That message is that, on the whole, the customs union
produced a considerable amount of wage convergence, in particular compared to the
experience of the internal market programme. The reason for this seems to be extremely
simple, notably that the customs union represented much farther-reaching integration
than anything which has come above and beyond it. This would also explain the find-
ing in Chapters 3 and 4 that EFTA countries also showed a considerable convergence of
wages and that NAFTA wages diverged in the recent past.
7.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we tried to establish bounds of magnitude for the factor price effects of
both the imposition of both the customs union and the internal market. As far as the
customs union was concerned, we addressed the issue of the wage effects of the imposi-
tion of the CET. Although this implies that we could not produce any meaningful state-
ments as to the effects of other aspects of the customs union (e.g., the abolition of inter-
nal quotas), we believe that our simulation exercises provide a reasonable impression of
what has happened with wages as a result of the customs union. To obtain an impres-
sion of these effects, we analyzed what would happen with the dispersion of wages if
the Member States would decide to undo the customs union in 1970 and would return
to the pre-union (1959) trade policies. We found that, as far as the short-run wage
effects are concerned, that the customs union may have resulted in an impressive
amount of wage convergence. This conclusion was achieved under the assumption of an
adjusted PPP exchange rate. In case one would not want to make the assumption of ad-
justed PPP exchange rates, the conclusion should be that the customs union produced
both convergence and divergence of wages, depending upon the sector under consider-
ation. However, these converging and diverging trends would be extremely small in the
majority of cases, too small to conclude the existence of significant wage effects.
The long-run wage effects of the customs union seem to confirm the short-run
results. Correction of the PPP exchange rate would result in a considerable long-run
convergence of wages, whereas absence of this correction would lead to the conclusion
that the customs union had a negligible effect on international wage dispersion.
As far as the completion of the internal market programme is concerned, we may
point at the following. The internal market programme had a negligible effect on wage
dispersion, both measured at constant and adjusted PPP exchange rates, and both in theTaw simtt/affon expenmenrs 171
short run and the long run. These results proved to be consistent with other studies,
and therefore appear to be rather robust.
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the static wage effects produced by the customs
union produced much more wage convergence than the programme to complete the
internal market resulted in. This is hardly surprising, since it could be argued that the
customs union was a much more far-reaching integration attempt than any other inte-
gration measures which have come above and beyond it.CHAPTER
8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The creation of the EEC in the 1960s and the programme to complete the internal mar-
ket in the late 1980s involved exercises that could have had considerable distributional
effects. As the theory of international trade predicts, such changes in the internal and
external protection of a country generally produces "winners" and "losers". This study's
primary purpose was to attempt to isolate the wage effects of the EC's integration pro-
cess on the five main founding countries of the EC (EC-5).
Since the theory of international economic integration has usually based its predic-
tions concerning the factor price effects of integration on the most important theorems
of international trade theory, we started our investigation with a selective review of the
relevant trade literature. We focused primarily on the factor price equalisation model,
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the specific factors model. According to the factor
price equalisation and Stolper-Samuelson models, a liberalisation of trade may be ex-
pected to result in a convergence of factor prices between the trading nations. However,
detailed analysis of the factor price equalisation and Stolper-Samuelson theorems
showed that the assumptions underlying these theorems are rather restrictive, indeed.
Thus to predict that economic integration will result in a full factor price equalisation
would most probably be too optimistic, and all that one could expect is a tendency in
the direction of factor price equalisation. The specific factors model, on the other hand,
predicts that the results of a trade liberalisation will be ambiguous and definitive state-
ments as to the effects for the mobile factor cannot be made without further informa-
tion. In this respect, much seems to depends on the precise nature of production techno-
logy, as well as on factor proportions. All three models served as a basis for our own
empirical analysis.
In Chapter 3, we analyzed the behaviour of wages in the EC-5 region for the 1964-
1989 period. We looked at the behaviour of gross hourly wages, hourly labour costs and
labour costs per manyear. We started that analysis verifying some tendencies found in
the literature on wage structures. In conformity with the results of these studies, our
data reveal a considerable degree of stability and international similarity of wage struc-
tures in the EC-5 countries. Subsequently, we analyzed the question whether our data
reveal any movement in the direction of a convergence or divergence of international
wage differentials. Gross hourly wages, measured in current ECU exchange rates, did
not reveal a good deal of wage convergence in the EC-5 region. However, working with174 Owpfer S
current exchange rates results in interpretation difficulties due to inflation differences
between countries. Therefore, we also analyzed the development of wages in purchasing
power parities. When wages were expressed in purchasing power parities we found evi-
dence a considerable amount of international wage convergence. This convergence is
due to the fact that low-wage countries seemed to catch up with high-wage countries.
In addition, our results indicated that this convergence also takes place if one analyses
other definitions of wages, w'z. hourly labour costs and labour costs per manyear. Al-
though there seems to have been convergence of wages and labour costs, we also found
that wage differentials between countries are rather persistent. In addition, our data
confirmed findings of older studies, which had concluded that there is a remarkable
temporal stability in a country's wage structure, as well as a substantial degree of simi-
larity between the wage structures of various countries.
In Chapter 4 we reviewed the empirical literature on models that could explain the
stability and similarity of wage structures, as well as the development of and the persis-
tence in international wage differentials. We identified several approaches and conclu-
ded that a very small number of authors have systematically attempted to capture the
distributional effects of preferential trading agreements. As far as researchers did study
international wage structures, they have usually done so as labour economists. As far as
international economists have considered the influences of trade on the development of
wages, they have either done so in an ad hoc manner or in a one-country setting. There-
fore, it proved useful to consider the problem of the wage effects of economic integra-
tion with the aid of a trade model that specifically tries to identify these wage effects.
In Chapter 5 we developed our model of the factor price effects of customs unions.
Basing ourselves on the theory of international trade, we distinguished a short-term and
a long-term version of the model. The difference between the short and long run was
formed by the degree of intersectoral factor mobility, which was considered to be absent
in the short-run model. The model incorporated three factors of production, w'z. capital,
labour and intermediate inputs and was formulated in terms of duality. We derived the
comparative statics of the short-run model first, and identified the factors influencing
the sign and pattern of factor price responses to trade policy measures. We found that
an economic integration scheme does not necessarily result in a convergence of wages.
In this respect, the wage effects of integration proved to depnd on the concrete specifi-
cation of technology, factor proportions and the direction of change of final commodity
prices and intermediate input prices. We identified several situations in which the mag-
nitude of international wage differentials could increase after a country enters into an
economic integration scheme with other countries. For example, in case a high-wage
country would owe its high wages to high tariffs and would at the same time have low
values of the own Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution, wages could easily show a
perverse response following a trade liberalisation and might even increase. Conversely,
if tariffs in a low-wage country would be low and if the own Allen-Uzawa elasticities of
substitution would be close to zero, wages in that country could decline following a
trade liberalisation.
In Chapter 6 we estimated the parameters of our model as well as the implied values
of the Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution. To empirically represent the structure of
the economy, we used the translog functional form, which is flexible and has no a priori
restrictions at all. In addition to these advantages, the translog form enables us to derive
easily the elasticities of substitution that we needed for the model simulations. Using
the translog form, we derived explicit share (and therefore conditional factor demand)
equations for all factors of production. The translog cost function was estimated to des-
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found that, as far as the substitution possibilities between pairs of factors are concerned,
that labour and capital were predominantly complements, and that capital and interme-
diates on the one hand and labour and intermediates on the other tended to be substitu-
tes. In addition, we found evidence of a predominantly capital-using and labour-saving
bias in technical progress.
The elasticities of substitution that were estimated in Chapter 6 were used for simula-
tion of the wage responses to the creation of the customs union and the implementation
of the internal market programme in Chapter 7. We started to assess the quantitative
importance of the tariff barriers prior to the customs union and the quantitative impor-
tance of the internal market non-tariff barriers prior to the launching of the 1992 pro-
gramme. In our simulations, we created anti-mondes for both the creation of the cus-
toms union and the internal market. As far as the creation of the customs union is con-
cerned, the results of our experiments indicated that the creation of the customs union
| resulted in a substantial convergence of wages. However, this conclusion was achieved
| under the assumption of purchasing power parity exchange rates that were adjusted for
the changes in prices that occur after a trade policy measure. In case one would not
want to make this assumption, the short-run effects of economic integration are much
IJ less pronounced, i.e., both convergence and divergence seem to occur. In the long run
I these tendencies appear to be confirmed, i.e., with the correction of purchasing power
? parity exchange rates convergence is clearly visible, but without that adjustment there
* seem to be only a minor wage effects following the imposition of the customs union.
; The internal market programme was found to have very small effects on the magni-
i rude of the international wage differential. This conclusion holds irrespective of whether
,• or not we correct the purchasing power parity exchange rate for inflation changes due
• to trade policy measures. In the long run, the internal market programme even fails to
show any effects at all on wage dispersion.REFERENCES
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Het economische integratieproces in de EEG heeft twee belangrijke momenten gekend,
waarop de interne handel in de Gemeenschap in aanzienlijke mate werd geliberaliseerd.
Enerzijds werd in de jaren zestig de douane unie tussen de lidstaten een feit. Anderzijds
werd in de jaren tachtig serieus werk gemaakt met het tot stand brengen van de interne
markt.
De economische théorie van de internationale integratie leert ons, dat dergelijke pro-
cessen van handelsliberalisan'e aanzienlijke effecten kunnen hebben voor de functionele
inkomensverdeling in de integrerende staten. In dit proefschrift staan deze verdelings-
effecten centraal. Meer in het bijzonder tracht het proefschrift een antwoord te geven op
de vraag, welke effecten de intra-Europese handelsliberalisatie heeft gehad voor de
lonen in de lidstaten. Het onderzoek beperkt zich daarbij tot de looneffecten in de vijf
belangrijkste oprichters van de EEG (EG-5).
De centrale vraag, namelijk de vraag naar de looneffecten van het Europese integra-
tieproces, is door de théorie van de internationale integratie altijd beantwoord onder
verwijzing naar de (reële) théorie van de internationale economische betrekkingen.
Daarom begint het eigenlijke onderzoek in hoofdstuk 2 met een overzicht van de meest
relevant geachte handelstheoretische literatuur. Daarbij is overwegend aandacht ge-
schonken aan het factorprijsegalisatie theorema, het theorema van Stolper-Samuelson en
het "specific-factors" model. Volgens het factorprijsegalisatie theorema leidt een vrijma-
king van de internationale goederenhandel tot een internationale gelijkmaking van de
lonen en kapitaalkosten. Het theorema van Stolper-Samuelson, dat kan worden opgevat
als een comparatief-statische versie van het factorprijsegalisatie theorema, leidt tot de
conclusie, dat een verlaging van een invoertarief zal resulteren in een daling van de
prijs van de intensieve factor in de importsector.
Het factorprijsegalisatie theorema en het theorema van Stolper-Samuelson worden in
the economische théorie van de internationale integratie doorgaans geacht van toepas-
sing te zijn op de handelsliberalisatie in de EG, d.w.z. dat door de aanhangers van die
théorie allerwege een convergentieproces van de lonen wordt voorspeld. Nadere bestu-
dering van de literatuur omtrent beide theorema's leert ons evenwel, dat een volledige
egalisatie van de factorprijzen onwaarschijnlijk moet worden geacht en dat men hoog-
stens een tendens tot factorprijsegalisatie kan verwachten. Die conclusie wordt bevestigd
door een studie van de comparatief-statische effecten in het "specific-factors" model,
waaruit blijkt dat de factorprijseffecten vooral afhankelijk zijn van de concrete specifica-
tie van de produktietechnologie en van de factorintensiteiten.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt nagegaan, hoe de lonen zich hebben ontwikkeld in de EG-5
landen in de période 1964-1989. Daarbij is het verloop onderzocht van de bruto uur-
lonen, de arbeidskosten per uur en de arbeidskosten per manjaar voor ISIC en NACE
industriële sectoren op een 2 digit niveau. De gegevens omtrent lonen en arbeidskosten
die in die analyse worden gebruikt, zijn geconverteerd met behulp van twee wissel-
koersdefinities, namelijk de lopende ECU wisselkoers en de koopkrachtpariteit wissel-
koers. Een analyse van de industriële loonstructuur in de EG-5 landen doet enkele inté-
ressante, deels bekende feiten aan het lient komen. Allereerst wordt geconstateerd, dat
de loonstructuur in aile onderzochte landen gekenmerkt wordt door een hoge mate van
stabiliteit. In de tweede plaats blijken de loonstructuren in de verschillende landen een
verrassende mate van gelijkvormigheid te bezitten. Zowel de stabiliteit als de gelijkvor-
migheid van de loonstructuur in verschillende landen zijn in de literatuur uirvoerig
gedocumenteerd. Ten derde blijkt dat internationale loonverschillen tussen landen tot
op zekere hoogte persistent te zijn. LJitgedrukt in de lopende ECU wisselkoers blijkt er
nauwelijks sprake te zijn van een loon- en arbeidskostenconvergentie. Indien de lonen186
en arbeidskosten echter worden uitgedrukt in koopkrachtpariteiten blijkt er sprake te
zijn van een substantiële convergentie. Deze convergentie is vooral terug te voeren op
het feit, dat de lage-lonen-landen in de loop der tijd steeds meer aansluiting hebben ge-
vonden bij de hoge-lonen-landen. Daarnaast kan worden geconstateerd, dat deze ont-
wikkeling zich niet alleen voordoet in de EEG, maar zich ook (wellicht zelfs in sterkere
mate) voordoet in de landen van de EFTA.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een overzicht gegeven van de belangrijkste bijdragen aan de
empirische literatuur, waarin getracht is de waargenomen stabiliteit en gelijkvormigheid
van de loonstructuren te verklaren, alsmede waarin een poging is gedaan de ontwikke-
ling van de internationale loonverschillen te verklaren. De stabiliteit en gelijkvormigheid
van loonstructuren is vooral het onderzoeksobject geweest van arbeidseconomen. In ar-
beidseconomische verklaringen worden de stabiliteit en de gelijkvormigheid van loon-
structuren traditioneel verklaard uit variabelen als het gemiddelde opleidingsniveau in
een sector, het aandeel van vrouwen in die sector, kapitaalintensiteiten, en een aantal
institun'onele variabelen. Daarentegen hebben weinig economen, meestal uit de interna-
b'onaal economische hoek, aandacht besteed aan de verklaring van de ontwikkeling van
internationale loonverschillen. Wanneer aan dit vraagsruk al aandacht wordt besteed,
wordt dat vaak op een ad hoc wijze gedaan en slechts zelden wordt de relatie tussen
internationale loonverschillen en economische intégra tie gelegd. Empirische modellen
gebaseerd op optimaliseringsgedrag van economische subjecten zelfs bijzonder schaars,
hetgeen merkwaardig is indien men bedenkt dat de theorema's van de handelstheorie
juist een dergelijk optimaliseringsgedrag veronderstellen.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een model gepresenteerd waarin de relatie tussen de ontwikke-
ling van loonverschillen en economische integratie centraal staat. Het model komt op
wezenlijke punten overeen met standaardmodellen uit de théorie van de internationale
handel (zoals deze o.a. beschreven zijn in Woodland (1982)). In het model, dat in een
duale formulering wordt gepresenteerd, worden drie produktiefactoren onderscheiden,
te weten arbeid, kapitaal en intermédiaire leveringen, welke op korte termijn geacht
worden sector specifiek te zijn. Op lange termijn zijn arbeid en kapitaal volledig inter-
sectoraal mobiel. Analyse van de comparatieve statica in het korte termijn model leert,
dat de looneffecten van handelspolitieke maatregelen vooral afhankelijk zijn van de pro-
duktietechnologie, alsmede van de factorintensiteiten. Teneinde de looneffecten van eco-
nomische integratie nader in te vullen wordt voorgesteld om de prijsveranderingen, die
optreden nadat een douane unie wordt gevormd, te berekenen als een gewogen gemid-
delde van enerzijds prijsveranderingen die hun origine hebben in partnerlanden van de
douane unie, en anderzijds van prijsveranderingen die hun origine hebben in derde
landen. Het belangrijkste resultaat, dat op basis van het model kan worden afgeleid is,
dat de implementatie van een douane unie niet noodzakelijk hoeft te leiden tot een
loonconvergentie tussen de lidstaten van de douane unie. Met andere woorden, er zijn
situaties denkbaar, waarin de implementatie van een douane unie leidt tot grotere, in
plaats van kleinere internationale loonverschillen tussen de lidstaten. Dit is bijvoorbeeld
het geval, indien de lage lonen in lage-lonen-landen gepaard gaan aan lage invoerbar-
rières en lage waarden voor de eigen Allen-Uzawa partiële substitutie elasticiteiten. In
dat geval zullen de lonen in dit land dalen na de implementatie van een douane unie,
hetgeen een internationale convergentie van de lonen uiteraard ernstig bemoeilijkt.
Omgekeerd kan het voorkomen, dat er in een land met hoge lonen sprake is van hoge
invoerbarrières en lage waarden van de eigen Allen-Uzawa partiële substitutie elastici-
teiten. De instelling van een douane unie zal alsdan leiden tot nôg hogere lonen, het-
geen uiteraard eveneens een internationale loonconvergentie in de weg staat187
In hoofdstuk 6 worden de parameters van het in hoofdstuk 5 besproken model empi-
risch geschat en worden op basis van de parameterschattingen waarden afgeleid voor
de relevante Allen-Uzawa partiële substitutie elasticiteiten. De produktietechnologie van
de verschillende sectoren wordt daarbij in beeld gebracht door translog kostenfuncties.
Dit soort kostenfunctie behoort tot de familie van zg. flexibele functionele vormen, die
geen a pnon restricties opleggen aan de specificatie van de kostenfunctie. De translog
kostenfunctie heeft als belangrijk voordeel, dat de verschillende Allen-Uzawa partiële
substitutie elasticiteiten er eenvoudig uit kunnen worden afgeleid. De translog kosten-
functie wordt in hoofdstuk 5 geschat voor de 13 onderscheiden industriesectoren in
ieder EG-5 land. Wat de waarden van de Allen-Uzawa partiële substitutie elasticiteiten
betreft wordt gecondudeerd dat arbeid en kapitaal in de meerderheid der gevallen moe-
ten worden beschouwd als complementen, terwijl arbeid en intermédiaire leveringen
enerzijds en kapitaal en intermédiaire leveringen anderzijds in de meerderheid der ge-
vallen substituten blijken te zijn. Verder vinden we dat de produktietechnologie wordt
gekenmerkt door een arbeidsbesparende en een kapitaalvermeerderende tendentie.
De in hoofstuk 6 afgeleide waarden van de substitutie elasticiteiten worden in hoofd-
stuk 7 gebruikt voor twee simulatie experimenten. In het eerste experiment wordt nage-
gaan, wat de looneffecten zijn geweest van de implementatie van de douane unie in de
jaren zestig. In deze simulatie worden die effecten verkregen door een vergelijking van
de feitelijke loonontwikkeling met een hypothetische situatie, die ontstaat indien in
douane unie in 1970 zou worden afgeschaft en de EG-5 lidstaten zouden besluiten tot
herinvoering van het uit 1958 daterende handelspolitieke instrumentarium. De condusie
van dit experiment is, dat de douane unie heeft geleid tot een aanzienlijke loonconver-
gentie. Hierbij dient evenwel te worden opgemerkt, dat deze conclusie werd afgeleid
onder de veronderstelling dat de als gevolg van de afschaffing van de douane unie op-
tredende prijswijzigingen zich vertalen in gewijzigde koopkrachtpariteiten. In het geval
men deze veronderstelling niet wenst te maken en uitgaat van ongewijzigde koop-
krachtpariteiten, dan blijkt dat de loonconvergentie veel minder sterk zichtbaar wordt.
In het tweede simulatie experiment wordt nagegaan, wat de looneffecten van het
interne marktprogramma zouden kunnen zijn. Daarbij wordt verondersteld, dat het pro-
gramma in 1985 onmiddellijk zou zijn uitgevoerd. De conclusie waartoe dat experiment
aanleiding geeft is, dat de implementatie van het 1992 programma tot verwaarloosbare
looneffecten leidt en nauwelijks tot enige ontwrichting van de arbeidsmarkten aanlei-
ding zal geven. In enkele industriesectoren treedt er een (overigens geringe) loonconver-
gentie op, in enkele andere gevallen treedt er een (geringe) divergentie op en tenslotte is
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